Stochastic modeling of responsiveness,
schedule risk and obsolescence of space
systems, and implications for design choices by Dubos, Gregory Florent
STOCHASTIC MODELING OF RESPONSIVENESS, 
SCHEDULE RISK AND OBSOLESCENCE OF SPACE 
























In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Doctor of Philosophy in the 











Copyright  2011 by Gregory F. Dubos 
STOCHASTIC MODELING OF RESPONSIVENESS, 
SCHEDULE RISK AND OBSOLESCENCE OF SPACE 






Approved by:   
   
Dr. Joseph H. Saleh, Advisor 
School of Aerospace Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
  
   
Dr. Eric Feron 
School of Aerospace Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 Dr. R. Scott Erwin 
Space Vehicles Directorate 
Air Force Research Laboratory 
   
Dr. Dimitri Mavris 
School of Aerospace Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 Dr. Owen Brown 
Chief Technology Officer 
Kinsey Technical Services Inc. 
   
   
 







First and foremost, I wish to acknowledge with gratitude my debt towards my advisor, 
Dr. Joseph Saleh. From our first informal meeting over a cup of coffee on the Georgia 
Tech campus, to the last steps of my doctoral experience, Dr. Saleh has been a most 
wonderful advisor. His continuous support, advice and enthusiasm about my research 
gave me the courage and the confidence to overcome the doubts and questions inherent to 
the life of a Ph.D student. Through our discussions about abstract concepts and a unique 
work relationship that fostered creativity, Dr. Saleh has offered me invaluable intellectual 
stimulation. His attention to details and subtleties (without ever missing the big picture!) 
has truly enriched my research. I am also very grateful to him for the numerous 
opportunities that he has extended to me, from the conferences that I had the chance to 
attend within the United States as well as internationally, to the several journal papers 
that I published with him and of which I am very proud.  
Dr. Saleh has not only been a great advisor, but also a brilliant mentor. He has passed on 
to me his passion for teaching and exchanging ideas with others, and has shared his 
wisdom about academia and the aerospace industry with me. Some of our discussions 
could span an array of topics as diverse as American history, Italian opera, French 
musician Georges Brassens, Lebanese architecture,… that somehow had always 
connections with engineering that he would unveil before me! Finally, I am very grateful 
to him for his constant availability, for the friendly work environment that he has 




I am also very thankful to all the members of my Ph.D committee, Dr. Eric Feron, Dr. 
Dimitri Mavris, Dr. R. Scott Erwin and Dr. Owen Brown, for their valuable feedback and 
expertise that have enriched the preparation and execution of this thesis. As I realize that 
their time is precious, I am truly honored that they accepted to serve on my Ph.D 
committee. 
 
I would also like to extend my thanks and appreciation to Dr. Jeff Jagoda for supporting 
me since the first day of my graduate studies at Georgia Tech. He has provided me with 
essential academic advice and offered me numerous teaching opportunities that have not 
only made me grow as a graduate student (it is true that you never really know something 
until you teach it!), but that have also played a critical role in the successful completion 
of my curriculum. 
 
By working at the Space Systems Design Laboratory, I had the privilege to interact with 
brilliant students, among which many have become very good friends. I would like to 
thank my fellow labmate Jean-Francois Castet, for his patience in dealing with me during 
stressful times, our interesting (yet fun!) research discussions and for making my Ph.D 
experience so much more enjoyable. I am very grateful to Jarret Lafleur for always 
offering his assistance and his valuable inputs and for bearing with some of my 
unsuccessful jokes. I am also thankful to Joy Brathwaite, for engaging in many candid 
discussions that proved essential to preserve my sanity in my periods of doubt.  
 
 v
Thanks also to my other fellow aerospace graduate students with whom I had the chance 
to interact, and who, by their presence and their personality, contributed to create a nice 
and supporting work environment: Zarrin Chua, Mike Grant, So Young Kim, Gregory 
Lantoine, Chris Tanner, Brad Steinfeldt, Nitin Arora.  
 
I am also very grateful to Claire Perigaud, with whom I started my journey in the United 
States. I would probably not be where I am now without her. She has been an extremely 
positive influence in my life and I am proud to count her as one of my closest friends. 
 
To all my dearest friends in Atlanta: Carlos, Jennifer, Marco, Keith, Ansley, Ellen, 
Lawson, Brenton, Angel, Jenny, thank you so much for making me feel at home. By your 
presence and your friendship, you have made these years the most exciting and 
unforgettable ones of my life. 
 
Finally, I would like to thank my family: my father Francis and my mother Françoise for 
their unconditional love, trust and support in every decision I made; my brother 
Sébastien, his wife Sonia with a special thought to my young nephews Clément, Quentin 
and Timéo, hoping that they can forgive their uncle for not being more often by their side 
as they grow up; and my dear sister Delphine, who knows me better than anyone and who 
has accompanied me in every step of this journey. As a writer herself, Delphine probably 
knows exactly how I am feeling as I am finalizing this dissertation. From my young days 
as a little boy when she taught me to read, to the final stages of my dissertation, Delphine 
 vi
has provided me with her invaluable support, love and encouragements. She thus 
deserves much credit for helping make this thesis possible.  
My deepest thanks to all of you.  
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS........................................................................................................... iii 
LIST OF TABLES....................................................................................................................... xiv 
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................................... xv 
NOMENCLATURE .................................................................................................................... xxi 
SUMMARY............................................................................................................................... xxiv 
1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Motivation.......................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Research objectives and hypotheses.................................................................................. 5 
1.3 Outline and summary of contributions .............................................................................. 8 
2 ON SPACE RESPONSIVENESS AND THE ONSET OF SPACECRAFT SERVICE 
DELIVERY.............................................................................................................................. 11 
2.1 Introduction...................................................................................................................... 11 
2.2 Definition of space responsiveness.................................................................................. 14 
2.3 The three levels of responsiveness .................................................................................. 17 
2.3.1 Global responsiveness ............................................................................................... 17 
2.3.2 Local stakeholder responsiveness ............................................................................. 19 
2.3.3 Interactive or inter-stakeholder responsiveness ........................................................ 19 
2.3.4 Formalization............................................................................................................. 20 
2.4 Schedule compressibility and responsiveness maps........................................................ 21 
 viii
2.4.1 Schedule compressibility........................................................................................... 21 
2.4.2 Responsiveness maps ................................................................................................ 22 
2.5 Levers of responsiveness ................................................................................................. 25 
2.5.1 The launch levers of responsiveness: launch vehicles and launch ranges ................ 27 
2.5.2 The soft levers of space responsiveness .................................................................... 31 
2.5.3 Design and architecture levers .................................................................................. 36 
2.6 TRL, schedule slippage and responsiveness: an example of univariate analysis ............ 44 
2.6.1 Data Description........................................................................................................ 44 
2.6.2 Modeling Schedule Slippage..................................................................................... 47 
2.7 Other readiness metrics for complex engineering systems.............................................. 55 
2.7.1 Integrated Technology Index..................................................................................... 55 
2.7.2 Integration Readiness Level (IRL) ............................................................................ 56 
2.7.3 System Readiness Level (SRL)................................................................................. 58 
2.8 Summary.......................................................................................................................... 59 
3 SPACECRAFT TECHNOLOGY PORTFOLIO: STOCHASTIC MODELING AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR RESPONSIVENESS AND SCHEDULE SLIPPAGE ...................... 62 
3.1 Introduction...................................................................................................................... 62 
3.2 The notion of portfolio in Finances and Research & Development ................................ 65 
3.3 Spacecraft as a technology portfolio................................................................................ 69 
3.4 Probabilistic Model of Spacecraft Time-to-Delivery ...................................................... 73 
3.4.1 Model of Instruments Delivery Schedule.................................................................. 73 
3.4.2 Model of spacecraft Integration & Testing ............................................................... 77 
3.4.3 Model of Spacecraft Shipping Time ......................................................................... 80 
 ix
3.4.4 Monte-Carlo simulations ........................................................................................... 82 
3.4.5 Final Model of Spacecraft Time-to-Delivery............................................................ 85 
3.4.6 Domain of applicability and limitations of the model of time-to-delivery ............... 86 
3.4.7 Metrics of interest...................................................................................................... 88 
3.5 Impact of Spacecraft Portfolio Choice on Mean-Time-To-Delivery and Schedule 
Risk .................................................................................................................................. 90 
3.5.1 Homogeneous TRL case ........................................................................................... 91 
3.5.2 Heterogeneous TRL case........................................................................................... 95 
3.6 Utility Implications of Spacecraft Time-to-Delivery and Portfolio Selection............... 100 
3.6.1 Definition of utility.................................................................................................. 100 
3.6.2 The paradigm shift needed to design for space responsiveness .............................. 103 
3.6.3 Optimal portfolios in the calendar-based design paradigm..................................... 107 
3.7 Summary........................................................................................................................ 111 
4 ON SYSTEM OBSOLESCENCE: MULTIDISCIPLINARY REVIEW OF 
CONCEPTS AND MODELING APPROACHES ................................................................ 115 
4.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................... 115 
4.2 Key concepts.................................................................................................................. 117 
4.3 The drivers of obsolescence........................................................................................... 120 
4.3.1 Technological innovation ........................................................................................ 121 
4.3.2 Network externalities, standardization and compatibility ....................................... 124 
4.3.3 Regulatory changes ................................................................................................. 130 
4.3.4 Disappearance of a need.......................................................................................... 131 
4.4 A multidisciplinary review of obsolescence.................................................................. 133 
 x
4.4.1 Obsolescence in economics..................................................................................... 134 
4.4.2 Obsolescence in Operational Research ................................................................... 137 
4.4.3 Obsolescence in Bibliometrics ................................................................................ 140 
4.4.4 Obsolescence in engineering ................................................................................... 145 
4.5 Summary........................................................................................................................ 150 
5 RISK OF ON-ORBIT OBSOLESCENCE: NOVEL FRAMEWORK, STOCHASTIC 
MODELING AND IMPLICATIONS ................................................................................... 154 
5.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................... 154 
5.2 Facing the consequences of obsolescence or designing for obsolescence?................... 157 
5.3 Obsolescence of space systems: the concept of on-orbit obsolescence......................... 159 
5.4 Markov Chains............................................................................................................... 162 
5.5 Monte-Carlo Simulations............................................................................................... 164 
5.6 Stochastic Model of On-Orbit Obsolescence ................................................................ 165 
5.6.1 Obsolescence model ................................................................................................ 165 
5.6.2 Technology maturation model................................................................................. 167 
5.6.3 Initial conditions...................................................................................................... 170 
5.6.4 Simulations.............................................................................................................. 171 
5.7 Results and Discussion .................................................................................................. 174 
5.7.1 Obsolescence maps.................................................................................................. 174 
5.7.2 Static Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence (SRO) ......................................................... 177 
5.7.3 Two dynamic views of the risk of on-orbit obsolescence ....................................... 180 
5.7.4 Time-to-Orbit or time of first delivery of capability ............................................... 192 
5.7.5 Obsolescence-responsiveness plot .......................................................................... 194 
 xi
5.8 Summary........................................................................................................................ 197 
6 INTEGRATED STOCHASTIC ANALYSES: SPACECRAFT DELIVERY AND ON-
ORBIT OBSOLESCENCE.................................................................................................... 200 
6.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................... 200 
6.2 Development module: model of spacecraft Time-to-Delivery...................................... 202 
6.2.1 Local approach of technology maturation and instrument development ................ 203 
6.2.2 Spacecraft Integration & Testing ............................................................................ 205 
6.2.3 Spacecraft shipping and launch operations ............................................................. 206 
6.2.4 Final state representation of the model of Spacecraft Time-to-Delivery ................ 207 
6.2.5 Comparative examples ............................................................................................ 209 
6.3 Operations module: instrument-centric model of obsolescence.................................... 211 
6.3.1 Instrument obsolescence.......................................................................................... 212 
6.3.2 Calibration of transition probabilities using data: examples ................................... 214 
6.4 Operations module: failure model and replacements .................................................... 217 
6.4.1 Failure model........................................................................................................... 217 
6.4.2 Replacement strategy .............................................................................................. 218 
6.5 An integrated framework for the modeling of spacecraft schedule and on-orbit 
obsolescence .................................................................................................................. 220 
6.5.1 State representation ................................................................................................. 220 
6.5.2 Refinements to the use of the spacecraft utility ...................................................... 222 
6.5.3 Simulation tool with Graphical User Interface (GUI)............................................. 224 
6.5.4 Further directions to validate the integrated framework ......................................... 226 
6.6 Results............................................................................................................................ 228 
 xii
6.6.1 Utility profiles ......................................................................................................... 228 
6.6.2 Calendar Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence and Schedule Risk ................................ 232 
6.6.3 Scenarios and examples of application ................................................................... 234 
6.7 Summary........................................................................................................................ 244 
7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK.......................... 246 
7.1 Summary and contributions........................................................................................... 246 
7.2 Review of hypotheses .................................................................................................... 253 
7.2.1 Hypothesis #1 .......................................................................................................... 253 
7.2.2 Hypothesis #2 .......................................................................................................... 254 
7.2.3 Hypothesis #3 .......................................................................................................... 255 
7.2.4 Hypothesis #4 .......................................................................................................... 256 
7.3 Flexibility of the modeling framework.......................................................................... 256 
7.4 Recommendations for future work ................................................................................ 260 
7.4.1 Data collection......................................................................................................... 260 
7.4.2 Beyond the limitations of the TRL metric............................................................... 261 
7.4.3 Further investigation of time to system integration and testing .............................. 265 
7.4.4 Impact of resource allocations................................................................................. 265 
7.4.5 Implications of on-orbit obsolescence..................................................................... 267 
7.4.6 Concurrent development of design alternatives and implications for 
spacecraft time-to-delivery...................................................................................... 268 
APPENDIX A: LOGNORMAL PROBABILITY PLOTS FOR THE MODEL OF 
SPACECRAFT TIME-TO-DELIVERY................................................................................ 270 
APPENDIX B: ALGORITHMIC STRUCTURE....................................................................... 276 
 xiii
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................... 284 
VITA........................................................................................................................................... 302 
 xiv
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1. Summary of different Technology Readiness Levels......................................... 42 
Table 2. Model parameters for the average schedule slippage in this data set ................. 50 
Table 3. Model accuracy: mean relative schedule slippage and TRL .............................. 51 
Table 4. Model parameters for the maximum schedule slippage in this data set ............. 54 
Table 5. Summary of different Integration Readiness Levels [59]................................... 58 
Table 6. Model parameters for the average Tint (a,b) and the variance of Tint (c) in 
the data set........................................................................................................ 79 
Table 7. Parameters of the lognormal model for the spacecraft shipping time Tship......... 81 
Table 8. Views on obsolescence among different disciplines ........................................ 153 
Table 9. Technology maturation model parameters ....................................................... 169 
Table 10. Standard deviation s of (1 – TSoAon-orbit / Ton-orbit) and error  on the SRO ...... 179 
Table 11. Time-to-Orbit as a function of TRLini ............................................................. 194 
Table 12. Possible spacecraft portfolios combinations yielding MTTDs/c  66 
months ............................................................................................................ 241 




LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Delays and schedule slippage since program start (adapted from GAO-07-
730T) .................................................................................................................. 2 
Figure 2. Schedule growth for various recent NASA missions .......................................... 3 
Figure 3. Average time-to-delivery of spacecraft and corresponding standard 
deviation bars as a function of mission class ................................................... 14 
Figure 4. Illustrative representation of an industry value-chain. End customer and 
various stakeholders (Si). Not all links are represented................................... 17 
Figure 5. Global responsiveness, end-customer, and block diagram................................ 18 
Figure 6. Conceptual improvement of global responsiveness .......................................... 19 
Figure 7. Responsiveness map for a given stakeholder Si................................................ 23 
Figure 8. Responsiveness map and prioritization of improvement efforts ....................... 24 
Figure 9. Summary of levers of responsiveness and their impact (when pulled in the 
“right” direction) .............................................................................................. 26 
Figure 10. Responsiveness and implications of BTO and BTI to launch providers 
and end-customers............................................................................................ 29 
Figure 11. Heritage and learning effects for R = 80% (illustrative) ................................. 41 
Figure 12. Relative Schedule Slippage (RSS) for 28 NASA programs (mean, max, 
and regression analysis) as a function of TRL. ................................................ 49 
Figure 13. Funnel representation of the design and development of a spacecraft 
conceived of as a “portfolio of instruments”.  (Adapted from GAO [70]) ...... 71 
Figure 14. Distributions of Instrument Time-to-Delivery for various values of the 
initial TRL of the instrument (notional)........................................................... 75 
Figure 15. Instruments Delivery Schedule of a spacecraft (notional) .............................. 76 
Figure 16. Model of average duration of Integration & Testing as a function of the 
number of instruments ..................................................................................... 78 
Figure 17. Distribution of the spacecraft shipping time in the data sample and 
associated lognormal fit ................................................................................... 81 
 xvi
Figure 18. Lognormal distributions of the Time-to-Delivery for the instruments, for 
each value of the initial TRL............................................................................ 83 
Figure 19. Lognormal distributions of the spacecraft Integration & Testing Time 
for each value of the portfolio size n................................................................ 84 
Figure 20. Lognormal distribution of the spacecraft Shipping Time................................ 84 
Figure 21. Summary of the model of spacecraft Time-to-Delivery (notional)................. 86 
Figure 22. Final distribution of spacecraft Time-to-Delivery TDs/c with MTTD and 
SR0  (illustrative)............................................................................................... 90 
Figure 23. MTTD as a function of the initial TRL of the instruments (left) and as a 
function of the portfolio size (right)................................................................. 92 
Figure 24. Schedule Risk curves as a function of the TRL of the instruments (n = 
3), for various risk levels.................................................................................. 95 
Figure 25. Mean-Time-To-Delivery for heterogeneous TRL cases with 2 
Instruments....................................................................................................... 97 
Figure 26. Mean-Time-To-Delivery as a function of the degree of TRL-
heterogeneity () .............................................................................................. 99 
Figure 27. Utility provided by the spacecraft until the time-horizon is reached 
(notional) ........................................................................................................ 101 
Figure 28. Cumulative utility as a function of portfolio size  for different time-
horizons (TRLini = 4) ...................................................................................... 102 
Figure 29. The paradigm shift needed to design for Responsive Space (notional) ........ 105 
Figure 30. Cumulative utility over time after development starts,  for various 
portfolio sizes (TRLini = 4) ............................................................................. 107 
Figure 31. Map of optimal portfolio sizes yielding the maximum cumulative utility.... 109 
Figure 32. Cumulative utility versus MTTD for all portfolio combinations (for ops 
= 12; shown on the figure are portfolio sizes 2  n  5) ................................ 110 
Figure 33: Obsolescence under technological innovation (notional) ............................. 123 
Figure 34. Obsolescence under network externalities (example) ................................... 128 
Figure 35: Straight-line depreciation (left) and geometric depreciation (right) ............. 135 
Figure 36. Obsolescence due to “Sudden Death” of the demand ................................... 138 
 xvii
Figure 37. Probability density function for the time-to-obsolescence Tobs ..................... 139 
Figure 38. Synchronous approach (left) and diachronous approach (right) ................... 141 
Figure 39: Citation age distribution ................................................................................ 143 
Figure 40: Half-life of different literatures (adapted from Burton and Kebler, 1960) ... 144 
Figure 41: Traditional product lifecycle curve (adapted from Solomon et al. [168])..... 147 
Figure 42. Transition matrix for a system with four states ............................................. 163 
Figure 43. Typical transition graph for a Markov chain................................................. 163 
Figure 44. State representation of the obsolescence model ............................................ 166 
Figure 45. State representation of the technology maturity model................................. 170 
Figure 46. Representation of the simulation for one single series of spacecraft ............ 173 
Figure 47. Obsolescence map  for Tlife = 5 years and TRLini = 4 (left), or TRLini = 7 
(right) ............................................................................................................. 175 
Figure 48. Static Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence for the various values of the 
model parameters and corresponding 95% confidence intervals................... 178 
Figure 49. Illustration of the calculation process of the Lifetime Risk of On-Orbit 
Obsolescence.................................................................................................. 182 
Figure 50. Lifetime Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence for TRLini = 4 and TRLini = 7 
(Tlife = 5 years)................................................................................................ 183 
Figure 51. Lifetime Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence and 95% confidence intervals 
at t’ = 1, 30 and 60 months after launch, for TRLini = 4 and TRLini = 7 
(Tlife = 5 years)................................................................................................ 184 
Figure 52. Illustration of the calculation process of the Calendar Risk of On-Orbit 
Obsolescence.................................................................................................. 187 
Figure 53. Calendar Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence for Tlife = 5 years  and TRLini = 
4 (left) vs. TRLini = 7 (right) ........................................................................... 189 
Figure 54. Calendar Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence for TRLini = 7  and Tlife = 2 
years (left) vs. Tlife = 7 years (right) ............................................................... 190 
Figure 55. First delivery to orbit for Tlife = 5 years and TRLini = 4 (left) vs.  TRLini = 
7 (right) .......................................................................................................... 193 
 xviii
Figure 56. Illustration of the trade-off between initial CRO and time of first 
delivery of capability ..................................................................................... 194 
Figure 57. Example of an Obsolescence-Responsiveness plot....................................... 195 
Figure 58. Spacecraft lifecycle and the impact of design choices on time-to-delivery 
and time-to-obsolescence ............................................................................... 201 
Figure 59. Global approach of instrument time-to-delivery (notional) .......................... 203 
Figure 60. Local approach of instrument time-to-delivery............................................. 205 
Figure 61. Model of spacecraft Integration & Testing duration (notional) .................... 206 
Figure 62. Model of spacecraft Integration & Testing duration (notional) .................... 207 
Figure 63. State representation of the model of spacecraft Time-to-Delivery, for 
illustrative purposes only. .............................................................................. 208 
Figure 64. State representation of the obsolescence model for each portfolio 
instrument....................................................................................................... 213 
Figure 65. Spatial resolution of surface imaging sensors since 1970. Adapted from 
Kramer [201].................................................................................................. 214 
Figure 66. Range precision of radar altimeters sensors since 1970. Adapted from 
Kramer [201].................................................................................................. 216 
Figure 67. Spatial resolution of Synthetic Aperture Radars since 1975. Adapted 
from Kramer [201]. ........................................................................................ 217 
Figure 68. State representation of the functionality status of each portfolio 
instrument....................................................................................................... 218 
Figure 69. State representation of the complete integrated framework for a 
spacecraft portfolio of ninst = 3 instruments (illustrative)............................... 221 
Figure 70. Graphical User Interface (GUI) of the simulation tool ................................. 226 
Figure 71. Examples of utility profiles for a 3-instrument portfolio .............................. 229 
Figure 72. Examples of utility profiles for a series of spacecraft of Tlife = 4 years 
and ops = 20 years.......................................................................................... 232 
Figure 73. Calendar obsolescence – Schedule risk plot.................................................. 233 
Figure 74. Schedule risk of exceeding 96 months and average cumulative utility 
after Tlife= 2 years for spacecraft portfolios of size ranging from 1 to 4 
instruments ..................................................................................................... 235 
 xix
Figure 75. Spacecraft portfolios resulting in a schedule risk lower than 5 % for the 
96-month delivery requirement...................................................................... 236 
Figure 76. Number of spacecraft portfolios meeting the 5 % schedule risk 
constraint as a function of the time remaining until the targeted launch 
opportunity. .................................................................................................... 237 
Figure 77. MTTD vs. average cumulative utility for all the various 2-instrument 
spacecraft portfolios, ops = 15 years after development start (for the 1st 
satellite of the series)...................................................................................... 240 
Figure 78. Mean cumulative utility delivered by a series of  2-instrument 
homogeneous spacecraft portfolios ([6 6] and [9 9] respectively) after 
ops = 15 years................................................................................................. 243 
Figure 79. Calendar-based optimization of utility delivered under the risk of late 
delivery, on-orbit obsolescence and on-orbit failures (notional) ................... 252 
Figure 80. Crisp set and fuzzy set (notional) .................................................................. 263 
Figure 81. Possible Triangular Fuzzy Number (TFN) representation of TRL ~ 4 
(left)  and possible Trapezoidal Fuzzy Number (Tr.FN) representation of 
TRL ~ 4-5 (right) ........................................................................................... 264 
Figure 82. Lognormal probability plot for duration of Integration & Testing (left: 
all portfolio sizes; right: only ninst = 3)........................................................... 271 
Figure 83. Lognormal probability plot for duration of Shipping.................................... 272 
Figure 84. Comparison between the empirical cumulative distribution function 
from the data and the cumulative distribution function of the model of 
shipping time.................................................................................................. 273 
Figure 85. Lognormal probability plot for total schedule (left: all TRLs; right: only 
systems with system-TRL = 5) ...................................................................... 275 
Figure 86. Basic simulation using the integrated framework for a given portfolio 
configuration (using command or GUI)......................................................... 278 
Figure 87. Basic simulation using the integrated framework for a series of 
spacecraft based on a given portfolio configuration ...................................... 279 
Figure 88. Algorithm used to investigate the impact of common TRL and portfolio 
size on spacecraft time-to-delivery (illustrative)............................................ 280 
Figure 89. Algorithm used to investigate the impact of TRL heterogeneity on 
MTTD (illustrative)........................................................................................ 281 
 xx
Figure 90. Influence of the time horizon on the optimal portfolios (on a utility 
basis) .............................................................................................................. 282 
Figure 91. Visualization of all portfolios and their associated MTTD, schedule risk 






AFRL = Air Force Research Laboratory 
AHP = Analytic Hierarchy Procedure 
AO = Announcement of Opportunity 
ANSI = American National Standards Institute 
BEA = Bureau of Economic Analysis 
BTI = Built-to-Inventory 
BTO = Built-to-Order 
CADRe = Cost Analysis Data Requirement 
CRO =  Calendar Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence (dynamic) 
DMSMS = Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages 
DOD = Department of Defense 
DSK = Dvorak Simplified Layout 
EAR = Export Administration Regulations 
EIA = Electronic Industries Associations 
FAA = Federal Aviation Administration 
FCC = U.S Federal Communications Commission 
FDM = Fuzzy Delphi Method 
FTD = Final Total schedule Duration 
GAO = Government Accountability Office 
GUI = Graphical User Interface 
I&T = Integration & Testing 
IDE  = Initial schedule Duration Estimate 
IDS = Instruments Delivery Schedule 
IOC = Initial Operational Capability 
IRL = Integration Readiness Level 
ITAR = International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
ITI = Integrated Technology Index 
 xxii
IXO = International X-Ray Observatory 
LRO = Lifetime Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence (dynamic) 
MAV/MAU = Multi-Attribute Value/Utility 
MDR = Mission Definition Review 
mO = minor Obsolescence state 
MO = Major Obsolescence state 
MTTD = Mean-Time-to-Delivery 
NASA = National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NPD = New Product Development 
NPV = Net Present Value 
PDR = Preliminary Design Review 
PnP = Plug and Play 
ORS = Operationally Responsive Space 
OSI = Open Systems Interconnect 
R&D = Research and Development 
R&D3 = Research and Development Degree of Difficulty 
RFI = Request For Information 
RFP = Request For Proposal 
RSS = Relative Schedule Slippage 
S&T = Science & Technology 
SAR = Synthetic Aperture Radar 
SBIRS = Space Based Infrared System High 
SoA = State-of-the-Art state 
SPN = Stochastic Petri Net 
SRL = System Readiness Level 
SRO = Static Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence 
ST6 = Space Technology 6 
TAA = Technical Assistance Agreement 
TFN = Triangular Fuzzy Number 
THESIS = Terrestrial and Habitable-zone Exoplanet Spectroscopy Infrared 
Spacecraft 
 xxiii
TNV = Technology Need Value 
TRL = Technology Readiness Level 
Tr.FN = Trapezoidal Fuzzy Number 
USML = United States Munitions List 
VCDM = value-centric design methodology 




The U.S Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration continue to face common challenges in the development and acquisition 
of their space systems. In particular, space programs repeatedly experience significant 
schedule slippages, and spacecraft are often delivered on-orbit several months, sometimes 
years, after the initially planned delivery date. The repeated pattern of these schedule 
slippages suggests deep-seated flaws in managing spacecraft delivery and schedule risk, 
and an inadequate understanding of the drivers of schedule slippages. Furthermore, due to 
their long development time and physical inaccessibility after launch, space systems are 
exposed to a particular and acute risk of obsolescence, resulting in loss of value or 
competitive advantage over time. The perception of this particular risk has driven some 
government agencies to promote design choices that may ultimately be contributing to 
these schedule slippages, and jeopardizing what is increasingly recognized as critical, 
namely space responsiveness.  
 
The overall research objective of this work is twofold: (1) to identify and develop a 
thorough understanding of the fundamental causes of the risk of schedule slippage and 
obsolescence of space systems; and in so doing, (2) to guide spacecraft design choices 
that would result in better control of spacecraft delivery schedule and mitigate the impact 
of these “temporal risks” (schedule and obsolescence risks). 
 
To lay the groundwork for this thesis, first, the levers of responsiveness, or means to 
influence schedule slippage and impact space responsiveness are identified and analyzed, 
 xxv
including design, organizational, and launch levers. Second, a multidisciplinary review of 
obsolescence is conducted, and main drivers of system obsolescence are identified. This 
thesis then adapts the concept of a technology portfolio from the macro- or company 
level to the micro-level of a single complex engineering system, and it analyzes a space 
system as a portfolio of technologies and instruments, each technology with its distinct 
stochastic maturation path and exposure to obsolescence. The selection of the spacecraft 
portfolio is captured by parameters such as the number of instruments, the initial 
technology maturity of each technology/instrument, the resulting heterogeneity of the 
technology maturity of the whole system, and the spacecraft design lifetime. Building on 
the abstraction of a spacecraft as a portfolio of technologies, this thesis then develops a 
stochastic framework composed of two main analysis and simulation modules: (1) The 
development module models the technology maturation process of each instrument as 
well as the integration, testing and shipping of the entire spacecraft, producing estimates 
of the spacecraft time-to-delivery and schedule risk; (2) The operations module then 
models the risk of on-orbit obsolescence by simulating the evolution of the state of 
obsolescence of the spacecraft instruments/subsystems over time. The complete 
framework provides a powerful capability to simultaneously explore the impact of design 
decisions on spacecraft schedule, on-orbit obsolescence, and cumulative utility delivered 
by the spacecraft. Specifically, this thesis shows how the choice of the portfolio size and 
the instruments Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) impact the Mean-Time-To-
Delivery (MTTD) of the spacecraft and mitigate (or exacerbate) schedule risk. This work 
also demonstrates that specific combinations/choices of the spacecraft design lifetime and 
the TRLs can reduce the risk of on-orbit obsolescence. This thesis then advocates for a 
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paradigm shift towards a calendar-based design mindset, in which the delivery time of the 
spacecraft is accounted for, as opposed to the traditional clock-based design mindset. The 
calendar-based paradigm is shown to lead to different design choices, which are more 
likely to prevent schedule slippage and/or enhance responsiveness and ultimately result in 
a larger cumulative utility delivered. Finally, missions scenarios are presented to illustrate 
how the framework and analyses here proposed can help identify system design choices 





“Mora cogitationis diligentia est.” 
"Le retard employé à réfléchir tient lieu de diligence." 
"To take your time while planning is due diligence." 
 
Publilius Syrus, Sententiae – Ist century BC. 
 
1.1 Motivation 
The U.S Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) continue to experience common challenges in the development 
and acquisition of their space systems. In particular, space programs repeatedly 
experience significant schedule slippages, and spacecraft are often completed and 
delivered on-orbit several months, sometimes years, after the initially planned delivery 
date. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has highlighted the difficulties 
encountered by the DOD in keeping the acquisition of space systems on schedule (and 
within budget): 
“DOD’s space system acquisitions have experienced problems over the past several 
decades that have driven up costs by hundreds of millions, even billions, of dollars; 
stretched schedules by years; and increased performance risks. In some cases, 
capabilities have not been delivered to the warfighter after decades of 
development.”  [1]  
 
 2
Figure 1 shows the delays or schedule slippage for five DOD programs, as of April 2007. 
The reader is referred to the GAO-07-406SP [2,3] for details about these programs. All 
five programs have suffered from delays equal or greater than 2 years; in the case of the 
Space Based Infrared System High (SBIRS-High), launch schedule slipped by as much as 



























































































Figure 1. Delays and schedule slippage since program start (adapted from GAO-07-730T) 
In addition to the schedule difficulties experienced by DOD space programs, GAO has 
also highlighted similar schedule growth problems with NASA missions over the last 
decade [4]. Figure 2 represents the schedule growth for 18 NASA missions launched 
since the late 1990’s (between the estimated launch date at the Preliminary Design 
Review and the actual launch date). Most missions experienced schedule slippage, and 






































































































Figure 2. Schedule growth for various recent NASA missions 
To explain the significance and persistence of such schedule slippages, several 
government reports published in the past two decades have emphasized the impact of 
programmatic and organizational deficiencies on the schedule of space programs.  
First, numerous management and staffing changes are likely to occur over the long 
development time of such programs, at the organization level (NASA or DOD), at the 
legislative level (Congress) as well as at the executive level (Office of the U.S President). 
Such variations are often associated with funding instabilities that have been found to 
result in significant program delays. For example, the GAO describes the case of the 
Chandra X-ray Observatory (initially named AXAF), whose budget was cut by “about 
$26 million and $76 million in fiscal years 1991 and 1992, respectively” to allow funding 
for the Hubble Space Telescope. “These cuts caused cost increases of about $90 million 
because the program had to be rephased. After rephasing, Congress reduced fiscal year 
1992 development funding by $60 million and significantly reduced funding for fiscal 
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year 1993. These latter budget cuts delayed the launch from early 1998 to mid-1999” [5] 
(representing a year and a half of delay).  
Second, over optimism and unrealistic cost estimates have also been identified as a driver 
of cost and schedule growth. The 2003 report of the U.S Defense Science Board/Air 
Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force on Acquisition of National Security 
Space Programs [6] stated that “unrealistically low projections of program cost and lack 
of provisions for management reserve seriously distort management decisions and 
program content, increase risks to mission success, and virtually guarantee program 
delays.” In 1992, the GAO reported that NASA had been experiencing similar issues: 
“unrealistic contractor estimates” coupled with a culture of optimism was leading “the 
program team to underestimate technical challenges and overestimate its capabilities to 
solve them”, which often resulted in schedule slippages [5].  
Finally, the DOD also highlighted the recent and dramatic increase of systems 
requirements (due to a multiplication of users of space assets since the 1990’s) and in 
many cases, the poor control of these requirements during program implementation 
(requirements creep) [6]. Such difficulties associated to systems requirements have been 
invoked to explain some of the schedule delays experienced by many space systems. 
According to the GAO [7], AEHF and SBIRS-High are among the systems represented 
on Figure 1 that experienced a combination of the programmatic reasons mentioned 
above.  
 
However, the repeated pattern of these schedule slippages, in both military and civilian 
contexts, suggests fundamental flaws in managing spacecraft delivery and schedule risk 
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that are not solely restricted to programmatic issues, and probably a limited 
understanding of the drivers of schedule slippages. Furthermore, it is important to 
recognize that the management of schedule of space systems is a problem of dual nature, 
with the prevention of schedule slippage as one side of the coin, and the schedule 
compression, or responsiveness improvement, as the other side of the coin. Fundamental 
changes would therefore be required not only to contain or prevent these schedule 
slippages, but also to compress these schedules in order to make the space industry more 
responsive to new or evolving customer needs.  
 
In addition, due to their long development time and physical inaccessibility (for most), 
space systems, unlike many other engineering systems, are exposed to a particular and 
acute risk of obsolescence. The high pace of technological progress is such that this 
exposure to obsolescence can even occur before the space systems become operational. 
The perception of this particular risk has driven the DOD to promote design choices that 
may ultimately be contributing to these schedule slippages, and jeopardizing what the 
DOD is recognizing as increasingly critical, space responsiveness. 
1.2 Research objectives and hypotheses 
The overall research objective of this thesis is twofold: (1) to identify and develop a 
thorough understanding of the fundamental causes of the risk of schedule slippage and 
obsolescence of space systems; and in so doing, (2) to guide spacecraft design choices 
that would result in better control of spacecraft delivery schedule and mitigate these 
“temporal risks” (schedule and obsolescence). 
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To achieve those goals, several research hypotheses are formulated. Research objectives 
are then devised to guide the testing of these hypotheses.  
 
Context: Programmatic reasons, such as funding instability and requirements 
changes, are often the only reasons invoked to explain or excuse schedule slippage 
and lack of responsiveness.  
• Hypothesis 1: In addition to these programmatic considerations, 
architectural choices and design parameters are key determinants of 
spacecraft delivery, schedule slippage and responsiveness (or lack thereof). 
• Research objective 1: Develop quantitative models and analyses to 
investigate the relationship between spacecraft delivery schedule and design 
parameters. 
 
Context: Each spacecraft subsystem and instrument follows its own maturation and 
development path, which impacts the delivery schedule and schedule risk of the 
whole spacecraft. 
• Hypothesis 2: Conceiving of and analyzing a spacecraft as a technology 
portfolio (of instruments/subsystems) will reveal insights about spacecraft 
delivery schedule and responsiveness, and will help make better risk-
informed design decisions (in particular with respect to schedule risk). 
• Research objective 2: Propose a theoretical framework and a probabilistic 
analysis of spacecraft delivery time by conceiving of it as a technology 
portfolio, with multiple technologies/instruments having distinct maturation 
 7
and development paths, and by accounting for their time to integration in the 
portfolio. 
 
Context: The persistence of the issues of schedule slippage in space system 
development suggests that more fundamental causes are in effect, as early as in the 
design process, and that are common across projects. 
• Hypothesis 3: The current clock-based design optimization mindset is one 
major driver of the recurrent issues of schedule slippage. 
• Research objective 3: Present the circumstances under which this clock-
based calendar mindset is flawed and demonstrate the relevance of a 
calendar-based mindset to design for responsiveness. 
 
Context: The DOD asserts that the inclusion of technologies with low maturity still 
represents an important way of ensuring that its space systems always possesses the 
most advanced technologies, thus mitigating their risk of obsolescence. 
• Hypothesis 4: The risk of on-orbit obsolescence is influenced by architectural 
choices and design parameters, and a trade-off exists between mitigating the 
risk of on-orbit obsolescence and schedule risk. 
• Research objective 4: Quantify the impact, if any, of spacecraft design 
parameters and technology choices, on the risk of on-orbit obsolescence. This 
research objective entails developing quantitative assessment of the risk of 
on-orbit obsolescence and identifying possible strategies for mitigating this 
risk as early as during the design process. 
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1.3 Outline and summary of contributions 
Chapter 2 presents a literature review on responsive space and provides a new 
multidisciplinary framework for thinking about and addressing issues of 
responsiveness and schedule slippage in the space industry. This framework 
advocates three levels of responsiveness: a global industry-wide responsiveness, a local 
stakeholder responsiveness, and an interactive or inter-stakeholder responsiveness. The 
use of “responsiveness maps” for multiple stakeholders is then introduced and motivated. 
“Levers of responsiveness”, or means to influence schedule slippage and impact space 
responsiveness, are identified and discussed, and special emphasis is put on “design 
levers” or technical spacecraft-centric ways to improve responsiveness. Specifically, the 
Technology Readiness Level (TRL), a proxy for technology maturity, is an important 
design parameter whose impact on schedule slippage and schedule risk is investigated 
independently. A univariate analysis of historical NASA data is conducted to 
characterize the relationship between TRL and schedule slippage and analytical 
models for schedule slippage as a function of TRL are provided. 
 
In order to account for other sources of variability in system delivery schedule, Chapter 3 
adapts the idea of portfolio from the macro- or company level to the micro-level of a 
single complex engineering system, by conceiving of the space system itself as a 
portfolio of technologies or instruments. This idea of a spacecraft as a technology 
portfolio is then used to guide the formulation of a stochastic model of spacecraft 
time-to-delivery, through which the impacts of the portfolio characteristics on the Mean-
Time-To-Delivery (MTTD) of the spacecraft and its schedule risk are investigated. 
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Preliminary results from this model support the claim that the clock-based design 
optimization mindset in which the space industry currently operates is one important 
underlying driver of these persistent schedule slippages. A paradigm shift towards a 
calendar-based design mindset, in which the delivery time of the spacecraft is 
accounted for, is proposed and shown to lead to different design choices that are more 
likely to prevent schedule slippage and enhance space responsiveness.  
 
The issue of schedule risk, central to Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, pertains to the likelihood 
that a space system will not be delivered and provide a service in time to respond to 
customer needs. Chapters 4 and 5 explore a second type of “temporal risk” faced by 
spacecraft, namely the risk of obsolescence that jeopardizes the ability of space system 
to maintain a service that fulfills customer expectations.  
 
In Chapter 4, the concept of obsolescence is discussed in a general sense, and main 
drivers of obsolescence are identified. A multidisciplinary review of the phenomenon 
of obsolescence is then conducted that presents how the fields of economics, operations 
research, bibliometrics and engineering have tackled this issue and discusses the 
modeling approaches that have been proposed. 
 
Chapter 5 further continues the discussion of obsolescence by focusing on space systems, 
which, unlike ground-based systems that can be physically accessed and thus upgraded, 
face a specific risk of obsolescence, referred to in this thesis as “risk of on-orbit 
obsolescence”. More specifically, Chapter 5 discusses the position of the Department of 
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Defense that argues that, given both their long development schedules and their long 
design lifetimes, satellites face a serious risk of on-orbit obsolescence if low TRL 
technologies are not considered at the onset of their development. To assess the 
appropriateness of this rationale, a Markov model for quantifying and analyzing the 
risk of on-orbit obsolescence is developed and the impact of selected design parameters 
(including TRL) on the risk of obsolescence is investigated.  
 
Chapter 6 integrates the models presented in Chapter 3 and 5 to explore jointly the impact 
of design choices (materialized by the selection of portfolio characteristics) on both the 
time-to-delivery and time-to-obsolescence of the spacecraft. The result is an integrated 
framework that can help inform decisions made during the design of a spacecraft 
(or series of spacecraft) for mitigating schedule and obsolescence risks. 
 





2 ON SPACE RESPONSIVENESS AND THE ONSET OF 
SPACECRAFT SERVICE DELIVERY 
 
 
“Rien ne m'arrête plus ; dans mon élan rapide 
J'obéis au courant, par le désir poussé, 
Et je vole à mon but comme un grand trait liquide 
Qu'un bras invisible a lancé.” 
“Nothing can stop me anymore; in my rapid impetus 
I obey the current, pushed by the desire 
And I fly to my goal like a long liquid stream 
That an invisible arm has launched.” 
 




Customers’ needs are dynamic: they emerge in time and evolve stochastically, prompted 
by unfolding environmental (political, economic, and or technological) uncertainties and 
network externalities. The ability of an industry to address these needs in a timely and 
cost-effective manner is indicative of its responsiveness. In the space industry, a systemic 
discrepancy exists between the time constants associated with the emergence and change 
of customers’ needs, and the response time of the industry in delivering solutions to 
address these needs. The needs can consist of a new capability on-orbit for a military or a 
commercial customer, or a modification and repositioning of an existing on-orbit asset. 
When a new capability is required, from the moment when the need is identified and 
requirements are formalized to the time when an operational asset is delivered on-orbit, 
several years would typically elapse. Although different in details, other industries have 
struggled with conceptually similar issues, and management approaches such as just-in-
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time were developed in part to address the discrepancy between the rate of change of 
customers’ needs and the ability of the industry to deliver timely solutions (better 
inventory management also played a role in the just-in-time emphasis).  
 
Space responsiveness was first conceptualized in a military context, where needs can 
emerge as a result of an unexpected threat, and require the rapid deployment of space 
assets to ensure communications between allied forces, as well as surveillance of regions 
of interest. The time needed to respond to these new needs can therefore be critical to 
ensure swift tactical advantage. Conversely, important penalties can result from the late 
delivery of a needed capability to the battlefield. To tackle this challenge, the U.S 
Department of Defense issued in 2007 a report outlining the steps required to establish an 
Operationally Responsive Space Program Office to improve “the Nation’s means to 
develop, acquire, field and employ space capabilities in shortened timeframes” [8]. 
 
The need for space responsiveness extends however beyond the defense community and 
is equally relevant in the commercial space sector. In a commercial context, 
responsiveness is helpful to gain and sustain a competitive advantage, for example by 
securing the first-mover advantage against a competing or alternate technology. 
Conversely, lack of responsiveness can result in an opportunity loss and hence, loss of 
potential revenue and value to shareholders. In addition, satellite manufacturers may be 
(contractually) obligated to pay penalties, “liquidated damages”, if they experience 
schedule slippage (the opposite of responsiveness) and miss satellite delivery dates. 
Responsiveness is also important for scientific space missions. In the case of 
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interplanetary missions, launch windows offer very little schedule flexibility and only 
occur every few months or years. The overall goal of more responsive missions in 
science is to provide an “increased return of science in much shorter time horizons” [9]. 
In certain cases, “responsive missions” would allow scientists to observe and study 
transient phenomena (e.g., atmospheric or astrophysical) whose duration is uncertain, 
shortly after they appeared [10]. In short, improving space responsiveness is important 
for military, commercial, and science applications in the space industry. 
 
In the current space industry, various degrees of responsiveness are achieved depending 
on the purpose of the space mission. Figure 3 shows the average time-to-delivery for a 
sample of spacecraft launched since the 1990’s, organized by mission class: commercial 
communication satellites (29 spacecraft), military missions (15 spacecraft) and civil 
scientific missions (29 spacecraft). While commercial communication satellites are 
typically delivered in 2 or 3 years following the contract award, the development of 
defense and science spacecraft often takes longer, typically 5 years (or more). 
Furthermore, the delivery schedule of military and science spacecraft exhibit a higher 
variability than that of commercial communication satellites. (Note however that the size 
of the sample of military missions is almost half of that of commercial missions). Unlike 
military and science spacecraft that are often tailored to a specific mission and are thus 
typically designed around a unique payload, commercial communications satellites tend 
to be produced at a larger scale, with design similarities that range from the reliance on a 
common bus to the use of analogous payloads. In addition to this major distinction, other 
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reasons that may explain the differences in responsiveness observed in Figure 3 are 































Figure 3. Average time-to-delivery of spacecraft and corresponding standard deviation bars 
as a function of mission class 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a definition of 
space responsiveness. Section 2.3 introduces a new framework for thinking about issues 
of space responsiveness, with three levels of responsiveness, which clarify who / what is 
responsive in the space industry. Section 2.4 presents tools for identifying and prioritizing 
responsiveness-improvement efforts. Finally, section 2.5 discusses the levers of 
responsiveness, or means for improving space responsiveness, including spacecraft 
design and operational levers, launch levers, and “soft” levers of responsiveness (e.g., 
acquisition policies). 
2.2 Definition of space responsiveness 
It is important to note that space responsiveness is a broader issue than the sole time-to-
delivery of a spacecraft as shown in Figure 3. For example, in a commercial context, 
much time can elapse between the identification of a new need or market opportunity and 
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the award of a contract to develop a new satellite. Similarly, the instant at which an asset 
is operational may not directly coincide with the instant of the launch (or the 
modification) of said asset. From the perspective of the end-customer or the stakeholder 
with the need for the space asset, responsiveness is related to the total time 0 elapsed 
from the instance when the need for a given on-orbit capability is identified and 
formalized to the time when the asset is ready and operational on-orbit. Improving 
space responsiveness therefore requires a thorough understanding of the schedule 
structure of a space asset, that is, the temporal breakdown of each activity in the space 
industry following the issuance of a Request For Proposal (RFP) for a new or modified 
on-orbit capability as well as an assessment of how much time each activity contributes 
to the total time 0. This “time accounting” is traditionally performed internally by each 
stakeholder for technical activities (e.g., design, manufacturing, integration and testing) 
in the schedule documents developed for a given space project. Other activities that 
should also be considered in this “time accounting” include legal, organizational and 
procedural activities that can often have a significant impact on the overall system 
delivery schedule.  
 
Responsiveness, unlike reliability for example, is not a characteristic of an item, but a 
higher-level attribute of an industry’s value-chain or an industry’s set of customers and 
suppliers. Although the technical characteristics and design of the space system under 
development are key drivers of the space industry’s responsiveness, or lack thereof, they 
are not its sole determinant. Other aspects have an impact on responsiveness and can be 
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usefully tackled, along with design aspects of a spacecraft, to improve space 
responsiveness. 
 
If beauty is in the eye of the beholder, responsiveness is in the eye of the “customer”; it 
characterizes the reaction time of “suppliers” to an external stimulation (e.g., a new order 
for product X). Figure 4 provides an illustrative representation of an industry value chain. 
Si in Figure 4 are the various stakeholders in this industry and are affected when the end-
customer issues a new order for a product or a service*. As the end-customer identifies a 
new need or opportunity and issues an RFP for a new asset, that RFP stirs the industry 
and propagates upstream its value-chain. Figure 4 illustrates the fact that there are 
multiple sets of “customers–suppliers” in an industry. Furthermore, one stakeholder’s 
customer is often another stakeholder’s supplier. For example, S22 is the “customer” of 
S221 and S222, but S22 is also the “supplier” of S2.  
 
                                                 
* Although not important for the purpose of this chapter, a distinction is made herein between an end-
customer (who issues the RFP and “pays the bill” for the whole space asset), and the end-user who pays 
service fees for temporary access to some on-orbit capability (e.g., a transponder). Also, note that in order 

















Figure 4. Illustrative representation of an industry value-chain. End customer and various 
stakeholders (Si). Not all links are represented. 
 
Since responsiveness is relevant for “customers” (or stakeholders with needs), and it 
characterizes the reaction time of “suppliers” (or stakeholders addressing those needs, in 
whole or in part), different levels and types of responsiveness can be defined:  
1. A global industry-wide responsiveness, as seen from the perspective of the end-
customer; 
2. A local stakeholder responsiveness, as seen from the perspective of a “local” 
customer;  
3. An interactive or inter-stakeholder responsiveness.  
2.3 The three levels of responsiveness 
2.3.1 Global responsiveness 
The global or industry-wide responsiveness is seen from the perspective of the end-
customer who issues the RFP for a given space capability and “pays the bill” for the 
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space asset. This is a “macro-level” attribute of the whole industry. Regardless of how the 
industry is structured, whether there are hundreds of suppliers or just a couple of them, 
from the perspective of the end-customer, what matters is the time 0 elapsed from the 
issuance of the RFP for a space asset until the asset becomes operational on-orbit. Figure 
5 provides a symbolic representation of this relationship as a block diagram in which the 
“black box” contains all the suppliers ((Si)) that interact with the end-customer. 
Improving global responsiveness of an industry implies among other things reducing or 
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Figure 5. Global responsiveness, end-customer, and block diagram 
 
Conceptually, compressing 0, and consequently improving global responsiveness, can be 
achieved by three different types of actions: (1) eliminating bottlenecks in the value-chain 
and minimizing waiting periods, (2) maximizing overlap, to the degree possible, between 
different streams of activities at different suppliers, and (3) compressing the “response 
time” of each supplier. In practice, in order to identify levers for improving 
responsiveness, lower levels of responsiveness—the constituents or components of this 
global responsiveness—must be defined, to identify areas where practical improvement 
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actions can be taken. Two additional levels are introduced to this effect, local stakeholder 

















implies among other things
compressing 0. This can be 
accomplished by:
• Eliminating or minimizing 
waiting periods
• Maximizing overlap when 
possible or practical
• Compressing each supplier’s 
response time
 
Figure 6. Conceptual improvement of global responsiveness 
 
2.3.2 Local stakeholder responsiveness 
In addition to the global responsiveness, responsiveness can be defined at a local level in 
an industry value-chain, by local customers instead of the “end-customer”. For example, 
in Figure 4, the local responsiveness of S11 is seen from the perspective of its customer, 
S1, and is related to the total time S11 elapsed from the instance when S1 formalizes its 
needs with respect to a given supplier, here S11, to the time when S11 delivers the required 
product and/or service and fulfills its customer’s needs. Improving local responsiveness 
implies among other things reducing or compressing this total time S11. 
2.3.3 Interactive or inter-stakeholder responsiveness 
Each stakeholder, by improving its own local responsiveness (Si), contributes to 
improving the responsiveness of its own customer(s), and ultimately the global 
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responsiveness. However, the responsiveness of a local customer is not only dependent 
upon and determined by the responsiveness of its suppliers, but also by how well (or 
efficiently) the customer interacts and works with its suppliers. For example in Figure 4, 
the responsiveness of S22 is not only determined by the intrinsic responsiveness of its 
suppliers, S221 and S222, but also by the time-efficiency of the interaction between S22 and 
its two suppliers. This can be referred to as "interactive" or "inter-stakeholder 
responsiveness" and characterizes the time-efficiency of the interaction between any two 
stakeholders in an industry value-chain. The time constant associated with this interactive 
responsiveness is noted as inter_resp. For example, a customer that can finalize 
procurement agreements with its suppliers in a few weeks has a better interactive 
responsiveness than one requiring several months to set up such agreements.  
2.3.4 Formalization 
The time constant associated with the responsiveness of a local stakeholder, LS, can be 
expressed as a function of the response times of all its suppliers Si (i = 1 to n) plus the 
interactive responsiveness and the intrinsic responsiveness of the local stakeholder as 
shown in the symbolic representation of Eq. 2.1: 
 
 LS  f  S1 ; S2 ;...; Sn ; overlaps   inter_resp  +   intrinsic(LS)      (2.1) 
 
intrinsic(LS) is a time component of LS that captures the speed and efficiency by which a 
local stakeholder (LS) can address its own customer’s needs irrespective of, or following 
its suppliers’ responsiveness and the interactive responsiveness, as shown in Eq. 2.1. 
intrinsic(LS) can be termed the local customer’s “self-responsiveness,” and is function of the 
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internal technical skills within the company as well as the managerial skills and 
organizational structure that facilitate or hamper lean operations and decision-making. 
The functional dependence of LS on various parameters (Eq. 2.1) is now discussed. 
2.4 Schedule compressibility and responsiveness maps 
Improving space responsiveness requires identifying the activities ai contributing to the 
overall development and readiness of the system, and assessing the extent to which the 
duration of each activity ai can be reduced. These tasks can be performed via the time 
compressibility metric along with the responsiveness maps, which are presented next. 
2.4.1 Schedule compressibility 
As the time dimension of responsiveness is related to 0 for the global responsiveness, 
and Si for the local stakeholder responsiveness, improving a company’s or an industry’s 
responsiveness implies among other things compressing these time scales. By analogy 
with the notion of compressibility in fluid dynamics, a time compressibility metric can be 






















or                 (2.2) 
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When expressed for every activity ai in the space industry that follows the issuance of an 
RFP for a new or modified on-orbit capability, this time compressibility metric can help 
the analyst and decision-maker to think explicitly about the functional dependence of the 
schedule for developing a spacecraft on the resources that can be allocated to the various 
activities in the development and manufacturing process. This metric need not be 
considered with the analytic rigidity that Eq. 2.2 may suggest, but can be assessed 
qualitatively (e.g., low, medium, high) through the solicitation of experts’ opinion and 
judgment of engineers and program managers.  
2.4.2 Responsiveness maps 
Given all the activities{ai,j | j = 1 to m} performed by a given space industry stakeholder, 
Si, to satisfy its customer’s needs, and ai,j the duration of each activity, a 
“responsiveness map”  can be constructed as follows (Figure 7): the x-axis is constituted 
by the compressibility of each activity undertaken by stakeholder Si, and the y-axis is the 
normalized duration of each activity with respect to the total response time of the 


















  Figure 7. Responsiveness map for a given stakeholder Si 
 
Figure 7 can be interpreted as follows: 
  
1) The upper-right corner contains activities that are highly compressible (e.g., 
ai,1), that is with limited additional effort or resources (people and/or money) their 
time to completion can be dramatically reduced. Furthermore, these activities are 
major contributors to the total response time of the stakeholder, i.e., they 
constitute important bottlenecks. Therefore, these activities in the upper-right 
corner should be tackled first in a responsiveness improvement effort. 
2) The upper-left corner of Figure 7 contains activities that cannot be easily 
compressed even if they were allocated additional resources, yet these activities 
constitute important bottlenecks for the company (e.g., ai,2). In other words, the 
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time reduction sought in tackling these activities are more difficult to obtain than 
in streamlining the activities in the upper-right corner. 
3) The lower-left corner contains activities that are neither easily compressible nor 
do they constitute bottlenecks in the overall workflow to deliver a product or 
service (e.g., ai,3). 
4) The lower-right corner contains activities that are easily compressible but that 
do not constitute bottlenecks in the overall workflow to deliver a product or 



















Figure 8. Responsiveness map and prioritization of improvement efforts 
Responsiveness maps can be developed for every stakeholder in the space industry, and 
multiple layers or levels of detail can be included on these maps. Once such maps are 
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developed, a company can prioritize its responsiveness improvement efforts by tackling 
activities in the higher priority sectors as shown in Figure 8.  
 
The time compressibility metric, as defined in Eq. 2.2, captures one important functional 
dependence of the development schedule of a complex system, namely the relationship 
between schedule and resources. The development schedule however, and more generally 
LS and 0, are not only dependent on resources, but also on other “structural” 
considerations: for example, a change in development process, a modification of program 
reviews, a change in the architecture of the system under development, or a change in the 
procurement practices can significantly impact LS and 0, by modifying or eliminating 
some of the activities {ai,j | j = 1 to m}. Responsiveness can therefore be improved by 
acting on various “levers of responsiveness”, which are presented next. 
2.5 Levers of responsiveness 
In a broad sense, improving the responsiveness of the space industry can be achieved by 
improving each or any local stakeholder’s responsiveness (i.e., having more responsive 
satellite manufacturers, launch providers, and/or launch ranges, and in general more 
responsive “suppliers”). It is important to note however that the objective of compressing 
delivery times and improving space responsiveness is quite ambitious, given that many 
past and current space programs have experienced and continue to experience significant 
schedule slippage, as discussed in section 1.1. When exploring ways to improve 
responsiveness, it is therefore essential to recognize the dual nature of this problem: the 
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prevention of responsiveness deterioration or schedule slippage as one side of the coin, 
and the schedule compression as the other side of the coin.  
 
These two complementary tasks can be achieved by acting on levers of responsiveness† 
described next. Figure 9 provides a graphical summary of various levers of 
responsiveness presented in the following section, and their impact on the time constant 





























































































Figure 9. Summary of levers of responsiveness and their impact (when pulled in the “right” 
direction) 
                                                 
† Whether these levers should be pulled—and to what extent—or not is dependent upon numerous 
considerations and should be part of larger analyses and trade-offs performed during the design. 
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2.5.1 The launch levers of responsiveness: launch vehicles and launch ranges 
2.5.1.1 Launch vehicles 
Launch vehicles are key-enablers of the global space industry’s responsiveness. At 
present, it typically takes several months from the time a spacecraft is shipped from the 
manufacturer’s premise to the launch facility, to the time when it is placed on orbit. This 
duration is increasingly viewed as an objectionable lack of responsiveness, both for 
commercial and (especially) military customers. In response to this problem, new launch 
vehicles aiming at meeting the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) requirements are 
developed to reduce the launch response time to a few days [11]. One proposed solution 
requires having launch vehicle parts available “off-the-shelf,” so that launchers are built-
to-inventory. Such a new approach implies new constraints, among which is the use of 
propellants capable of being stored at ambient temperatures. [12]. 
 
One major problem underlying launch responsiveness, or lack of it, resides in what is 
referred to in the Operations Research literature as the build-to-order versus the build-
to-inventory production approaches [13]. Launch vehicles today are effectively built-to-
order, that is, they are built for a specific mission/spacecraft and after a confirmed order–
with all the financial guarantees–for the vehicle has been placed [14]; the build-to-order 
approach is sometimes referred to as “pull” production system in which the market 
effectively “pulls” the products from the manufacturer. By contrast, the build-to-
inventory is a “push” production approach in which products are manufactured (and sent 
to the “inventory”) not in response to confirmed orders, but in the hope that “pushing” 
said products onto the marketplace will result in them being purchased. It is easy to 
 28
conceive of hybrid production approaches that lie between these two ends of the 
spectrum (BTO and BTI) and for which 1) products are built in part to order, and in part 
to inventory, 2) products are built to (credible) sales forecast, 3) products are built with 
varying degrees of commitments from the customers (shy of firm orders). These various 
productions approaches differ in their consequences on responsiveness as well as in their 
economic and risk implications, due to the following considerations (summarized in 
Figure 10):  
 
1. Launch vehicles are highly complex and costly artifacts. The design of launch 
vehicles is driven by and matches the present day dominant design of spacecraft 
as large monoliths. 
2. Given the high cost of a launch vehicle and the low volume nature of the launch 
business, launch providers cannot afford the financial risks that come with the 
build-to-inventory production approach, or the significant inventory holding costs 
associated with this production approach. The build-to-order approach therefore is 
both a lower risk and cost approach to the launch providers than the build-to-
inventory. 
3. From a customer’s perspective however, the build-to-order of launch vehicles, 
unlike the build-to-inventory, is a non-responsive approach and results in 
significant delays before a needed capability is placed on-orbit. Launch 
responsiveness, as seen from the end-customer’s perspective (e.g., the U.S. Air 
Force), is therefore traded against lower financial risks and inventory costs by the 
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Figure 10. Responsiveness and implications of BTO and BTI to launch providers and end-customers. 
 
Enticing the launch providers to switch from a BTO to BTI, and hence towards a more 
responsive production approach, will succeed only when credible economic solutions are 
found to: 1) distribute the financial risks between the launch providers and the end-
customers; 2) have the latter share in the inventory holding costs associated with the 
build-to-inventory approach. 
  
Another hypothetical solution for the switch from BTO to BTI is to dramatically lower 
the cost of launch vehicles. This can only happen if the current dominant architecture of 
spacecraft (large monolith) is significantly disrupted and a new spacecraft design 
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paradigm emerges and proves competitive, such as powerful micro-satellites or 
fractionated spacecraft [15]. 
2.5.1.2 Launch ranges 
Just like airports have a limited capacity to handle air traffic, so do launch ranges have a 
limited launch turnover rate. Saturation of the launch range capacity can generate an 
important “bottleneck” representing a challenge for the responsiveness of the space 
industry, as the current number of launch ranges around the world is not sufficient to 
satisfy the demand without generating waiting periods. In addition, most ranges are 
government-owned, and function under significant restrictions that often result in delays 
of the order of months in their operations. As a result, several initiatives have recently 
emerged to build private launch ranges that would allow leaner operations and would 
“un-choke” the current flow of demand in launches. For example, the Mojave Spaceport 
became the first facility to be certified as a spaceport by the U.S Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) in 2004, and allowed the flight of X-Prize’s winner 
SpaceShipOne. Similarly, Spaceport America, built in New Mexico in 2006, experienced 
its first successful launch of a SpaceLoft XL rocket in April 2007. 
 
Since spaceports are typically built around specific vehicle designs, any required 
modification to accommodate new vehicle architecture can be time-consuming, i.e., “on 
the order of several years” [16]. New practices in the design of launch ranges are 
therefore sought to make spaceports compatible with the requirements of Responsive 
Space, and move towards airport-like operations. These practices include for example a 
reduction of complexity by reducing the number of ground interfaces with the launch 
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vehicle, as well as a standardization of these interfaces [17]. Furthermore, vehicle and 
payload characteristics (e.g., propellants used, geometry of launch vehicles, on-site 
integration of components, special payload services) are thought to have an influence on 
the responsiveness of the launch range [18]. These design interactions between the 
vehicle and payload with the launch range can be seen as impacting the “interactive 
responsiveness” as conceptualized in Eq. 2.1, since in that case the responsiveness is 
jointly controlled by the launch vehicles and the launch ranges. Finally, new spaceport 
and range technologies offer promising opportunities to reduce turnaround times, 
reorganize the scheduling of range assets more efficiently, and increase the availability of 
the launch windows [16]. 
2.5.2 The soft levers of space responsiveness 
Recent initiatives to meet the goals of Operationally Responsive Space have mostly 
focused on two categories of levers of responsiveness, launch-centric and design-centric 
levers of responsiveness (presented in section 2.5.3). Practical achievements that 
illustrate this effort include for example the TacSat series of satellites that combine the 
use of small, modular satellites with rapid and low cost launch vehicles [19]. However, 
efforts to improve space responsiveness ought not focus solely on the technical and 
operational characteristics of the artifacts created by the space industry, but should also 
address the legal, organizational, and managerial aspects of “doing business” in this 
industry. These “soft” levers of responsiveness include the selection process of 
competing proposals in response to an RFP, the design reviews during the development 
process, and the acquisition policies of space assets (this last point is relevant in the 
particular case of military acquisition).  
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2.5.2.1 Selection process 
The selection process of proposals in response to an RFP can significantly delay the start 
of the development of a space program, thus jeopardizing its responsiveness. In the case 
of NASA’s Discovery missions, this selection process can take up to 2 years from the 
“development of a draft [Announcement of Opportunity] AO until the start of mission 
formulation” [20]. In a Federal acquisition context for example, the selection process of 
space assets should not only emphasize fairness and accountability, but also explicitly 
timeliness. A reduction in time of the selection process from two years to say a few 
months therefore represents an important lever for space responsiveness.  
2.5.2.2 Design reviews 
Spacecraft are developed according to the traditional stage-gate development model with 
multiple design reviews that punctuate the development process. Repeated and extensive 
design reviews can significantly stretch the development schedule of a spacecraft [21] 
and thus degrade responsiveness. In an environment where responsiveness is increasingly 
important, it is worth carefully exploring other more expeditious or less frequent reviews 
and controls approaches. Reviews support transparency and minimize technical and 
programmatic risks between customers and suppliers—for example between an end-
customer, e.g., a satellite operator and a satellite manufacturer. Minimizing the frequency 
or limiting the extent of the design reviews may have some benefits in terms of 
responsiveness. However, it should be recognized that this potential lever on 
responsiveness, which acts on the interactive responsiveness (inter_resp term in Eq. 2.1), 
comes at a cost of increased programmatic risk and less transparency between the end-
customer and the satellite manufacturer. 
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2.5.2.3 Acquisition policies 
Recent studies by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), as well as the 
report of the Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task 
Force on Acquisition of National Security Space Programs (also known as the “Young 
Panel report” [6]) are consistent in their findings that the DOD space acquisition policies, 
despite recent reforms, are failing, with the result that many space programs have 
experienced cost growth sometimes exceeding 100-percent, and significant schedule 
delays, in some cases as much as 6 years [3,22]. 
 
Better practices in systems acquisition have thus been found to constitute effective levers 
of responsiveness, if not for compressing systems delivery times at least by helping 
programs stay on schedule. The following are some example of policy recommendations 
that can be conceived of as levers of responsiveness (the first two are related to the 
technology heritage lever discussed previously): 
 
 Technology development should not be undertaken in an acquisition program [23,24]. 
The rationale for this recommendation is that technology development cannot be 
easily time-compressed and it is the most likely to cause schedule slippage. As a 
result, GAO recommends confining technology development to the research and 
development environment, which is more forgiving of schedule slippages than 
acquisition programs where responsiveness matters. One practical instantiation of this 
policy is GAO’s recommendation that acquisition programs not include technologies 
with a TRL lower than 6 or 7 in the development of a space system (see the 
“technology heritage” lever of responsiveness in section 2.5.3.3) [22,25]. 
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 Stable definition of system requirements is critical to ensure space responsiveness, 
since frequent significant changes in these requirements often result in schedule 
delays [6,24].  
 The number of officials and organizations involved in defining the requirements for 
space systems should be limited to avoid the proliferation of requirements [6,24] and 
sufficient authority should be given to program managers to make the necessary 
trade-offs between requirements, requirements growth, and responsiveness. 
2.5.2.4 Export control laws and regulations 
When a country exports some of its space technology and shares it with foreign entities, 
its national security as well as the competitiveness of its space industry are at a potential 
risk. Export control laws and regulations are established to monitor the type of 
technology and information that can be exported, in order to protect national security and 
commercial interests. Under such regulations, technology must undergo an administrative 
process punctuated by various reviews and approval requests before being exported. In 
the United States, almost every field of science and engineering is covered by the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), supervised by the U.S Department of Commerce, 
and/or the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), supervised by the U.S 
Department of State. In 1999, non-military space technology, which had been handled by 
the Department of Commerce for several years, returned to the U.S Munitions List 
(USML) subject to the stricter ITAR control. A policy of this nature can have significant 
implications in terms of space responsiveness. In the case of the U.S space industry, this 
effect manifested itself in various ways:  
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 The more stringent reviews of space-related technology by the Department of State 
were found to be much more lengthy than when they were handled by the Department 
of Commerce (in roughly 17% of the cases treated by the Department of Commerce, 
the review time was greater than 60 days, whereas this proportion goes up to 
approximately 48% for cases treated by the Department of State [26]).  
 Spacecraft is the commodity group for which permanent export licenses granted by 
the Department of State take the longest to process [27]. 
 The average time needed to approve Technical Assistance Agreements (TAA’s), 
which are critical to international cooperation and marketing, has increased from 52 
days in 2003 to 106 days in 2006 [28].  
 International partners have also observed the increasing delays of space projects 
resulting from the application of ITAR [29]. 
 The time needed to obtain export licenses is hard to predict with confidence [30].  
 
As export control laws and regulations have a significant impact on schedule of space 
systems (and as a result, on the competitiveness of the space industry), various steps can 
be taken to improve responsiveness in this area. These include: 
 A clearer distinction between the truly military-sensitive technology and the more 
harmless commercial technology, both at the industry level (e.g., removing 
commercial satellites from the munitions list), and at the spacecraft level (e.g., 
distinguishing the sensitive components from the non-sensitive ones) 
 A clarification of the role and authority of each administrative entity in granting 
export licenses (interactive responsiveness) 
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 Improving the efficiency of the entities which conduct the reviews and grant export 
licenses (self-responsiveness of each administrative entity). 
2.5.3 Design and architecture levers 
In addition to extra resources and to the launch and soft levers of responsiveness 
presented previously, the development and manufacturing schedule of a system also 
depends on the nature and characteristics of the system under development such as its 
complexity, heritage, and more generally its architecture. 
2.5.3.1 Modularity, Plug-n-Play (PnP), and standardization of interfaces 
The many definitions of modularity [31] derive from the notion of module. In product 
design, a module is a component or group of self-contained components that: 1) has well-
defined interfaces to a platform, a system, and/or other modules; 2) provides a specific 
self-contained function within the system in which it is embedded [32]; 3) can be 
“removed (or interchanged) from a product non-destructively as a unit” [33]; 4) can be 
easily “plugged” into a system, and both its presence and the function it provides are 
directly recognized by the system and put to use accordingly. Modularity acts as a lever 
of responsiveness by operating at least on two levels: 
 
 System-level impact: in an integral design (the “opposite” of modularity), 
components are tightly coupled, physically and functionally. Because of the lack of 
physical and functional separation, the system’s development cycle is constrained to a 
large extent to be sequential, with limited or no possible overlap between different 
development phases. By contrast, decoupling of functions between different modules 
allows a certain degree of parallelism among the tasks performed during the 
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development of a modular system [31]. Since modules are separate, providing 
specific and self-contained functions, they can be designed, assembled and tested 
separately and simultaneously, offering potential time-savings and thus 
responsiveness improvements. The total development time of a modular spacecraft 
can be symbolically expressed as in Equation 2.3: 
modular   design   assembly   testing   overlap (ai ; a j )
i j
      (2.3) 
The system-level improvements of responsiveness enabled by modularity are 
represented by a negative term that subtracts the overlaps between various activities in 
the development cycle of a modular system design.  
 
 Module-level impact: 
Modularity is sometimes designated in the literature as a “plug-and-play” (PnP) 
approach. Interfaces between modules (and/or between modules and platform) need 
to be designed in advance, and modules must comply with the standards pre-defined 
in order to be connected through these interfaces to the platform or overall system. 
Among the benefits presented by this upfront investment in modularity and 
standardization of interfaces, the re-use of similar modules is intuitively associated 
with a reduction in product development time [33]. In the case of spacecraft, schedule 
reduction or responsiveness improvements can result from the adoption of modular 
designs, since certain tasks performed once on a given module need not be performed 
again when a similar module is being built. This effect is particularly noticeable for 
the design and qualification phases. For example, once a module has been tested and 
(space-)qualified, its subsequent versions will require limited amount of additional 
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testing before it can be integrated into a new system (see [34] for the modeling of cost 
savings resulting from modularity in spacecraft design). Several stakeholders in the 
space industry, including the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory, have recently 
embarked on the development of technology infrastructure and the formulation of 
standards to support spacecraft PnP [35, 36, 37] and proposed modular designs of 
spacecraft subsystems and payloads [38] in support of improving space 
responsiveness. 
2.5.3.2 Complexity  
Engineers and program managers are interested in design complexity, its measures, and 
implications on schedule, cost, and risk among other things. In general, design 
complexity is indicative of: 1) the total number of subsystems or components used in an 
engineering system; 2) the number of different kinds of subsystems used (i.e., degree of 
heterogeneity); 3) the number of interfaces and connections between these subsystems 
(i.e., organizational complexity). Detailed discussions of complexity and its measures can 
be found in [39,40,41]. It is commonly accepted that design complexity dramatically 
impacts the development and assembly time of a product [42,43].   
 
In the case of spacecraft, complexity influences all the parameters identified in Eq. 2.1, 
(in which the local stakeholder (LS) is the spacecraft manufacturer) in at least three ways:  
 
 Component-centric: a decrease in system complexity can be reflected by a reduction 
of the number (and diversity) of subsystems and payload instruments to be developed, 
as well as their connections and interfaces. As a consequence, lower complexity 
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results in shorter design and development times for the different “parts” of a 
spacecraft.  
 System-centric: a decrease in spacecraft complexity reduces the amount of time 
required to integrate and test the whole spacecraft.  
 Organizational: a reduction in spacecraft complexity is likely to result in fewer 
stakeholders and suppliers involved in delivering “parts” to the spacecraft. Fewer 
suppliers are likely easier to be managed than scores of them, thus reduced spacecraft 
complexity has also the potential to improve the interactive responsiveness.  
 
For example, the number of instruments on-board a spacecraft is a proxy for the 
spacecraft size and is one possible indicator of the system’s complexity. As a design 
choice, this number of instruments carried on board will influence a space program’s 
schedule and can therefore significantly impact responsiveness. When other factors 
contributing to complexity (such as design lifetime, power, or propulsion type) are taken 
into account, more complex missions tend also to take longer to be developed [44]. 
2.5.3.3 Heritage, learning curve, and Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 
The three terms, heritage, learning curve, and TRL, cover closely related concepts in 
engineering design. The idea of improvement in cost resulting from repetitive tasks was 
formalized by T.P. Wright [45] and its adaptation for development and assembly times 




 T1  n
b               (2.4) 
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 0              (2.5) 
 
where  thnT is the development and assembly time of the n
th unit, T1 the development and 
assembly time of the first unit, and R is referred to as the learning rate. The application of 
Eq. 2.4, and the schedule advantages—or time compressibility—resulting from heritage 
and learning curve effects are illustrated in Figure 11, where the cumulative production 
time for n identical units is plotted with and without learning effects. In the case of 
commercial communication satellites, the production of a large number of identical units 
and the resulting time savings may explain (at least partly) their higher responsiveness 
compared to that of military and scientific missions, as observed previously on Figure 3.  
Heritage, as shown in Figure 11, is the “depth of the past” or the amount of experience in 
producing identical units (n), whereas what is traditionally  referred to as the learning 
curve, or learning rate, R is another parameter that determines the improvements (in 
terms of production time or cost) between two identical and consecutive units produced. 
(The cost analog of this model (Eq. 2.4) is sometimes written as follows: 
C
n th
 CTFU  n
b . For this model, “the learning rate (R) for the space and aerospace 
industry is such that, on average, the nth unit will cost between 87% and 96% of the 
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Figure 11. Heritage and learning effects for R = 80% (illustrative) 
 
In addition to heritage and learning curves, the aerospace community has also developed 
and widely adopted the concept of Technology Readiness Levels, or TRL, introduced by 
NASA in the 1980s [48]. “TRL [is a] systematic metric/measurement that supports, 1) the 
assessments of the maturity of a particular technology, and, 2) the consistent comparison 
of maturity between different types of technology” [49]. This metric is organized on a 
scale of nine levels corresponding to key stages of development of a given technology, as 
briefly described in Table 1. TRL has been traditionally used to assess the development 
(and cost) risk of a spacecraft. For example, whether only in-flight proven technologies 
should be admitted in response to an RFP, or not, has potential implications on the design 
and development schedule of a spacecraft. The lack of technology maturity or low TRL, 
sometimes described in the literature as technology uncertainty, is often associated with 
schedule risk, albeit qualitatively. Browning [50] defines schedule risk as the 
“uncertainty in the ability of a project to develop an acceptable design […] within a span 
of time, and the consequences thereof.” The author also defines technology risk as the 
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“uncertainty in capability of technology to provide performance benefits (within cost 
and/or schedule expectations), and the consequences thereof.”  
Table 1. Summary of different Technology Readiness Levels 
TRL Summary description 
TRL 1  Basic principles observed and reported 
TRL 2 Technology concept and or application formulated 
TRL 3 Analytical and experimental critical function 
and/or characteristic proof-of- concept 
TRL 4  
 
Component and/or breadboard validation in 
laboratory environment 
TRL 5  
 
Component and/or breadboard validation in 
relevant environment 
TRL 6  
 
System/subsystem model or prototype 
demonstration in a relevant environment (ground 
or space) 
TRL 7  
 
System prototype demonstration in a space 
environment 
TRL 8  
 
Actual system completed and “flight qualified” 
through test and demonstration (ground or space) 
TRL 9 Actual system “flight proven” through successful 
mission operations 
 
By their definitions alone, these concepts suggest a close relationship between technology 
uncertainty and schedule risk. In fact, in a study conducted by Gupta and Wilemon [51] 
of large technology-based firms, “about 58% of the interviewees cited technological 
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uncertainties as a major reason for delays.” The link between technology uncertainty and 
technology maturity is intuitive: the more mature a technology is, the more knowledge is 
available concerning its development, manufacturing, and mode(s) of operation. This, in 
turn, provides a higher confidence level that the mission requirements will be met. As a 
result, technology uncertainty in the project is reduced. Therefore, maturing technology is 
critical to completing a program on schedule and within budget.  
Low TRL of the space system/payload under development has been repeatedly identified 
by the U.S Government Accountability Office as an important culprit associated with 
schedule slippage [2,22,25,52,53]. Indeed, as the low-TRL world (research environment, 
or S&T in government parlance) and the high-TRL world (e.g, development and 
production) are significantly different and do not always interact seamlessly, it is hard to 
predict how smooth this maturation process will be, and more importantly, how much 
time it will take to bring a low TRL technology (e.g., TRL = 4) to a comfortable level of 
maturity (e.g., TRL = 8). This issue is sometimes referred as the TRL gap and is 
described by George and Powers as “the problem of efficiently transitioning a new 
technology from concept to viable product in the shortest possible time and at the least 
cost” [54]. 
 
TRL, learning curves and heritage, bundled under the single heading of “technology 
heritage”, have therefore significant implications on the design of space systems in 
general and are likely to impact all the parameters identified in Eq. 2.1, which determine 
the local and global responsiveness. In short, the use of higher technology heritage in 
space programs is likely to result in faster delivery times and hence improved 
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responsiveness. The following section further investigates the impact of TRL as a design-
centric lever of responsiveness and explores its influence on schedule slippage. 
2.6 TRL, schedule slippage and responsiveness: an example of 
univariate analysis 
To analyze quantitatively the impact of design levers on responsiveness and schedule 
slippage, one preliminary step consists in looking at the influence of each design attribute 
on schedule, treated independently. In the following, an example of univariate analysis of 
schedule slippage is provided, by considering TRL as the independent variable and using 
it as a proxy for technology maturity (or lack of). Schedule slippage is thus considered a 
random variable, or more precisely, a random vector or an indexed family of random 
variables with TRL as the index. This section proposes to characterize through data 
analysis and modeling the central tendency and dispersion of this random variable as a 
function of TRL.  
2.6.1 Data Description 
Paradoxically, despite the fact that technology readiness level is a central theme in 
feasibility studies of system design (spacecraft and other), limited TRL data is available 
to the technical community for analysis—unlike other parameters such as system cost for 
example for which quantitative data and a number of (cost) models exist and are widely 
available. In some cases, when TRL is discussed in the technical literature, qualitative 
maturity levels (“Low/Medium/High”) are employed.  
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For the purpose of this analysis, programmatic data from 28 NASA programs was 
considered. Most of these programs considered here are unmanned, and include Earth 
science missions and interplanetary probes. Lee and Thomas [55] used this data to 
construct probability-based models for the cost growth of NASA’s programs. Details 
about this data can be found in Ref. 55. This section focuses instead on schedule slippage 
and is concerned with three parameters from the data set: 
1. TRL at start of program 
2. Initial schedule Duration Estimate (IDE)  
3. Final Total schedule Duration (FTD) 
 
The Relative Schedule Slippage (RSS) is defined here as the percentage schedule growth 








RSS              (2.6) 
Recall that the objective of this section is to quantify how much schedule risk/slippage is 
associated with different levels of technology maturity or TRL. Given this objective, a 
regression analysis is performed on the data and the relationship between TRL and RSS 
is investigated. Both the central tendencies and the dispersion of RSS are analyzed as a 
function of TRL and the results are related to schedule risk and slippage. The details are 
further discussed in section 2.6.2. 
 
Before proceeding, a subtlety concerning the TRL data should be addressed: 
TRLs usually define the maturity of a given technology, and by extension, a TRL value is 
commonly assigned to a component characterized by one single technology. However, to 
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extend the notion of technology maturity to an entire program, an average TRL value for 
a complex system must be defined. Lee and Thomas [55] calculated a weighted average 
of TRL for each program (WTRL), by taking the “TRL of each component multiplied by 
their corresponding percent of the allocated cost against the entire program’s cost” as 
defined in Eq. 2.7.  
 
WTRLprogram  wi  TRLci
componentsci





w       (2.7) 
 
   programprogram WTRLnWTRLTRLsystem  n|Nmax      (2.8) 
 
For example, a complex system such as the Hubble Space Telescope is first broken down 
into subsystems (e.g., attitude control), which are then decomposed into components 
(e.g., control moment gyros)‡. The TRL of each component is then considered to 
regressively define the WTRL. This study used the WTRL as a preliminary basis for the 
“average system-TRL” whose influence on schedule slippage was investigated. The 
WTRL is proportional to the amount of resources spent for each component. Components 
with a small wi are either of minor importance in the design, or their TRL is already 
sufficiently high to limit the allocated cost for their development and implementation. In 
both cases, it is reasonable to assume that such components will not critically impact the 
advancement of the schedule, which justifies the use of the WTRL for this schedule 
analysis. However, this WTRL calculation results in a value with decimal digits. Such a 
                                                 
‡ D. Thomas, personal communication, August 2007. 
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degree of precision was not relevant for this study. To obtain the average system-TRL 
(hereafter often simply referred to as “TRL”), the final step consisted in rounding down 
to the next integer by applying the floor function to the WTRL as shown in Equation 
(2.8). Here again, when considering components requiring a large resource investment, it 
is contended that those with the lowest TRLs drive the schedule delays, as they represent 
the “slowest links” of the maturation chain. For example, consider a program whose 
WTRL is 4.62. If it involves components with TRL 5 or 6, it also involves components 
with integer values of TRL less or equal than 4. First, the WTRL of 4.62 gives a good 
indicator of the “average TRL” of the entire system. Then, considering that components 
with low TRL (e.g., TRL = 4) have a bigger impact on schedule slippage than 
components with TRL 5, the integer value, that is TRL = 4 was retained.§ 
2.6.2 Modeling Schedule Slippage 
For each of the 28 NASA programs in the data set, the doublet (TRL; RSS) where the 
TRL consists of the integer values discussed in the previous section is plotted and 
analyzed. The TRLs in the data set range from 4 to 8. The relative schedule slippage is 
considered a random variable—more precisely, a random vector or an indexed family of 
random variables with TRL as the index. In the following, both the central tendency and 
the dispersion of this random variable is analyzed and modeled as a function of the 
independent variable in this study, namely TRL. 
 
                                                 
§ Following these logics, one could argue that the minimum of all the components’ TRLs could be directly 
used in place of the WTRL. However, it is important to capture first the relative importance of every 
component in terms of the amount of resources spent. The WTRL provides this function. 
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2.6.2.1 Mean relative schedule slippage  
The central tendency of RSS is captured by its mean or average value, which for a given 










             (2.9) 
 
Figure 12 shows the mean RSS for each TRL. For example, for a TRL = 4 at start of the 
program, Figure 12 shows that an average 78% schedule slippage has been observed in 
all 28 programs considered—in other words, programs’ schedules have been consistently 
underestimated by 78% when the TRL at start of the program was 4 (this is low maturity 
technology in the context of a space acquisition program). Similarly, when TRL at start 
of the program was 7, Figure 12 shows a mean RSS of 19%. 
 
More generally, Figure 12 shows a monotonically decreasing average RSS as a function 
of TRL. This result can be interpreted as follows: the quality of the initial schedule 
estimate (IDE) at start of the program improves (i.e., is more accurate) as the 
technologies considered for the program are more mature. Conversely, the lower the 
maturity of the technology considered, the less the actual schedule or FTD can be 
predicted with accuracy (i.e., the bigger the error in the program’s initial schedule 
estimate). While this result may be considered intuitive, Figure 12 provides an empirical 































Figure 12. Relative Schedule Slippage (RSS) for 28 NASA programs (mean, max, and regression 
analysis) as a function of TRL.  
 
To analytically reflect this trend, this work proposes to model the mean relative schedule 
slippage with a decreasing exponential function of TRL, and perform a regression 
analysis on the data set to fit the model parameters. Equation 2.10 represents the model 
structure: 
 
RSS   eTRL              (2.10) 
 
This model structure was chosen both for its simplicity and conceptual relevance. A 
polynomial fit of order n >1 for example would be meaningless considering the small size 
of the sample, and the absence of a conceptual interpretation of the coefficients needed to 
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ensure goodness-of-fit. More importantly, the needed function should 1) account for the 
reduction of the schedule slippage with higher TRLs, and 2) provide increasingly smaller 
increments in schedule slippage as TRL increases. Condition 2 can be stated 
mathematically as follows: the absolute value of the derivative of the RSS  with respect 
to TRL should be a decreasing function. This justified the choice of a decreasing 
exponential function. 
 
Table 2 shows the results of the regression analysis using this model structure (Eq. 4). A 
comparison of the observed and modeled mean relative schedule slippage is provided in 
Table 3. The model of the mean relative schedule slippage, which consists of Eq. 2.10 
and the value of its parameters in Table 2, is fairly accurate, as reflected by the 
coefficient of determination R2, 94%, and by the error between the model output and the 
observed data (less than 10 percent). 
 
Table 2. Model parameters for the average schedule slippage in this data set 







The R2 parameter** indicates that the variability in the mean relative schedule slippage is 
primarily accounted for by the TRL. However, due to the limited size of the sample (28 
data points with an average of 6 points for each TRL), the R2 value of this model, 94%, 
should be considered with caution and not interpreted beyond the fact it indicates an 
accurate model. 
 
Table 3. Model accuracy: mean relative schedule slippage and TRL 










4 78% 88% 10% 
5 57% 50% 7% 
6 20% 29% 9% 
7 19% 16% 3% 
8 7% 9% 2% 
 
Note that while no spacecraft with an average system-TRL of 9 was found in the original 
data set, the modeled RSS mean extrapolated for a system-TRL of 9 yields a value of 
5.3%, suggesting that schedule slippage may still occur for the highest level of 
technology maturity. This tends to validate the influence of non-technical parameters 
(i.e., the “soft” levers of responsiveness discussed in section 2.5.2) on schedule slippage. 
                                                 
** If yi are the values of the dependant variable considered, ˆ yi the fitted values, and y the sample mean, the 
coefficient of determination is defined by R2 








, and takes a value between 0 and 1. 
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2.6.2.2 Dispersion of the relative schedule slippage 
In addition to the mean relative schedule slippage, the data allows us to model the 
envelope or range within which the relative schedule slippage falls for each TRL. The 
range of the relative schedule slippage is referred to as its dispersion. In the following, 
the range or envelope of RSS is modeled by the upper- and lower bound (UB, and LB 
respectively) values of RSS for each TRL level: 
UB j  max RSSi TRL j







              
 (2.11) 
 
The envelope and dispersion of the data set are defined by Eq. 2.12: 
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         (2.12) 
 
The lower-bound model (LBj) is trivial and equal to zero for all TRLs. In other words, for 
each TRL, at least one data point was found in this sample for which the initial estimated 
schedule (IDE) almost matched the actual schedule (FTD), thus resulting in an RSS 
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almost equal to zero††. Consequently, the upper-bound model is also a model of the data 
dispersion. 
 
The upper-bound is modeled with a decreasing exponential as defined in Eq. 2.13: 
UB   'e'TRL              (2.13) 
 
Figure 12 shows that the dispersion of RSS narrows down as TRL increases. This 
dispersion can be considered a proxy for the time uncertainty in the technology 
maturation process: the lower the TRL, the bigger the schedule uncertainty, that is, the 
less we can predict with accuracy the time it will take to complete a project. GAO [3] put 
it more forcefully: 
“There is no way to estimate how long it would take to design, develop, and build 
a satellite system when critical technologies planned for that system are still in a 
relatively early stages of discovery and invention.” 
These results provide additional nuance to, and quantification of, this statement by GAO. 
Table 4 shows the results of the regression analysis using this model structure (Eq. 2.13).  
This model of the dispersion of the relative schedule slippage is fairly accurate, as 
reflected by the coefficient of determination R2 (83%). However, the same caveat 
regarding the R2 parameter discussed previously (2.6.2.1) also applies in this case of the 
dispersion model. 
                                                 
†† This was a surprising result for the low TRL (4 and 5). It can be assumed that for these exceptional cases 
a significant schedule margins was probably factored into the initial schedule estimate, although 
unfortunately the data provided here does not allow the verification of this assumption.  
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Table 4. Model parameters for the maximum schedule slippage in this data set 





Beyond the schedule estimation errors reflected by the mean RSS model (Equation 2.10 
and Table 2)—these may be due to a variety of factors including intrinsically flawed 
schedule estimation methods in use by the industry—the dispersion of the RSS data 
suggests the existence of other sources of discrepancies between FTD and IDE (i.e., other 
than TRL), specific to each space program (e.g., complexity of the system under 
development, experience of the program manager, funding delays, requirements creep, 
etc.).  
 
The models presented previously constitute an example of a univariate analysis of 
schedule that can help gain a preliminary understanding of the impact of one design 
parameter on schedule (or design lever of responsiveness). Here, technology maturity 
was considered the independent variable, measured through an average or aggregate TRL 
of the spacecraft subsystems. It is however important to recall that the concept of 
technology maturity has its primary meaning when considered at the subsystem or single-
instrument level. For that reason, the use of TRL beyond its initial domain of validity for 
the characterization of an entire system has been criticized [56,57,58,59]. To address the 
limitations of the TRL scale, other metrics have been proposed to assess various aspects 
of the readiness of a complex system. The next section now briefly reviews such metrics 
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to identify whether they can serve as the basis for a framework for modeling spacecraft 
schedule and helping guide design decisions. 
2.7 Other readiness metrics for complex engineering systems 
2.7.1 Integrated Technology Index 
Observing that “TRLs do not provide any insight into the uncertainty that may be 
expected in pursuing the further maturation of the technology in an R&D program”, 
Mankins [60] proposed a new metric called R&D degree of difficulty (R&D3) to 
complement the existing TRL metric. The purpose of the R&D3 is to help quantify the 
perceived difficulty in achieving research and development objectives, and to help decide 
on the appropriate number of design options to consider concurrently to reach those 
objectives. Note that it does not directly help quantify the time needed to bring a system 
to completion. In an effort to address the “technology challenge” that characterizes a 












where for each technology, TRL represents the gap between the current TRL and the 
intended TRL, R&D3 represents the R&D degree of difficulty, TNV represents the 
Technology Need Value (TNV) that reflects the level of criticality of that specific 
technology. A concept with low ITI presents low technological uncertainty and vice-
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versa.. Mankins states that the Integrated Technology Index “compensates inherently for 
the differing levels of fidelity with which different advanced systems concepts may be 
defined (since the number of technologies normalizes the sum of the individual index 
values)”. In other words, ITI attempts to account for the disparities in technology 
advancement within a complex system; however the potential resulting integration 
difficulties are only captured in an indirect manner through the normalization by the 
number of technologies. The Integration Readiness Levels (IRL) described next have 
been defined to more explicitly measure the integration maturity between technologies 
embedded in a complex system. 
2.7.2 Integration Readiness Level (IRL) 
Initially inspired from the Open Systems Interconnect (OSI) standard for network 
systems, the Integration Readiness Level (IRL) scale was proposed by Sauser et al. [61] 
to evaluate the integration maturity of a technology. Its latest formulation [59] with a 9-
level structure resembles that of the TRL scale and is presented in Table 5. 
 
Several comments regarding the IRL scale and its relevance to the work conducted in this 
thesis can be made: 
 
 Sauser et al. [59] state that “IRL does not evaluate cost and schedule”, and much of 
the added value of the IRL scale pertains to the management of technical risk (as 
illustrated by the failure examples of Mars Climate Orbiter, Ariane 5 and Hubble 
Space Telescope presented by the authors as correlated with low-IRL technologies) 
rather than programmatic risk. 
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 Due to its conceptual connections with the OSI model, the proposed IRL scale puts 
much emphasis on data/information exchange. The integration of instruments and 
subsystems into a whole spacecraft not only requires the verification that the 
data/information remains consistent from one technology to the rest of the spacecraft 
(which is the main orientation of the IRL scale), but also necessitates that the integrity 
of the entire system (e.g., from a mechanical, electromagnetic, thermal, etc. 
standpoint) is maintained when a technology is integrated. While this may be implied 
by IRL 7-IRL8, the actual integration and testing of the technologies constitutes an 
important phase of the spacecraft development that this thesis seeks to more explicitly 
capture. 
 
 The IRL does in fact relate to a duplet of technologies (Technology 1, Technology 2) 
rather than one single technology. The authors recall that “it is to be used to assess 
integration maturity between two TRL assessed technologies”. It is therefore not 
sufficient per se to evaluate the maturity of the integration of a technology with 
respect to its entire environmental system or spacecraft host.  Recognizing this 
limitation, the authors have proposed another metric called System Readiness Level 






Table 5. Summary of different Integration Readiness Levels [59] 
IRL Summary description 
IRL 1 An interface between technologies has been identified with 
sufficient detail to allow characterization of the relationship 
IRL 2 There is some level of specificity to characterize the 
interaction (i.e., ability to influence) between technologies 
through their interface. 
IRL 3 There is compatibility (i.e., common language) between 
technologies to orderly and efficiently integrate and interact. 
IRL 4 
 
There is sufficient detail in the quality and assurance of the 
integration between technologies. 
IRL 5 
 
There is sufficient control between technologies necessary to 
establish, manage, and terminate the integration. 
IRL 6 
 
The integrating technologies can accept, translate, and 
structure information for its intended application. 
IRL 7 
 
The integration of technologies has been verified and 
validated and an acquisition/insertion decision can be made. 
IRL 8 
 
Actual integration completed and “mission qualified” through 
test and demonstration, in the system environment. 
IRL 9 Integration is “mission proven” through successful mission 
operations 
 
2.7.3 System Readiness Level (SRL) 
Sauser et al. [57] proposed a metric to “assess the maturity of the entire system that is 
under development”, and adopted a formulation based on the existing TRL scale as well 




jiji TRLIRLSRL  (2.15)
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with IRLjj = 1 and IRLij = 0 when there is no integration between technology i and 
technology j. SRLi attemps to quantify “the readiness level of a specific technology with 
respect to every other technology in the system while also accounting for the 
development state of each technology through the TRL” [57]. A composite SRL index 
can then be defined as a weighted average of the SRLi for all the technologies included in 
the system to reflect the overall maturity of the entire system. Note that in this form, the 
composite SRL index would present the same limitations than the averaged system-TRL 
that was presented at the end of section 2.6. The authors then investigated the possible 
mapping between their SRL index and the different phases of the system engineering life 
cycle but warned that “the SRL for one system cannot be compared to the SRL of another 
system unless they are the same system”. In other words, the SRL (in its current 
formulation) could prove useful to monitor the advancement of the readiness of one given 
system, but it does not allow a consistent comparison across systems (unlike the TRL 
scale). 
2.8 Summary 
This chapter provided a review and synthesis of the literature on responsive space and the 
challenge of keeping the development of space systems on schedule. A multi-disciplinary 
framework was provided for thinking about and addressing issues of space 
responsiveness. Also discussed were tools for identifying and prioritizing responsiveness-
improvement efforts. The levers of responsiveness, or means for improving space 
responsiveness were presented, including spacecraft design and operational levers, launch 
levers, and “soft” levers of responsiveness. In response to the first research objectives, 
this chapter then focused on one design-centric lever of responsiveness, namely the 
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Technology Readiness Level. The preliminary univariate analysis of schedule as a 
function of average system-TRL suggested that the overall level of technology maturity 
characterizing a space system at the start of its development has significant implications 
on schedule slippage and schedule risk. However, the concept of TRL is meaningful at 
the subsystem or single-instrument level rather than at the system level. In addition, other 
design parameters have a potential influence on schedule (as reflected by the dispersion 
of the RSS), that can be combined with the impact of technology maturity. Finally, the 
last section of this chapter briefly reviewed some other readiness metrics that could 
support the formulation of a framework for the modeling of spacecraft schedule in 
relation with design parameters. The System Readiness Level (SRL) metric exhibited the 
same limitation than an average system-TRL and does not appear to translate into an 
elementary design parameter whose meaning remains consistent across various design 
options. At a more fundamental level, the IRL metric highlighted the significance of 
technology integration in the spacecraft development process, which was not explicitly 
reflected in the Integration Technology Index (ITI). Nevertheless, its formulation 
(between a duplet of technologies), its focus (information-centric) and its purpose 
(managing technical risk), do not adequately address the thesis’ objective of developing a 
framework for modeling spacecraft schedule that should help inform design decisions 
that have programmatic implications. 
 
The next chapter proposes a modeling framework of spacecraft schedule based on the 
concept of “spacecraft technology portfolio” that  
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1) addresses the limitation of an average system-TRL (or a composite SRL) by 
considering the full spectrum of technology maturities of the various instruments (or 
subsystems) in a spacecraft 
2) explicitly captures the significance of the integration and testing phase of the entire 
space system. 
Furthermore, this model is formulated in a stochastic fashion, in order to reflect the 






3 SPACECRAFT TECHNOLOGY PORTFOLIO: 
STOCHASTIC MODELING AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
RESPONSIVENESS AND SCHEDULE SLIPPAGE 
 
“By the fourth grade, I graduated to an erector set  
and spent many happy hours constructing devices of unknown purpose  
where the main design criterion was to maximize the number of moving parts and overall size.”  
 
Steven Chu, American physicist, 1997 Nobel Prize Laureate in Physics. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter extends the analysis conducted in chapter 2 by increasing the resolution on 
the technology maturity and assigning a TRL to each of the subsystems or instruments 
considered for the spacecraft. Furthermore, various design parameters, other than TRL, 
can drive schedule and also be considered as “levers of responsiveness”. For example, the 
size and/or complexity of a spacecraft (as discussed in section 2.5.3.2), defined by its 
number of subsystems or instruments, is likely to affect the final delivery schedule of the 
spacecraft. The idea that, with a large number of instruments, the completion of an entire 
spacecraft is more likely to be delayed due to slippage in the development of one 
immature instrument is supported by historical evidence. For example, the GAO reports 
[62] that in the case of the DOD’s Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), “several design 
modifications have been necessary, including 39 modifications to the first of two infrared 
sensors to reduce excessive noise created by electromagnetic interference—a threat to the 
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host satellite’s functionality—delaying delivery of the sensor by 10 months […] 
Moreover, delays in the development of the first sensor have had a cascading effect. […] 
Program officials […] agreed that these delays put the remaining SBIRS High schedule at 
risk.” To quantitatively characterize this risk, this chapter thus proposes to add a portfolio 
dimension to the analysis of spacecraft schedule by considering the impact of the number 
of instruments, their individual technology maturity and the resulting TRL heterogeneity 
on the Time-to-Delivery of the entire spacecraft.  
 
In the literature on and practice of Research & Development (R&D) management, a 
similar problem has been tackled, and the general approach for handling this problem is 
commonly referred to as “portfolio management” (with the qualifiers “R&D” or 
“technology” often preceding it). This chapter adapts the idea of technology portfolio 
from the macro- or company level to the micro-level of a single complex engineering 
system and investigate its relevance and implications. More specifically, a spacecraft is 
conceived of as a portfolio of technologies and instruments. This portfolio is (to be) 
embedded within the spacecraft and is characterized by the triplet (number of instruments 
–or size–, individual TRLs, TRL heterogeneity). This technology portfolio 
characterization endogenous to the system can be considered as one proxy for the 
spacecraft’s complexity. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief overview of the concept 
of portfolio as it has traditionally been implemented by successful companies and the 
relevance of this approach to spacecraft design and schedule analysis is shown in section 
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3.3. In section 3.4, the relationship between technology maturity and delivery schedule is 
modeled at a micro-level via the formulation of a probabilistic model of the Time-to-
Delivery (TDi) for each instrument of the spacecraft’s “portfolio.” Based on actual data, 
models for the Time-to-Integration of the spacecraft and for the Shipping time of the 
spacecraft are then developed as a function of the number of instruments. The 
development of the entire spacecraft is finally simulated via the execution of Monte Carlo 
simulations of the three models sequentially: the concurrent development model of each 
instrument of the spacecraft portfolio, the model of Time-to-Integration of the whole 
spacecraft, and the model of Shipping time. The result is an important new random 
variable, referred to in this chapter as the spacecraft Time-to-Delivery (TDs/c), and 
defined as the time elapsed from the start of the program until the spacecraft is launched. 
This new random variable (along with its mean and dispersion) is one important 
characterization of responsiveness and is dependent on both the “size” and the maturity 
of the spacecraft’s technology portfolio.  From the distribution of TDs/c, the notions of 
Mean-Time-To-Delivery (MTTD) of a spacecraft and its schedule delivery risk are 
introduced. Section 3.5 investigates how the MTTD and schedule delivery risk are 
affected by the choice of the spacecraft technology portfolio (i.e., by varying the “size” of 
the portfolio and the individual technology maturities). Homogeneous TRL cases (with 
only instruments of identical initial TRL) and heterogeneous ones are considered. Finally, 
section 3.6 discusses the utility implications of varying the portfolio characteristics and 
time-horizons, and provides “portfolio maps” as guides to help system designers identify 
appropriate portfolio characteristics when operating in a calendar-based design 
environment (which is the paradigm shift that space responsiveness introduces). 
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3.2 The notion of portfolio in Finances and Research & Development 
In the 1950’s, Markowitz formulated the basic concepts of the Modern Portfolio Theory 
for financial assets, which rapidly generated significant interest in academia and in the 
financial industry. According to Markowitz’ rule of mean-variance of returns, an investor 
should choose the portfolios of assets that maximize the expected value of return for a 
given variance of return (i.e., the “financial risk”) or minimize the variance of return for a 
given expected value of return [63]. This principle highlighted the importance of the 
diversification of assets in order to optimize the value of the entire portfolio. In the field 
of Research & Development (R&D), this problematic found much resonance within 
companies having to decide on the types of research projects to support and the 
appropriate amount of resources to allocate to new projects. Since the 1970’s, the idea of 
R&D portfolios has gained strong foothold in industry and academia, and numerous 
studies tackling the issue of technology portfolio management have been conducted and 
published, sometimes under the heading of “New Product Development” (NPD) [64,65]. 
The similarities between R&D portfolio and the initial Markowitz formulation involving 
financial assets have been summarized by Roussel et al.: “the purpose of both business 
and R&D portfolio planning typically is to reach the optimum point between risk and 
reward, stability and growth” [66]. More recently, Cooper et al. proposed a formal 
definition of portfolio management [67]: 
 
“Portfolio management is a dynamic decision process, whereby a business’s list 
of active new product (and R&D) projects is constantly updated and revised. In 
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this process, new projects are evaluated, selected, and prioritized; existing 
projects may be accelerated, killed, or de-prioritized; and resources are allocated 
and reallocated to the active projects.” 
 
These definitions highlight several key notions characterizing the concept of portfolio 
and portfolio management. Five such key notions are discussed next: 
 
1. Portfolio management is a resource allocation problem. It is the scarcity of 
resources (for example, funding or time) available to a company, which calls for 
the use of a framework to select and appropriately distribute the resources among 
the prospective projects. In fact, resource limitations that were overlooked during 
the selection process often explain project cancellation [68,69].   
 
2. In portfolio management, innovation is recognized as essential to the sustainable 
success of a company. The constitution of a portfolio is thus directly related to the 
amount of innovation in which a company is willing to invest in order to meet its 
objectives. Innovating projects may offer novel capabilities or enhanced 
performance benefits over existing offerings (products or services) and can 
potentially give a company a competitive advantage by positioning it as a leader 
in an emerging market [64]. On the other hand, such projects often require, in the 
short-term, significant resource investments while offering the possibility of mid- 
or long-term returns on those investments. 
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3. As suggested by Markowitz [63] and Roussel et al. [66] uncertainties and risk 
are essential motivations for the portfolio mindset, whether in finance or in 
technology R&D. In a 2007 report, the GAO advocated the use of a portfolio 
management approach for the DOD acquisitions by noting that focusing 
excessively on new products in isolation could “result in long cycle times, wasted 
money and lost opportunities elsewhere”[70]. In addition to the technical risks 
and performance uncertainties inherent to new and unproven products/projects, 
environmental uncertainties (e.g., related to the dynamics of the market) put the 
portfolio selection process in a stochastic (dynamic and non-deterministic) 
context.  
 
4. In presence of limited resources and various sources of uncertainties, the balance 
of the resources allocation among projects is therefore a key notion to ensure that 
these resources are used in an optimal way, that is, to both maximize the return on 
investment and mitigate risk through diversification. In summary, portfolio 
management is about the “optimal investment mix between risk versus return, 
maintenance versus growth, and short-term versus long-term new product 
projects”[71].  
 
5. Finally, project selection for the constitution of a portfolio is a dynamic, iterative 
process, in which “[decisions] are revisited at multiple stages throughout product 
development in a gated review and assessment process”[70].  
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Numerous methods have been proposed and extensively discussed in the literature on 
developing and managing an R&D portfolio. Archer and Ghasemzadeh [68] 
distinguished these methods by identifying the following three major phases in the 
process of constituting an R&D portfolio: strategic considerations, individual project 
evaluation, and portfolio selection.  
 
In the first phase, a company identifies market opportunities and formulates a strategy to 
tackle these opportunities. From a customer perspective, strategies to position the 
company on the market can be for example operational excellence, product leadership or 
customer intimacy [72]. A set of objectives is then defined to support this strategy. 
Ultimately, portfolio management aims at aligning the products or projects with these 
objectives.  
 
In the second phase, projects are evaluated individually on the objectives listed by the 
company. Such criteria are for example expected profits, time-to-completion, cost, 
probability of success, etc. [66] Very often, criteria can be conflicting (e.g., reducing the 
time-to-completion could reduce the probability of success). A myriad of methods, 
quantitative and qualitative, have been proposed to perform this multi-criteria evaluation 
task. Thorough reviews of the literature on these techniques have been provided by Baker 
and Freeland [73], Cooper et al. [67], Chen-Fu Chien [74], Linton et al. [75], Henriksen 
and Traynor [76], Martino [77]. From a quantitative perspective, financial models based 
on net present value (NPV) [78,79], and Real Options Theory [80,81,82] have been 
proposed. While these techniques are formal and quantitative, some business managers 
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find them somewhat impractical and conveying a flawed sense of precision (when the 
numbers can be easily manipulated to support any decision). As a result, more qualitative 
methods such as checklists or scorecards, with various figures of merit for each project, 
have sometimes been used instead [83]. 
 
In the third phase, once the projects have been evaluated individually, the “portfolio” is 
constituted by comparing projects with each other and selecting appropriate combinations 
in line with the company’s strategy and resources. Qualitative methods such as the 
Analytic Hierarchy Procedure (AHP) [84,85] or the 2D bubble diagrams [66] have gained 
much popularity in corporate settings due to their accessibility. Several mathematical 
approaches are also available to select the best combinations by maximizing an objective 
function using for example linear programming [86]. Multi-attribute value/utility 
(MAV/MAU) methods have also been employed to obtain the overall value of a portfolio 
after computing the technical worth of individual projects [87]. 
 
It is important to note that “the combination of individually good projects [does not] 
necessarily constitute the optimal portfolio” [74], and that the emergent properties of the 
portfolio are more than the sum of properties of each individual project. Thus, a critical 
issue in portfolio management concerns the aggregation of attributes of each project into 
the final portfolio.  
3.3 Spacecraft as a technology portfolio 
This chapter proposes the idea that system design is, in several ways, a process similar to 
the constitution of an R&D portfolio. A spacecraft is here conceived of as a “technology 
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portfolio” or a portfolio of technologies. By focusing on the characteristics of this 
portfolio, the system’s size (e.g., number of instruments), the technology maturity of each 
instrument, and the resulting TRL heterogeneity of the portfolio, this chapter investigates 
their effects on the delivery schedule of a space system, its schedule risk, and its utility 
over varying time-horizons. 
 
By conceiving of an engineering system as a value-delivery artifact [88], a fundamental 
systems engineering and design principle similar to the one in portfolio selection is 
encountered: “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts”. Furthermore, beyond the 
housekeeping subsystems of a spacecraft (e.g., power, attitude control, Telemetry, 
Tracking, and Command), special emphasis is put in this chapter on the value-delivering 
elements of a spacecraft, hereafter referred to as the “instruments” or payload, as the 
constitutive elements of the spacecraft “technology portfolio”. The definition of 
“instrument” as a value-delivering part of a spacecraft proposed herein is intentionally 
extensible. For example, in the case of a technology demonstration mission, the 
“instrument” is the subsystem being tested (such as the attitude determination device 
“Compass” carried onboard the Space Technology 6 (ST6) spacecraft for NASA’s New 
Millennium Program).  
 
Using a portfolio approach, the selection of these instruments is performed in order to 
balance return on investment (such as science return) and risk (e.g., schedule risk or cost 
risk). As discussed previously, this selection is a dynamic, stage-gated process during 
which decisions are revisited, as more knowledge of the instruments, the customer 
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requirements, and the constraints becomes available. Figure 13 shows a typical “funnel 





























































Figure 13. Funnel representation of the design and development of a spacecraft conceived of as a 
“portfolio of instruments”.  (Adapted from GAO [70])  
 
Figure 13 is a diagram flowing from left to right, and it reads as follows. To the left, a 
customer need or market opportunity is identified for which a set of spacecraft 
capabilities is required to address or capture (in whole or in part). To provide these 
capabilities, various candidate instruments are considered (e.g., candidates I1 to I6 at the 
entrance of the “funnel”). If new capabilities are required, the technologies characterizing 
the candidate instruments may have low maturity levels and still be under development in 
a Science & Technology (S&T) environment [25]. As a result, some candidate 
instruments, because of their low technology maturity, may not make it past the first gate 
or filter in the funnel (e.g., instrument I4 in Figure 13). As the mission requirements and 
constraints are refined (moving to the right in Figure 13), available resources are 
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concentrated on the instruments that can best meet the objectives. The number of 
candidate instruments thus decreases as these pass the different gates or reviews (such as 
the Mission Definition Review). After the Preliminary Design Review (which 
traditionally marks the end of Phase B), a “design-to” baseline is usually chosen and 
further modifications to this baseline should only represent refinement and not 
fundamental changes [89]. At this point, the down-selection of instruments is assumed to 
be complete. The detailed design and development of the spacecraft is then conducted 
(Phase C and Phase D) and end with the delivery of the spacecraft (launch). 
 
Among the several issues that should be examined during the constitution of a portfolio, 
three essential questions have to be addressed: 1) how many projects can the resources 
support (and how should they be allocated among the various projects), 2) how 
“innovative” these projects (or each project) should be, and 3) what are the implications 
(benefits and risks) associated with different portfolio choices. The “innovativeness” 
dimension of a project is often difficult to quantify. To circumvent this difficulty, in some 
corporate R&D settings, this innovativeness is replaced by the time-to-impact of the 
considered project, with H-1 characterizing projects that can bear fruits within one to 
three years, H-2 within three to five years, and H-3 past five years. This chapter considers 
a spacecraft as a portfolio of technologies with a similar mindset and a focus on 1) the 
number of instruments for a spacecraft (i.e., the portfolio size), 2) the initial technology 
maturity of each instrument (or its TRL, taken here as a proxy for innovativeness) in the 
portfolio and the resulting TRL heterogeneity of the portfolio. The impact of these 
portfolio characteristics on the schedule delivery of the spacecraft and its schedule risk 
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are then analyzed. Finally, this chapter investigates the utility implications of varying the 
portfolio characteristics and time-horizons, and provides “portfolio maps” as guides to 
help system designers identify appropriate portfolio characteristics when operating in a 
calendar-based design environment (which is the paradigm shift that space 
responsiveness introduces, as it is argued in section 3.6.2). 
3.4 Probabilistic Model of Spacecraft Time-to-Delivery 
This section formulates a probabilistic model of the Time-to-Delivery of a spacecraft, 
TDs/c, based on the idea of technology portfolio. The novel random variable here 
introduced, TDs/c, which in the calculations includes the time to delivery of all the 
spacecraft instruments, the time for Integration and Testing of the whole system, and the 
shipping time of the spacecraft to the launch range, is an essential measure for the 
quantification of space responsiveness and schedule risk. Quantitative measures are 
important in any effort to benchmark and improve a given situation, especially the critical 
issue of acquisition of weapon systems in general, and space systems in particular. TDs/c 
is one contribution in this direction. 
3.4.1 Model of Instruments Delivery Schedule 
The first component of TDs/c is a probabilistic model of Instruments Delivery Schedule, 
which relates the time needed to complete the development of all the instruments of the 
spacecraft to their initial technology maturities. The Instruments Delivery Schedule is 
also affected by the size of the spacecraft portfolio (i.e., its number of instruments) in a 
manner that is discussed next.  
 
 74
3.4.1.1 Distributions of Time-to-Delivery of Instruments 
The main inputs of the Instruments Delivery Schedule model are the probability 
distribution functions of each instrument’s Time-to-Delivery. Each instrument i of the 
spacecraft portfolio is characterized by an initial Technology Readiness Level TRLi, and a 
probability distribution function describing the random variable Time-to-Delivery (TDi) 
of this instrument. TDi represents the time needed to fully develop an instrument and have 
it ready for integration in the whole spacecraft. This development of each instrument is 
subject to schedule uncertainty, which justifies the use of a probability distribution to 
model the Time-to-Delivery. The rest of this chapter uses lognormal distributions, which 
are by definition probability distributions of a random variable whose logarithm follows a 
normal distribution. The mean m and the variance v of the lognormal distribution can be 
related to the mean μ and standard deviation σ of the associated normal distribution via 
Eq. (3.1): 
 
As a result, for a given initial TRLi, and a mean mi and a variance vi for the random 
variable TDi (or, equivalently, a mean μi and a standard deviation σi for the random 

























































One distribution of Instrument Time-to-Delivery corresponds to one value of the initial 
TRL of the instrument considered. The use of more mature technologies compresses 
schedule and reduces schedule uncertainty, resulting in a decrease of both the mean and 











TRL 4 < TRL i < TRL 9
m4 > mi > m9
v4 > vi > v9
 
Figure 14. Distributions of Instrument Time-to-Delivery for various values of the initial TRL of the 
instrument (notional) 
Only values of the initial TRL ranging from 4 to 9 are considered in this work, since TRL 
1 through TRL 3 usually correspond to the early research and feasibility study stages 
rather than the technology development phase. The complete TRL scale was presented in 
Table 1. 
3.4.1.2 Portfolio vector 
The composition of the spacecraft is now described via a technology “portfolio vector” 
Pf whose elements are the values of the initial TRL for each instrument i. As the size of 
this portfolio vector represents the actual number of main instruments of the spacecraft, 
several TRL values may be repeated in the vector if the development starts at the same 
initial TRL for different instruments. 
 Pf  TRL1 TRL2 ... TRLn  (3.3)
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For example, a spacecraft whose technology portfolio is Pf = [6 6 8 9] contains 4 
instruments, two with an initial TRL of 6, one that has been completed and qualified 
through test and demonstration (TRL 8), and one that has been qualified through 
successful mission operations (TRL 9). In the following, n is used to refer to the size of 
the Technology Portfolio, i.e., the number of instruments. 
3.4.1.3 Instruments Delivery Schedule 
The development of the instruments is illustrated in Figure 15, and is carried out in a non-














Figure 15. Instruments Delivery Schedule of a spacecraft (notional) 
 
The subsequent step towards the completion of the spacecraft is the Integration and 
Testing phase, which starts when all the instruments have been developed and are 
“readied”, or stated differently, when the development of the last instrument has been 
completed. (Analysis of master schedules of several historical NASA missions revealed 
that the development of the spacecraft bus – which will host the instruments – usually 
ends before or coincides with the completion of the last instrument. For this reason, 
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completion of the last instrument has been chosen as the stopping condition for the 
Instruments Delivery Schedule). Assuming that the development of all the spacecraft 
instruments is triggered around the same time (given that the call for and the contracts of 
all the instruments are usually issued around the same time), the Instruments Delivery 
Schedule (IDS) is defined as the maximum Time-to-Delivery (TDi) of all the instruments 





 max  (3.4)
 
As each instrument’s Time-to-Delivery (TDi) is a random variable, the resulting IDS is 
also a random variable (nonparametric, unlike the parametric lognormal distribution of 
TDi).  
3.4.2 Model of spacecraft Integration & Testing 
Once all the instruments have been developed, they have to be integrated into the 
spacecraft and tested before the whole system is readied and delivered to the launch 
range. Therefore, in addition to the IDS, the model of Time-to-Delivery for an entire 
spacecraft includes a second model accounting for the Integration & Testing (I&T) phase 
of the instruments. The second “dimension” of the portfolio, namely its size (or number 
of instruments) is expected to directly influence the duration of this phase. In the 
following, the duration of spacecraft Integration & Testing is referred to as Tint. To 
analyze the impact of the portfolio size on Tint, schedule data from 21 NASA spacecraft 
                                                 
‡‡ The work presented in this chapter focuses on the modeling of the impact of varying portfolio characteristics on 
spacecraft delivery schedule (based on a determined number of instruments, and well-defined instruments TRLs). 
However, for completeness purposes, the model could easily incorporate the bus completion time by using max(TDi, 
Tbus) instead of Eq. 3.4. This would not affect the design space exploration presented in this chapter. 
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for which the duration of the I&T phase as well as the number of instruments were 
available is considered. In this sample, the number of instruments per spacecraft ranged 
from one to six. Within each of these six categories, the average duration of Integration & 
Testing was computed, as shown on Figure 16 as a function of the number of 



































Figure 16. Model of average duration of Integration & Testing as a function of the number of 
instruments  
 
The visible trend in Figure 16 confirms the intuition that on the average, the I&T phase of 
a spacecraft with many instruments (i.e., a “large portfolio size”) takes longer than that of 
a spacecraft with fewer instruments. Stated differently, the more instruments a spacecraft 
has, the longer the average Tint. Consider now a linear model of the average Tint, as 
expressed in Eq. (3.5): 
 
 Tint   a n  b (3.5)
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n represents the number of instruments in the spacecraft, and a and b are the parameters 
of the regression line. The resulting coefficient of determination is R2 = 0.8448, which 
along the visual inspection of Figure 16 indicates that a linear regression of this data 
provides a reasonable model to capture the average duration of the I&T phase for varying 
number of instruments. The parameters of this linear model [Eq. (3.5)] are provided in 
Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Model parameters for the average Tint (a,b) and the variance of Tint (c) in the data set 
Model Parameter Value 
a   4.5 
b  (month) 4.8 
c 74.0 
 
This model however does not capture variability or schedule uncertainty in the I&T 
phase. To do so, Tint is considered as a random variable instead of the single average 
value provided by Eq. (3.5), and lognormal probability distribution functions are used to 
model Tint (the justification of this choice is provided in the appendix). Furthermore, for 
each value of the portfolio size, the mean mn of the corresponding lognormal distribution 
is given by Eq. (3.5), namely mn = Tint  . The standard deviation is independent of the 




The resulting model for Tint is given by Eqs (3.6) and (3.7): 







































































3.4.3 Model of Spacecraft Shipping Time 
Once all the instruments have been delivered, and the spacecraft has been integrated and 
tested, it is ready to be shipped to the launch site. A few months are typically needed to 
ship the spacecraft to the launch site and integrate it to the launch vehicle, before it is 
delivered on-orbit to the customer and starts providing service. A brief holding time may 
also be needed before the launch range and/or the launch vehicle is ready. For the 
purpose of this work, a probabilistic model of the duration of this phase (that is referred 
to as “Shipping time” in a broad sense) was derived based on data from the 21 NASA 
spacecraft. Figure 17 shows the distribution of spacecraft shipping time in the sample, 
along with a lognormal fit of the data. 
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Figure 17. Distribution of the spacecraft shipping time in the data sample and associated lognormal 
fit  



































































mship and vship are respectively the mean and variance of the distribution. The values of 
these parameters resulting from the lognormal fit of the data are provided in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Parameters of the lognormal model for the spacecraft shipping time Tship  





3.4.4 Monte-Carlo simulations 
There are now three random variables that contribute to the Time-to-Delivery TDs/c of a 
spacecraft. The three variables are the Instruments Delivery Schedule, IDS, the duration 
of spacecraft Integration & Testing phase, Tint, and the shipping time Tship. Furthermore, 
the first random variable, IDS, results from a mathematical operation [Eq. (3.4)] on 
multiple random variables, namely the Time-to-Delivery (TDi) of all the instruments. As 
a result, in order to propagate the uncertainties on the input (random) variables, and 
capture their effect on the output of interest, namely the spacecraft Time-to-Delivery 
TDs/c [Eq. (3.9)], a numerical simulation method that can reproduce the random nature of 
the inputs is needed. This is typically done using a Monte-Carlo simulation, which is 
obtained by running an analytical model with random variables a large number of times 
(typically several thousands of run) and picking different values from the probability 
distribution functions of the input variables at each run [90].  
 
The probability density functions of the three input random variables (TDi, Tint, Tship) are 
given in Eqs (3.1), (3.6), and (3.8). As an illustration of Monte-Carlo simulations, these 
equations were used to randomly generate 50,000 values for each of these random 
variables. The intermediate results are shown in Figure 18, Figure 19 and Figure 20. In 
the subsection 3.4.5, Monte-Carlo simulations are used to derive the end result of interest 
in this chapter, namely the spacecraft Time-to-Delivery TDs/c for varying portfolio 
vectors, that is for different payload sizes, and different TRL’s of its constitutive 
instruments. 
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Initial TRL = 9
 
Figure 18. Lognormal distributions of the Time-to-Delivery for the instruments, for each value of the 
initial TRL 
Based on the functional form of Eq. (3.2), Figure 18 represents the six lognormal 
distributions obtained after generating random values for the Time-to-Delivery of the 
instruments (first step of the model of Instruments Delivery Schedule), given their initial 
TRL (from TRLini = 4 to TRLini = 9). Note that their form corresponds to the trends 
presented on Figure 14. 
 
Similarly, Figure 19 represents the six lognormal distributions of Eq. (3.6) that model the 
duration of the spacecraft Integration & Testing for values of the portfolio size ranging 
from n = 1 to n = 6. Observe that while the dispersion of the random data generated by 
Monte-Carlo simulation shows little variation, the mean duration increases as the 
portfolio size increases, as described by Eq. (3.7). 
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Figure 19. Lognormal distributions of the spacecraft Integration & Testing Time for each value of 
the portfolio size n 
 
Finally, the random data generated for the duration of spacecraft shipping following the 
model of Eq. (3.8) is shown in Figure 20.  
 














Figure 20. Lognormal distribution of the spacecraft Shipping Time  
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3.4.5 Final Model of Spacecraft Time-to-Delivery 
The final model of spacecraft Time-to-Delivery TDs/c estimates the total time needed 
from the start of the development of the instruments to the instant when the spacecraft is 
launched. This final model therefore calculates the spacecraft Time-to-Delivery TDs/c by 
summing the durations of the three previous consecutive phases, the Instruments 
Development Schedule, the Integration & Testing, and the Shipping [Eq. (3.9)]: 
 TDs / c  IDS Tint Tship  (3.9)
 
Since IDS, Tint, and Tship are random variables, the spacecraft Time-to-Delivery TDs/c is 
also a random variable with a probability density function numerically derived through 
the Monte Carlo simulation discussed previously. The process for calculating TDs/c is 































IDS = f (n,…,TRLi ,…,TRLn ) Tint = f (n,… )
+




Pf = [ TRL1, TRL2, … ,TRLn ]
 
Figure 21. Summary of the model of spacecraft Time-to-Delivery (notional) 
 
3.4.6 Domain of applicability and limitations of the model of time-to-delivery 
It is now important to emphasize the distinction between the structure of the model and 
the data discussed previously that was used to calibrate the model. Figure 21 showed a 
representation of the structure of the model of spacecraft time-to-delivery articulated 
around the concept of spacecraft portfolio. The conceptual foundations of this model 
make it relevant for a variety of applications and analyses whose validity is mainly 
limited by the availability and nature of the data used to calibrate the model. The only 
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current structural limitation pertains to the assumption that the development schedule of a 
spacecraft is organized around three main phases that are conducted sequentially. While 
this may be a reasonable approximation for many common spacecraft, in the case of large 
and very complex missions such as NASA’s Cassini spacecraft, the integration and 
testing of some subsystems may follow parallel paths while other 
technologies/subsystems are still maturing and at a relatively low TRL.  
 
In addition to the proposed structure of the model of spacecraft time-to-delivery, which is 
a main conceptual contribution of this thesis, a quantitative application of this model is 
presented by using historical data. As discussed in sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3, the data used 
to calibrate the characteristic parameters of the distributions of the models of integration 
& testing time and shipping time included 21 NASA spacecraft for which the duration of 
the corresponding phases and the number of instruments was known. This dataset 
contained spacecraft with up to six payload instruments. In this thesis, a portfolio 
instrument was defined as “an independent value-delivering subsystem of a spacecraft” 
(as presented in Section 3.3), in a manner that is consistent with the traditional definition 
of payload instrument used by NASA. As a result, the quantitative results of the analyses 
of spacecraft time-to-delivery conducted for this thesis are valid for a portfolio size ninst 
less or equal than six. Several extensions are however possible: 
 Should data including larger spacecraft (i.e., with more instruments) be available 
in the future, valid quantitative results could be derived for values of the portfolio 
size larger than six. 
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 Should a different definition of portfolio instrument be adopted (e.g., that extends 
to other spacecraft subsystems, as discussed in section 3.3), the structure and 
theoretical underpinnings of the model of spacecraft time-to-delivery remain 
relevant, and additional data will be required to calibrate each phase duration and 
to perform the corresponding quantitative analyses.  
3.4.7 Metrics of interest 
From the output probability distribution function of spacecraft Time-to-Delivery, TDs/c, 
two important quantities can now be defined: 
 
1. The first measure is the mean of this output random variable TDs/c, which is 
referred to hereafter as the Mean-Time-To-Delivery (MTTD) of the spacecraft. 
The concept of a MTTD of a spacecraft is one important quantitative metric for 
the analysis, measurement, and improvement of space responsiveness, and can be 
thought of as a proxy for the time constant 0, indicator of responsiveness as 
discussed in Chapter 2.  
2. Furthermore, a measure of variability of the spacecraft Time-to-Delivery is 
considered. Instead of using the standard deviation of the spacecraft Time-to-
Delivery, another measure that should prove more useful to system engineers and 
program managers is introduced, namely the likelihood of overshooting a given 
schedule estimate, which represents a form of schedule risk. More specifically, a 
family of schedule risks SRmr is defined, for various values of mr, as discussed 
next. Considering that the MTTD for a spacecraft constitutes a reasonable estimate 
that program managers could follow in planning the schedule, the Schedule Risk 
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cs dttfMTTDTDPSR )(}{ /0  (3.10)
 
f is the probability density function of TDs/c as represented on Figure 21. When 
defining any type of risk, it is often useful to specify the “risk level” considered. 
Risk is indeed commonly represented by a likelihood of occurrence of an event 
associated with the impact of this event (here, the “risk level”). (Risk is however 
sometimes mistakenly considered as the product of the probability of occurrence 
p with the consequence of the occurrence c. This definition is flawed and 
represents a misunderstanding of the concept of risk [91]. Risk is defined for 
various scenarios with likelihood of occurrence AND consequences, and not 
likelihood times consequence, p*c, a product which reduces the two-dimensional 
risk problem into a meaningless single dimension). The schedule risk SR0 of Eq. 
(3.11) captures all the various schedule slippages that can occur, relatively to the 
MTTD estimate. It is however possible to define other risk levels by focusing on 







csmr dttfmrMTTDTDPSR )(}{ /  (3.11)
 
mr represents, in years, the amplitude of the schedule slippage (from a program 
management perspective, mr can also represent the schedule margin planned for 
the program). For example, in the rest of this chapter the probability of 
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overshooting the MTTD by 6 months SR0.5 is considered, as well as the probability 
of overshooting the MTTD by one year SR1, etc. 
 
Figure 22 provides a visual illustration of the MTTD and schedule risk SR0 given 
the Monte Carlo simulation output of the probability distribution function of 
spacecraft Time-to-Delivery, TDs/c.  
 















Figure 22. Final distribution of spacecraft Time-to-Delivery TDs/c with MTTD and SR0  (illustrative). 
The following section now analyzes the influence of the spacecraft portfolio choice on 
the MTTD and various Schedule Risks. 
 
3.5 Impact of Spacecraft Portfolio Choice on Mean-Time-To-Delivery 
and Schedule Risk 
Farquhar and Rao [92] introduced the concept of “portfolio balance” by defining the total 
balance of a portfolio as “homogeneity or uniformity of scores of items on certain 
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attributes” (equi-balance) and “heterogeneity and multiformity of scores of items” on 
others (counter-balance). In this section, a similar classification is adopted by defining the 
balance of a spacecraft technology portfolio with respect to the individual TRL of all its 
instruments. The impact of portfolio choice on MTTD and Schedule Risk is investigated, 
by distinguishing two types of “balance” of spacecraft portfolio: homogeneous TRL 
cases, and heterogeneous TRL cases. 
3.5.1 Homogeneous TRL case 
The portfolio configurations considered in this section are referred as “homogeneous” as 
each instrument constituting the portfolio is developed from the same initial TRL. 
Configurations for which the development of the instruments starts at various values of 
TRL for the different instruments (the heterogeneous TRL cases) are discussed in the 
next subsection.  
3.5.1.1 Analysis of Mean-Time-To-Delivery 
Figure 23 (left) shows the influence of the initial technology maturity of the instruments, 
measured by the common value of their initial TRL, on the Mean-Time-To-Delivery of 
the spacecraft. Various portfolio sizes are represented, from n = 1 to n = 6 instruments. 
The two main ideas discussed in the Introduction can be found in Figure 23 (left): 
 
1. The MTTD of the spacecraft is reduced when the TRL of its instruments at the 
start of the spacecraft development is higher. In other words, a spacecraft on 
average will be completed and delivered faster when its instruments are more 
technologically mature. Indeed, a better knowledge of the technologies embodied 
in the instruments at the start of development compresses the delivery schedule of 
 92
these instruments. For example, the output distribution of TDs/c obtained by the 
model shows that, for n = 2 instruments, the MTTD is reduced from roughly 78 
months for TRLini = 4 to 30 months for TRLini = 9. 
 
2. For any given value of the initial TRL of the instruments, the MTTD increases as 
the spacecraft portfolio size increases. In other words, a spacecraft on average will 
take longer to be completed and delivered when it has more instruments. This 
increase is caused by the effect of the number of instruments n on both the 
Instruments Development [Eq. (3.4)] and Integration & Testing [Eq. (3.5–3.7)] 










































































Figure 23. MTTD as a function of the initial TRL of the instruments (left) and as a function of the 
portfolio size (right) 
The two previous results confirm intuition: longer schedules are associated with the use 
of lower technology maturity, as well as the inclusion of more instruments in a 
spacecraft. 
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The right plot of Figure 23 represents the same outputs of the model as those shown in 
the left plot but from a different perspective that highlights the combined effect of 
portfolio size and technology maturity. More specifically, it can be seen on the right plot 
of Figure 23 that: 
 
1. The sensitivity of the MTTD to TRL increases when the number of instruments 
increases. For example, when the spacecraft contains one instrument, the MTTD 
jumps from 24 to 64 months when the instruments TRL drops from 9 to 4, i.e. a 
difference of D1=40 months.  However, when the spacecraft contains 6 
instruments, the MTTD jumps from 49 months to 111 months when the 
instruments TRL drops from 9 to 4, i.e. a difference of  D6= 62 months. The fact 
that D6 > D1 reflects the more significant impact of the instruments TRL for larger 
portfolios. 
 
2. The impact of an increase in the number of instruments on the MTTD is more 
significant at low TRL. For example, at TRL = 9, the spacecraft’s MTTD is 24 
months with one instrument and it increases to 49 months when the spacecraft 
contains 6 instruments, i.e. an increase of 9 = 25 months. However, at TRL 4, 
when the spacecraft development starts with a single instrument, its MTTD is 64 
months and it increases to 111 months when the spacecraft contains 6 
instruments, i.e. an increase of 4 = 47 months. The fact that 4 > 9 reflects the 
more significant impact of a portfolio size increase for lower TRLs. 
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These observations are two faces of the same coin and they characterize the joint effects 
of the spacecraft portfolio characteristic (size and technology maturity) on the Mean-
Time-To-Delivery (MTTD) of the spacecraft. Incidentally, this finding provides one 
explanation to the larger dispersion of schedule slippages at low TRL than at high TRL, 
presented in section 2.6.2.2. 
3.5.1.2 Analysis of Schedule Risk 
In addition to the MTTD results discussed previously, Figure 24 provides the schedule 
risk curves as a function of the initial TRL of the spacecraft’s instruments, for a portfolio 
of n = 3 instruments. A significant reduction of schedule risk is visible when the TRL of 
the instruments increases. Figure 24 reads as follows. For example, with instruments of 
TRL = 4 at the start of the spacecraft development, the spacecraft time to delivery has 
roughly a 25% likelihood of overshooting the MTTD estimate by one year (mr = 1 year). 
This probability drops to approximately 17% if the instruments’ initial TRL is 6 (middle 
curve in Figure 24). 
Furthermore, a vertical cut across Figure 24 reads as follows. For instruments with  
TRL = 6, there is a 4% likelihood of the spacecraft overshooting its MTTD by 2 years (in 
other words, it is quite unlikely). However, there is a 31% likelihood of the spacecraft 





















Risk level = 6 months
Risk level = 1 year
Risk level = 2 years
 
Figure 24. Schedule Risk curves as a function of the TRL of the instruments (n = 3), for various risk 
levels.  
The concept of schedule risk curves is particularly important in the design and acquisition 
of space systems. This chapter’s recommendations are that the government and the space 
industry 1) adopt and develops, beyond the traditional single-point schedule estimate, 
schedule risk curves in space acquisition programs; 2) that these schedule risk curves be 
made available to policy- and decision-makers; and 3) that adequate schedule margins be 
defined according to an agreed upon acceptable schedule risk level. 
3.5.2 Heterogeneous TRL case 
The analysis conducted in the previous subsection was confined to instruments of 
identical technology maturity at the start of the spacecraft development. This situation 
was referred to as the “homogeneous TRL case.” In this subsection, this constraint is 
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relaxed and spacecraft portfolios with heterogeneous instrument TRLs at the start of the 
spacecraft development are investigated. 
 
A company may wish to allocate resources to different projects in its R&D portfolio that 
are not at the same stage of development or maturity. Similarly, instruments considered 
for inclusion in a spacecraft may not present the same technology maturity at the start of 
the spacecraft development. Cases of spacecraft portfolios with instruments that have 
different initial TRLs are now considered, and the impact of this heterogeneity of the 
technology maturity on the spacecraft mean time to delivery (MTTD) and its schedule 
risk is investigated. 
3.5.2.1 Spacecraft portfolios with two instruments 
To get a preliminary idea of technology maturity heterogeneity, first consider examples 
of spacecraft with only two instruments (i.e., the portfolio size is n = 2), for which the 
initial TRL of both instruments at the start of the spacecraft development is varied. Figure 
25 shows the Mean-Time-To-Delivery for all the 2-Instrument TRL combinations (such 































TRL of Instrument2 = 4
TRL of Instrument2 = 6
TRL of Instrument2 = 9
 
Figure 25. Mean-Time-To-Delivery for heterogeneous TRL cases with 2 Instruments 
Note on Figure 25 that when Instrument 2 has a TRL = 4, increasing the TRL of the other 
instrument (the x-axis) does not result in any significant reduction in the spacecraft 
MTTD. In other words, it is the least mature instrument that drives the MTTD. This result 
is expected since the Integration & Testing phase of the spacecraft can only start once all 
the instruments have been developed, as reflected by the “maximum” function in Eq. 
(3.4). 
3.5.2.2 Degree of TRL-heterogeneity 
To continue the exploration of the concept of TRL-heterogeneity of a portfolio and its 
implications on the Time-to-Delivery of a spacecraft, TDs/c, the following metric to 






1   (3.12)
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n is the portfolio size, μTRL is the average initial TRL of all the instruments in the 
portfolio, and TRLi is the specific TRL of instrument i. The degree of heterogeneity  is 
the standard deviation of the instruments TRLs in the portfolio.  
 
Two observations are in order. First note that when  = 0, all the instruments in the 
portfolio have the same average TRL, and as a result, this becomes the homogeneous 
TRL case discussed in 3.5.1. Second, it should be pointed out other measures of the 
degree of TRL-heterogeneity can be defined, such as the average L1 norm of the 






The definition in Eq. (3.12) was selected over the latter as it provided more “resolution” 
and yielded more spread values to reflect the diversity of portfolio configurations than the 
latter. Both measures however appear equally valid. 
 
As an application of Eq. (3.12), consider the following two portfolio vectors: 
Pf1 = [6 6 6 6 6 6] and Pf2 = [4 5 5 7 7 8]. 
Both of them have the same average TRL μTRL= 6. The degree of TRL-heterogeneity of 
the first is 1 = 0 and of the second 2 = 1.4142. Furthermore, many combinations of 6 
instruments with different TRL can form portfolios with an average TRL of 6. 
 
If responsiveness is an issue for a particular program, or if it is important that a system be 
fielded sooner rather than later, then the following question may emerge during the 
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design down-selection process: which portfolio selection will result in a spacecraft that is 
most likely to be delivered the earliest?  
 
The TRL-heterogeneity measure () allows us to extend the analysis with only two 
instruments in a spacecraft (n = 2) to any value of its portfolio size. The results for n = 6 
are provided in Figure 26. The results show a clear and strong positive correlation 
between the Mean-Time-To-Delivery of a spacecraft (MTTD) and its degree of TRL-
heterogeneity (). For example, the spacecraft with the most heterogeneous portfolio in 
Figure 26 (Pf3 = [4 4 4 6 9 9] with  = 2.2361) takes on average 102 months to be 
delivered, whereas a spacecraft with similar portfolio size and average TRL (i.e., the 
TRL-homogeneous case Pf1 = [6 6 6 6 6 6] and  = 0) takes on average 78 months to be 
delivered. This represents a significant 31% reduction in the MTTD of the spacecraft by 
simply pulling on the degree of TRL-heterogeneity lever to achieve better 
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Figure 26. Mean-Time-To-Delivery as a function of the degree of TRL-heterogeneity ()  
(ninst = 6, and μTRL= 6) 
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In conclusion, this analysis confirms the intuition that it is more advantageous from a 
schedule standpoint (MTTD and schedule risk) to select spacecraft portfolios with 
instruments of similar ( = 0) or roughly similar initial technology maturities (  < 1), 
rather than TRL-heterogeneous portfolios with both high and low maturity instruments. 
3.6 Utility Implications of Spacecraft Time-to-Delivery and Portfolio 
Selection 
3.6.1 Definition of utility 
The motivation for the adoption of a portfolio approach consists in the ability to select a 
bundle of projects (here, instruments in a spacecraft) and carefully plan their 
development over time in order to guide the proper overall trade-offs between return on 
investment and hedging against downside risks. Successful companies using this 
approach typically constitute their R&D portfolio according to a set of short-term, 
medium-term and long-term goals. This section proposes to analyze the cumulative utility 
provided by the spacecraft (through its instruments) and to identify the portfolio for 
which, given a time-horizon ops, this spacecraft utility is maximized. This analysis 
constitutes an important step towards the development of a value-centric design 
methodology (VCDM) for unpriced systems value (e.g., military or scientific systems, 
the services of which are not priced in a market) [93,94]. Utility is here defined as a 
scalar that represents the satisfaction derived from the services provided by the system to 
the customer per unit time. Recall that TDs/c captures the total time elapsing from the 
beginning of instruments development until the spacecraft launch. (For the utility 
analysis, the time needed to perform on-orbit check-ups before the spacecraft is delivered 
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to the customer and starts providing service is neglected). As a result, the model of 
spacecraft Time-to-Delivery presented in section 3.4 can be used, that is, TDs/c months 
after the start of the development for the spacecraft to begin delivering services. In the 
following, the calculation of the cumulative utility is performed starting from TDs/c, until 










Figure 27. Utility provided by the spacecraft until the time-horizon is reached (notional) 
By analogy with the definition of the spacecraft as a Technology Portfolio in Eq. (3.3), 
the instantaneous utility of the spacecraft is defined as the vector composed of the utility 
per unit time provided by each instrument: 
  ncs uuu ˆ...ˆˆˆ 21/ u  (3.13)
The values of the ûi components can be tuned to reflect that an instrument is more 
“useful” than others. For the sake of simplicity, they have all been set to 1 in the analysis 




itot uu ˆˆ  (3.14)
 
As illustrated in Figure 27, the spacecraft starts delivering utility once it has been 
delivered. The cumulative utility obtained after the time-horizon ops is thus defined as 
follows: 
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 )()(ˆ // csopscsopstot TDHTDuu    (3.15)
 
H(ops-TDs/c) is the Heaviside step function whose value is 0 when ops  < TDs/c  (the 
satellite has not yet been delivered) and 1 when ops > TDs/c. 
 
The following analysis considers the TRL-homogeneous case described in section 3.5.1. 
Figure 28 represents the results obtained after running the model for various durations 
after the development starts (i.e., for various time-horizons ops). Each curve in Figure 28 
corresponds to a single value of the time-horizon ops, for which the cumulative utility is 
plotted as a function of the number of instruments. In this example, the initial value of the 
TRL of the instruments is TRLini = 4. As expected, the cumulative utility is higher when 
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Figure 28. Cumulative utility as a function of portfolio size 
 for different time-horizons (TRLini = 4) 
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More importantly, the significant result in Figure 28 is the existence of a maximal 
cumulative utility for a given time-horizon. For example, if the time-horizon of interest is 
6 years after the development starts, it can be seen on Figure 28 that a spacecraft with 
only one instrument will provide the most utility of all other spacecraft with larger 
portfolio sizes. Spacecraft with more instruments will take longer to develop, and as a 
result, their on-orbit operational time will be shorter for a given time-horizon of interest 
(see Figure 27 for clarifications), and, while their utility per unit time will be larger than 
the single-instrument spacecraft [Eqs. (3.13-3.14)], the time-horizon of interest will not 
allow them to reap the benefits of the larger portfolio size (i.e., will not compensate for 
the increase in TDs/c). 
 
Similarly, Figure 28 shows that if the time-horizon of interest is 10 years, then the highest 
utility will be obtained by a portfolio size of 4 instruments. Larger spacecraft with more 
instruments cannot outperform the 4-instrument spacecraft on a utility basis. 
3.6.2 The paradigm shift needed to design for space responsiveness 
Figure 28 and the previous discussion raise an important paradigm shift, which is needed 
in design optimization for responsive space. The shift addresses the onset of the 
hypothetical chronograph when the system utility should start being evaluated. In this 
thesis, it is referred to as calendar-based optimization, and is opposed to the traditional 
clock-based (after launch) spacecraft design and optimization. In the latter, one cares 
about how much cumulative utility can be delivered n years after the delivery (or launch) 
of a space system. (This implies that designs are compared despite their possible different 
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time-to-delivery). As a result, schedule slippages are of limited relevance since the 
system utility starts being counted when the spacecraft is launched.  
However, in a calendar-based optimization, which is needed for responsive space, the 
clock starts ticking as soon as the need or opportunity for a space asset is identified. 
While the utility will be effectively delivered only when the spacecraft is launched, the 
same time origin (the identification of the need) is used to count utility for all the possible 
designs being evaluated in the optimization process. In such an environment, one cares 
about how much cumulative utility can be delivered n years after the identification of the 
need, that is, at a common calendar end date for all the designs being compared.   
 
Figure 29 illustrates how design decisions can differ based on the mindset in which the 
optimization is conducted. Consider two designs of spacecraft: one referred to as 
“responsive” (D1) as it yields a short time-to-delivery d1, the second being less 
responsive (D2), with a longer time-to-delivery d2, but offering a higher utility potential 
(e.g., a bigger spacecraft with more instruments, low TRL technologies but offering 
performance improvements, etc.).  
 
 In the clock-based mindset, the cumulative utility after n years following the 
launch only reflects the difference of utility potential between the designs, and 
does not take their responsiveness into account. In other words, the time-to-
delivery of the spacecraft TDs/c does not affect the spacecraft design choices. As a 
result, in a clock-based design environment, a larger spacecraft (D2) will always 
be better on a utility basis than a smaller one with fewer instruments (D1). 
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 In the calendar-based mindset, TDs/c becomes a critical duration and the choice of 
the time-horizon ops (end calendar date) determines how much importance is 
attributed to responsiveness. As a result, more responsive designs (D1), even if 
they offer a lower utility potential, will provide a higher cumulative utility than 
less responsive designs (longer time-to-delivery d2) when the time horizon is 
reached. Therefore, in a calendar-based design environment (i.e., for space 
























Figure 29. The paradigm shift needed to design for Responsive Space (notional) 
 
In other words, in the calendar-based design approach, the actual timeline of the 
existence of a need (emergence, evolution and possible disappearance) defines the time-
window or time-horizon during which the utility delivered has to be maximized§§. In such 
a mindset, design decisions are thus directly influenced by this timeline.  
                                                 
§§ Note that the end of the time window does not necessarily imply any discontinuation of the spacecraft. It rather 
corresponds to the instant at which the cumulative utility delivered by a spacecraft needs to be assessed. (This therefore 
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Various situations in which space responsiveness is needed can benefit from the 
application of a calendar-based optimization mindset. For example: 
 
 A calendar-based design mindset can be critical, as noted earlier, in a defense 
context, where space capabilities may be developed to support a war effort with 
an initially planned duration. For example, Doggrell reports that “when it became 
obvious in September 1990, during the planning for Desert Storm, that existing 
satellite-communications capacity would not support the war effort, we made an 
urgent attempt to launch an additional Defense Satellite Communications System 
III spacecraft. That mission finally launched on 11 February 1992, missing the 
war by over a year!” [95]. This example illustrates that a calendar-based approach 
that properly reflects the time-horizon of such military operations (1.5-2 years in 
this example) should help guide design choice to maximize the cumulative utility 
delivered by the spacecraft. 
 
 The notion of time-horizon may also be relevant for scientific missions, for which 
science can only be collected during a finite period of time. Specific orbital 
alignments and design constraints (e.g., amount of available V) only allow the 
study of certain bodies for a finite period of time, imposing de facto a time 
window during which science can be collected (or utility delivered). For celestial 
bodies with a large orbital period (e.g., comets on highly elliptical orbits, such as 
                                                                                                                                                 
may correspond to other events related to that assessment, such as a vote to decide on the budget allocated to a 
program, or a decision to extend a mission, etc.) 
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Halley’s comet visited by the ICE and Giotto spacecraft), such opportunities do 
not reoccur frequently, thus precluding the possibility of postponing the launch. 
With such calendar requirements, a calendar-based approach could prove useful 
to make the appropriate design decisions to maximize the science return obtained 
by a spacecraft. 
3.6.3 Optimal portfolios in the calendar-based design paradigm 
The proper portfolio characteristics in a calendar-based design environment are 
contingent on the time horizon of interest to the decision-makers, and address not only 
the size of the portfolio, but also its technology maturity and TRL-heterogeneity, as will 
be discussed next. The “utility-optimal” portfolio size in a calendar-based design 
environment is shown in Figure 30.  
optim
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Figure 30. Cumulative utility over time after development starts, 
 for various portfolio sizes (TRLini = 4) 
 
Using the utility results of Figure 28, “optimal” portfolio sizes that provide the highest 
utility based on the time-horizon considered can be identified. The results are shown in 
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Figure 30, for various portfolio sizes, namely n = 1, n = 3 and n = 5 (and a homogeneous 
portfolio with instruments TRLini = 4). The three utility curves intersect at different times, 
and these intersection points allow the identification of time regions where the use of a 
given portfolio size is more beneficial in terms of utility. For example, when the time-
horizon of interest is less than 8 years, a single-instrument spacecraft will provide more 
utility than spacecraft with the other portfolio sizes considered (see the first intersection 
point in Figure 30). On the other hand, if the time-horizon of interest is greater than 11 
years, then a spacecraft with 5 instruments will provide more utility than ones with n = 1 
and n = 3 (see the third intersection point in Figure 30). 
 
Next, the TRL dimension is considered, in addition to the time-horizon ops to the search 
of the utility-optimal portfolio size. Recall that the curves in Figure 28 and Figure 30 
were derived for a single value of the initial instruments TRL (TRLini = 4). The initial 
technology maturity level of the instruments affects the delivery schedule of the 
spacecraft (as seen in Figure 23a), which in turn affects the cumulative utility provided 
after a given period. The location of the intersection points of Figure 30 is therefore 
dependant on the initial TRL of the instruments.  
 
The results for the utility-optimal portfolio size as a function of the instruments TRL and 
the time-horizon are presented in Figure 31. Figure 31 shows the location of the 
intersection points for different values of the instruments TRL and provides the utility-
optimal portfolio sizes that maximize the cumulative utility over varying time-horizons. 
Different readings can be made of Figure 31. For example, if instruments considered for 
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inclusion on a spacecraft have an initial TRLini = 8, then a portfolio with 5 instruments 
will provide the most utility for time-horizons greater than 6 years. If one is interested in 
a short time-horizon of 3 years, a single instrument spacecraft will provide the highest 
utility. One final reading of Figure 31 is worth pointing out: if a program is keen on 
including low-TRL instruments, say TRLini = 4, the development schedule will be 
significantly stretched. In that case, it would almost take 11 years for a spacecraft with n 
= 5 instruments to reveal its benefits in terms of cumulative utility compared to a smaller 
spacecraft. Thus it seems preferable if low TRL instruments are necessary for inclusion in 
a spacecraft, to have smaller portfolio than larger ones (i.e., fewer instruments on-






































Figure 31. Map of optimal portfolio sizes yielding the maximum cumulative utility 
Next, the degree of TRL-heterogeneity is considered and all possible portfolio 
combinations are evaluated (by varying both n and ). The results for ops = 12 years are 
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Figure 32. Cumulative utility versus MTTD for all portfolio combinations (for ops = 12; shown on the 
figure are portfolio sizes 2  n  5) 
 
Two important observations are highlighted based on Figure 32: 
 
 For each portfolio size n (a given “line”), the bottom-right combination 
corresponds to the spacecraft that will provide the most utility after 12 years and 
will be delivered the earliest. These portfolio combinations tend to have the 
highest average TRL and lowest degree of TRL-heterogeneity.  
 
 If responsiveness is a high-priority goal of a space program, then schedule 
constraints can be specified by limiting the maximum MTTD allowable. This 
would be reflected by a horizontal line (threshold) in Figure 32, which the 
spacecraft development time should not exceed. This results in the exclusion of 
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all the portfolios that yield a longer MTTD (the subset of portfolios “points” that 
are above the required MTTD threshold). For example, if a spacecraft has to be 
delivered in less than 40 months, no portfolio combination with four or more 
instruments will satisfy this condition. The final selection of the “best portfolios” 
can then be made among the remaining candidates, based on tradeoffs between 
utility, cost, and other metrics of interest to the customer (which would require 
similar analyses along the other dimensions). In addition, Figure 32 can be used to 
identify the reduction in MTTD if one or more instruments are removed from the 
spacecraft portfolio. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that these results are based on the assumption of a 
homogeneous utility per instrument and across TRLs (assumption stated between Eq. 
(3.13) and (3.14)). This in reality need not be the case and the coefficients in the utility 
vector ˆ u s / c  can be tuned differently to reflect different instantaneous utilities provided by 
different instruments considered for the spacecraft. To capture the value of innovation, 
the utility provided by instruments using brand new technologies (and thus characterized 
by a low TRL) would be considered higher than that one of more traditional instruments. 
(This assumption of homogeneous utility will be lifted in Chapter 6). Such adjustments 
would modify the shape of the set of points presented in Figure 32, but would not alter its 
use and interpretation. 
3.7 Summary 
Addressing the challenges of Responsive Space and mitigating the risk of schedule 
slippage require a thorough understanding of the various factors driving the development 
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schedule of a space system. The technology maturity of spacecraft subsystems and 
payload instruments (as measured by the TRL) has been identified as a major driver of 
schedule for space programs. However, various parameters, other than TRL, affect the 
variability of schedule slippage across multiple space programs and should therefore be 
investigated along with the technology maturity. To that end, the notion of portfolio 
developed by the R&D community was adapted to the micro-level of a single complex 
engineering system by conceiving of a spacecraft itself as a technology portfolio. This 
chapter focused on the characteristics of this portfolio, namely its size (e.g., number of 
instruments), the technology maturity of each instrument, and the resulting TRL 
heterogeneity of the portfolio. As the development schedule of a spacecraft is subject to 
numerous sources of uncertainty, a probabilistic model of the Time-to-Delivery of a 
spacecraft, which includes the development, Integration and Testing, and Shipping 
phases, was formulated. The resulting random variable Time-to-Delivery (along with its 
mean and dispersion) is one important characterization of space responsiveness and 
schedule risk.  
 
Through the variation of the portfolio characteristics, this chapter investigated how the 
Mean-Time-To-Delivery (MTTD) of the spacecraft and schedule delivery risk are 
affected by the choice of the spacecraft technology portfolio. Results of the Monte-Carlo 
simulations confirmed that the MTTD and schedule risk of the spacecraft increase when 
the initial TRL of the instruments is lower, and that, for a given maturity level, the MTTD 
of the spacecraft increases when the number of instruments increases. Furthermore, the 
framework developed in this chapter proved useful to highlight “portfolio effects” 
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resulting from the joint impact of the portfolio size and the individual technology 
maturities of the instruments. Specifically, it was found that the influence of the portfolio 
size on the MTTD is more significant at low TRL. Finally, the utility implications of 
varying the portfolio characteristics and time-horizons were explored, and “portfolio 
maps” were provided as guides to help system designers identify appropriate portfolio 
characteristics. A critical paradigm shift needed for designing for space responsiveness 
was then identified: when operating in a calendar-based environment (i.e., for a given 
time-horizon after the start of development), larger spacecraft with more instruments are 
not necessarily providing more cumulative utility than smaller ones, as their delivery to 
the customer is more likely to be delayed. 
 
Note that, in this chapter, the utility delivered by each spacecraft instrument was assumed 
to be constant over the time horizon of interest. This assumption does not capture an 
important phenomenon that can result in a loss of value (or appeal) of a spacecraft over 
time, namely the obsolescence of some (or all) of its components. Located at the other 
end of the spectrum of technological innovation, obsolescence occurs when new and 
outperforming technology competes with a current design, or when changes in customer 
needs or regulations make the services currently delivered by the spacecraft less 
appealing. When designing to optimize the utility delivered by a spacecraft throughout its 
lifetime, it appears important to account for the effects of obsolescence.  
 
Before being able to model such effects, it is essential to understand more deeply the 
phenomenon of obsolescence and to unveil its fundamental causes. In the next chapter, a 
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definition of system obsolescence is thus proposed, and the main obsolescence drivers are 
identified. Furthermore, the various modeling approaches of the phenomenon adopted by 
different disciplines are reviewed, in order to support the formulation of a stochastic 





4 ON SYSTEM OBSOLESCENCE: MULTIDISCIPLINARY 




“Obsolescence never meant the end of anything, it's just the beginning.” 
 




In modern society, obsolescence has become a familiar phenomenon experienced in 
many settings. As noted by Naylor [96]:  “[i]n American culture and society, to change 
clothing styles, automobile design, or computer chips each year is a regular part of the 
culture.” As a sign that this culture of change is now very deeply enrooted in our 
societies, numerous scholarly publications address the problem of obsolescence across a 
large diversity of fields. In fact, a Web search can show that more than 8000 publications 
raise the question of obsolescence directly in their title. Among other things, one can 
find: “Will mercury manometers soon be obsolete?”, “Is halothane obsolete?”, “Has in-
vitro fertilization made salpingostomy obsolete?”, “Has Antitrust Policy in Banking 
Become Obsolete?”, “Have online international medical journals made local journals 
obsolete?”, “Are State and Local Tax Systems Becoming Obsolete?”, “Are R&D 




In the industry, complex systems are threatened by an increasing risk of obsolescence, as 
they are often characterized by long design lifetimes that do not match the continuously 
shorter existence of components on the market [97]. Obsolescence then becomes a 
serious concern as it significantly impacts the value of owned assets and complicates or 
even prevents the proper operation of a product. Strategies to mitigate or circumvent 
obsolescence have been explored but are often very expensive. In 2000, the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office reported that the budget to “resolve obsolescence and 
diminishing sources issues” of the F-22 fighter aircraft was estimated to be 1.6 billion 
dollars [98]. However, other opportunities exist to tackle the challenge of obsolescence 
by improving our understanding of the issue and ultimately developing our ability to 
model and predict the problem before it occurs.  
 
To this end, this chapter proposes to clarify the concept of obsolescence, unveil the 
fundamental causes of this phenomenon, and describe various modeling approaches that 
have been suggested. As illustrated in the previous Web search example, obsolescence is 
an issue that is pervasive across many disciplines. Although the definitions of 
obsolescence emanating from various fields do not necessarily agree with each other, 
each view on obsolescence can offer additional insight and provide directions to model 
this phenomenon. While obsolescence is sometimes discussed in the context of abstract 
entities (e.g., disciplines, laws, processes) or even persons (obsolescence of skills), the 
purpose of this chapter is to improve our understanding of obsolescence when it pertains 
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to material items that are designed and produced. In this case, it will be referred to as 
product or system obsolescence. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the key 
concepts inherent to the issue of obsolescence and provides a synthesized definition of 
obsolescence. In section 4.3, the root causes of obsolescence are discussed, and four main 
drivers of obsolescence are identified. Section 4.4 is a multidisciplinary review of 
obsolescence, as it has been in studied in economics, operations research, bibliometrics 
and engineering. It focuses on the phenomenology of obsolescence by looking at how 
obsolescence manifests itself in each discipline, and reviews the different modeling 
approaches that have been proposed. Finally, the findings of this work are summarized in 
section 4.5. 
 
4.2 Key concepts 
Obsolete derives from the Latin verb “obsolescere” meaning “to fall into disuse”. An 
obsolete product is thus an item that is “no longer in use”, “of a kind or style no longer 
current”, or “outmoded in design, style, or construction” [99]. Following those general 
definitions, there are several aspects of obsolescence that should be noted: 
 
 By essence, obsolescence is a temporal phenomenon: occurring more or less 
gradually, it is often described as “a loss in value” [100] of an item or “a decline of 
usefulness over time” [101]. The loss of value resulting from obsolescence is singular 
in the sense that it applies to a given design rather than a specific unit in a set of 
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identical items. For that reason, it should not be confused with physical deterioration 
or “aging”. A product subjected to physical deterioration will lose its appeal, as its 
performance or reliability may decline over time. An obsolete product however may 
very well be brand-new (i.e., newly manufactured) and thus perform as intended***. In 
this case, the loss of appeal results from certain attributes, inherent to its design, that 
are perceived as “outmoded”. In short, obsolescence is a design characteristic and not 
a product characteristic†††. 
 
 Obsolescence is a stakeholder-centric concept: the notions of value and usefulness 
appearing in the definitions presented at the beginning of this section imply that 
obsolescence is observed from the point of view of a stakeholder that experiences the 
decline in value of the item. This point of view is typically of either one of the two 
following forms: 
a. The supplier’s perspective, from which a sustained drop of market demand for a 
product results in a loss of value of the supplier’s production output, and can thus be 
one manifestation of product obsolescence.  
b. The customer’s perspective, from which one practical manifestation of 
obsolescence is the impossibility to replace or repair a product through the 
mainstream market, as suppliers of that item may have decided to cease production. 
Famous examples of such situations include the end of instant film production 
announced by Polaroid in 2008, or the end of the 3.5-inch floppy disk production by 
                                                 
*** Physical degradation or failures is sometimes referred to as “physical obsolescence” or “absolute obsolescence”. In 
this chapter, the distinction between aging and obsolescence is thus made intentionally. 
††† even if, by extension, a product will be said to be obsolete when its design is obsolete. 
 119
Sony in 2010. Fitzhugh [102] thus considers that obsolescence “occurs when the last 
known manufacturer or supplier of an item or raw material gives notice that he 
intends to cease production”. Penalties resulting from obsolescence (such as cost 
rises, scarcity of expertise, etc.) can even be experienced as soon as the pool of 
suppliers starts being reduced. This is the challenge faced by the U.S Department of 
Defense with many of its complex systems, and referred to as diminishing 
manufacturing sources and material shortages (DMSMS): “DMSMS concerns the 
loss or impending loss of manufacturers or suppliers of critical items and raw material 
due to discontinuance of production.” [103]. 
 
 Finally, obsolescence pertains to the external world: it is “due to changes in external 
circumstances over time” [104]; it results not from the “conditions or past operation 
history [of a product] but [from] a change in the external scenario of technological 
evolution and marketing” [105,106]. The obsolescence of an item is thus tightly tied 
to an external environment that provides referents, against which the value of an item 
is assessed, and constantly updated. The geographical, political, economical and 
social contexts in which a product (or concept) operates is therefore essential to the 
definition of its state of obsolescence. Consider the following example: between the 
1950’s and 1970’s, China strictly limited any interaction with the international 
technology community. Tan [107] explains that “[a]s a result, self-reliance and 
technology nationalism were achieved for China’s R&D system, with the cost of 
having low-level and obsolete technologies […]. The gap between Chinese 
technologies and the most advanced Western technologies were often a few decades 
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apart.” Chinese technologies were clearly obsolete with respect to Western standards, 
but since China remained isolated from the rest of the world, the economic 
implications of this obsolescence within the Chinese market were not experienced 
according to Western standards. It is therefore important to acknowledge this subtlety 
and recall that obsolescence is a spatially relative notion. A product design is never 
obsolete in itself, but with respect to the expectations of a given community of users 
or society.   
 
In the light of the characteristics of obsolescence discussed previously, a synthesized 
definition of product obsolescence is now proposed: 
Obsolescence is the decline of value of a product over time, due to a change in the 
stakeholder’s expectations resulting from exogenous events. 
 
Unlike in the case of physical degradation (wear-out), a product that becomes obsolete 
retains the same design attributes. It is the changes occurring in the external world that 
result in the inability of the product to meet the stakeholder’s expectations. What external 
changes can result in the obsolescence of a product? This question is addressed in the 
following section, which identifies and discusses the various drivers of obsolescence. 
4.3 The drivers of obsolescence 
To fully comprehend what obsolescence is and what its impact may be, it is essential to 
first understand what processes are at its origins. Much of the existing work on 
obsolescence has focused on its manifestations (which will be reviewed in section 4.4), 
sometimes with limited insight on the factors involved in its creation. In this section, the 
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root causes of obsolescence are discussed and four main drivers are identified: 
technological innovation, network externalities, regulatory changes and need 
disappearance. 
4.3.1 Technological innovation 
The most commonly perceived form of obsolescence can be referred as “technological 
obsolescence”‡‡‡: it is the process by which a product becomes obsolete due to the 
emergence of “challenger units displaying identical functionalities, but with higher 
performances” [108]. Stated alternatively, “technological obsolescence is caused when 
the functional qualities of existing products are inferior to newer models” [109].  
 
The history of the lighting industry provides a good example of the technology 
obsolescence caused by innovation. Oil lamps had been used for thousand years when the 
Argand lamp, which offered significant improvements in terms of brightness and 
steadiness of the flame, was introduced in 1780. As a result of the introduction of 
Argand’s new design, the previous and traditional designs of oil lamps were soon 
rendered obsolete, and the Argand lamp became the most common lighting device 
throughout Europe for over 70 years. Later, a new major revolution occurred when 
Edison combined the invention of the incandescent light bulb with his system for 
electricity distribution. This rapidly resulted in a wide replacement of the traditional oil 
and gas illumination in favor of electric lighting starting from the 1880’s [110]. 
                                                 
‡‡‡Technological obsolescence is preferred over “technical obsolescence”, which often refers to the obsolescence of the 
technical skills of the workforce. 
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Obsolescence due to technological innovation has become a much familiar phenomenon 
with the quasi-omnipresence of electronics in modern society. Another famous example 
of technological obsolescence concerns audio and data recording. Magnetic tapes, that 
were widely used throughout the 1980’s, were rendered obsolete in the 1990’s as they 
were progressively replaced by Compact Discs which provided a more efficient way of 
storing information. As buyers became accustomed to the higher capacity, higher sound 
quality and longer lifetime of the CD technology, their interest towards magnetic tapes 
declined. Similarly, slide rule calculators had been widely used for decades by engineers 
and scientists until the 1970’s when Hewlett-Packard and Texas Instruments released 
pocket-sized versions of electronic calculators. These new devices rapidly supplanted 
slide rules as they allowed much more straight-forward and accurate calculations than 
their predecessors for an acquisition price that quickly became comparable.  
 
In the previous examples, a new technology fulfilled the same function (e.g, providing 
lighting, recording data, or performing calculations) than an older concept but with an 
increased performance, reliability, or efficiency. In this case, the obsolescence of the 
product directly depends on the improvements offered by the technologies competing in 
the same environment or market. For a given customer need, Figure 33 illustrates how 
older designs are progressively “pushed” to the obsolescence zone following the 
emergence of a more innovative design. The two notional graphs represent two 
consecutive “snapshots” of the design space (or market), separated by a given time 
interval t. On the left graph, the designs D1 and D3 are leaders on the market, while D3 
is becoming outmoded and D2 is already considered obsolete. On the right graph, the 
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emergence of an innovative and competing design D5 that provides better performance 
raises the users’ expectations, which are no longer met by older designs; as a result, D1 
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Figure 33: Obsolescence under technological innovation (notional) 
On Figure 33, designs are considered obsolete when they become “inferior” to newer 
competing designs. However, the performance metric used on the y-axis to compare 
designs and to assess whether some have become obsolete need not be interpreted in a 
strict sense. Other metrics than quantitative performance may result in the obsolescence 
of a product due to the emergence of a “better” design. For an equivalent absolute 
performance output, a product may be rendered obsolete by newer competitors if its 
reliability is lower, that is, if failures occur more frequently than with newer designs. For 
example, in defense systems (in particular in avionic computer systems), newer 
technology is often pursued to increase reliability, “for systems of equivalent 
performance and cost” [111]. Efficiency improvements and ultimately cost reductions 
obtained through technological innovation are also reasons for the obsolescence of 
certain products. For example, in the 1860’s, kerosene rapidly superseded whale oil in 
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most oil lamps as its cost was significantly lower than that of whale oil. Similarly, 
although Edison’s first models of incandescent light bulbs provided a similar brightness 
than that of gas devices (Edison’s bulb provided 13 watts against 12 watts for gas jets), 
the overall system was low in complexity for the user [112] and was initially marketed by 
Edison himself as a “cheap and practical substitute for illuminating gas” [113]. The 
relative simplicity and low cost advertised by Edison were key elements that contributed 
to the wide acceptance of electricity as a replacement for gas lighting.  
 
Note that, in accordance with the definition of obsolescence proposed previously, 
technology innovation is a driver of obsolescence when it applies to a given need, that is, 
when it pertains to a defined set of users expectations. Technologically superior 
alternatives do not necessarily drive other designs obsolete if they target a specific group 
or “niche” of users. For example, due to its uniqueness and the prohibitive cost of its 
flights, one could hardly consider that the supersonic passenger airliner Concorde did 
render the existing fleets of subsonic airplanes obsolete. One important factor that 
decides whether or not a technology has become obsolete is the degree of penetration of 
competing alternatives, which is intrinsically related to “network externalities” as 
discussed in the next section. 
4.3.2 Network externalities, standardization and compatibility 
4.3.2.1 Network externalities 
Another driver of obsolescence pertains less to technology innovation strictly speaking 
and the benefits provided by a new technology than to the penetration and the adoption of 
a given standard by the community. For similar levels of performances, two or more 
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technologies can compete and very often, only one of them may reach a dominant 
position. While the other product might fulfill the intended function as well, it can 
become essential to adopt the dominant model in order to communicate and do business 
with the rest of the world. Katz and Shapiro [114] define network externalities as the 
force acting when “the utility that a given user derives from the good depends upon the 
number of other users who are in the same network.” Here, obsolescence is thus a decline 
of value, not triggered by the emergence of an outperforming product, but by another 
type of external change, the adoption of a standard as a direct result of network 
externalities. Some of the value of many of the systems used today often resides in the 
number of adopters of the same design. Sometimes this value is simply related to the 
easier and cheaper usage and maintenance of the dominant design (due to the prevalence 
of the available parts); sometimes, this value is intrinsically related to the functionality of 
the product itself, when the product must be used as part of a network, or work in 
conjunction with other products. This is typically the case for the standards adopted in 
electronics or information technology. A famous example of this phenomenon can be 
found in the emergence of Microsoft Windows as the dominant Operating System for 
Personal Computers since the 1990’s. For most computer users, it quickly appeared 
necessary to adopt this system in order to be able to exchange files with the rest of the 
world. As a result, rival systems such as IBM OS/2 were much less popular, and became 
obsolete until they eventually got discontinued.  
4.3.2.2 Standardization 
Gandal [115] suggests that “expectations of consumers regarding the future size of a 
network are critical in determining the adoption of network products. Thus consumer 
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expectations that one technology will become a standard may indeed lead to that 
technology becoming the standard.” This principle is consistent with the general 
definition of obsolescence proposed in section 4.2: in a network, products based on one 
design retain most of their value as long as the users still expect that said design will 
become the dominant one. If market dynamics follow a different path by favoring another 
candidate, users’ expectations change and the initial design becomes obsolete, due to 
network externalities. This was the case during the tough war that opposed 
JVC/Matsushita’s VHS and Sony’s Betamax standards for video recording. As VHS 
showed a consistent technological lead (each subsequent version of VHS allowed longer 
recording times than the competitor Betamax) [116], it imposed itself as the dominant 
design. Note however that the obsolescence of Betamax was less driven by the small 
technological advantage of VHS than by the fact that everyone (i.e., consumers, movie 
distributors, VCR manufacturers) soon chose to adopt VHS as the standard. The utility 
derived from the one format was clearly dependant upon the total number of users of that 
format (and in turn reflected by the number of movies and VCRs sold for that format). 
Betamax thus became obsolete mainly as a result of the network externalities ruling the 
videotape industry and the fact that only one standard would survive. Gandal [115] 
indeed observes that “competition in network markets is likely to lead to standardization 
on a single technology. In other words the long-term co-existence of competing 
incompatible standard is unlikely. This is because a small initial advantage will likely 
influence consumer expectations about the adoption of a particular standard. This in turn 
will lead to more consumers adopting the standard” [115]. This observation is echoed by 
Arthur’s analysis of “technology lock-in” that considers that “insignificant circumstances 
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become magnified by positive feedbacks to ‘tip’ the system into the actual outcome 
selected” [117].   
 
In some cases, the dominant design or standard is even considered a posteriori as 
technically inferior to its competitors, as argued by Liebowitz and Margolis [116]. One 
famous example of this situation is discussed by David [118] and concerns the keyboard 
layouts for typewriters and computers. August Dvorak and W.L. Dealey patented in 1932 
a keyboard arrangement named Dvorak Simplified Layout (DSK) that aimed at avoiding 
some of the disadvantages of the QWERTY keyboard. Although DSK resulted in an 
“increased efficiency” and let “you type 20-40% faster” as advertised by Apple [118], it 
failed to replace QWERTY as the standard for keyboard. Resistance to adoption was 
strong due to the network externalities, that is, an important penetration of the QWERTY 
keyboard at the manufacturer level (machines and processes were designed to produce 
QWERTY keyboards) and at the user level (typists were trained by default to use 
QWERTY). As a result, DSK is considered obsolete by many.  
This example confirms the idea that obsolescence is not always driven by technological 
lag (as described in section 4.3.1) but by a process different in nature, namely network 
externalities. 
 
Figure 34 illustrates how network externalities can result in the obsolescence of a 
product. In this example, when design D1 is released, the number of its adopters quickly 
rises, showing the sign of an initial success. Design D2 is released concurrently but 
proves less successful initially than D1. At this stage of the products’ lifecycle, the initial 
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users’ expectations in terms of general adoption of a design remain unclear (i.e., low in 
terms of number of adopters), as users still ignore in what direction the market will 
evolve. After a certain time, the adoption of D2 takes off while the initial success of D1 
proves actually unsustainable and the number of adopters of D1 declines. At this time of 
the product’s lifecycle, the users’ expectations are clearer. The design adopted by the 
majority soon becomes the standard (D2), while competing designs with fewer adopters 

















Figure 34. Obsolescence under network externalities (example) 
 
4.3.2.3 Intersystem compatibility and the propagation of obsolescence 
After the establishment of a given design as a standard, obsolescence does not only affect 
the competing designs, but also any product that depends on or interacts with those non-
standard designs. In the engineering world, compatibility is the ability “to work with 
another device or system without modification”. With complex systems that are 
characterized by a high degree of parts coupling and that operate by interacting with other 
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products, obsolescence propagates from subsystem to subsystem due to compatibility 
requirements. This is typically the case in computer engineering where software and 
hardware are highly interdependent. Programs designed to run on a given platform are 
likely to become obsolete if this platform becomes obsolete itself. Sandborn and Myers 
refer to this interdependence in the commercial-off-the-shelf world as a “symbiotic 
supply chain relationship where hardware improvements drive software manufactures to 
obsolete software, which in turn cause older hardware to become obsolete […].” [119].  
4.3.2.4 Product obsolescence as the inverse of product diffusion  
The two drivers of obsolescence that have just been discussed are inherent to the 
emergence and the adoption of technologies. Modeling this adoption of innovations is 
precisely the purpose of the diffusion models that have flourished since the work of 
Mansfield [120] and Bass [121] (see Mahajan et al. [122] for a review). A few of these 
models even feature more explicit connections with the problem of obsolescence, 
addressing the problem of technology substitution by looking at the influence of a second 
product generation on an earlier one [123,124,125]. Overall, most of these models have 
in common that they include two effects contributing to the diffusion of a product: 
innovative adoption and imitative adoption [121,126,125]. Note the similarities with the 
two drivers of obsolescence discussed previously. Based on those two sole effects 
(innovation and imitation), a symmetry is apparent between the way to conceive the 
adoption of a product (diffusion) and the way to conceive the opposite trend, that is, the 
loss of appeal of a product (obsolescence). However, beyond those conceptual 
similarities, there exist other phenomena that can specifically drive obsolescence, such as 
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regulatory changes and the disappearance of a need. These two drivers are discussed in 
the following sections. 
4.3.3 Regulatory changes 
Section 4.3.1 discussed one form of obsolescence, namely technological obsolescence, 
through which expectations of individual users are raised with the emergence of 
innovating designs that offer performance improvements. Similarly, expectations of users 
can change over time as a communal process, especially when collective attributes, such 
as safety, order, comfort, etc., of a group are sought to be improved. To do so, organized 
communities regularly set up rules and standards that reflect the desired improvements 
and new requirements (which are often hardened). As a result, “design standards and 
government codes define criteria for obsolescence,” as noted by Lemer [127]. Norms are 
redefined by governments on a regular basis to ensure higher levels of safety, efficiency 
and comfort. This includes, for example, power limits for wireless transmitters [128], 
norms for accessible design [129] (to allow infrastructure access by disabled people), 
building seismic standards, motor vehicle emission standards [130], etc. As these norms 
are constantly revised, old designs become de facto obsolete with respect to society’s 
regulatory needs.  
 
Although somehow related to the two previous drivers discussed previously, there are 
subtle but important differences that characterize regulatory changes as a driver of 
obsolescence. First, unlike standards that emerge through network externalities in a non-
deterministic fashion (i.e., combination of adopters imitation and random events), new 
regulatory standards result from conscious decisions and collectively planned events. For 
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example, increased awareness of the health risks posed by asbestos led the European 
Union to prohibit the use of all asbestos fibers in 2007 [131], rendering it obsolete for 
building construction purposes. Second, while technological innovation may have 
initiated the obsolescence process (by making superior alternatives available), it is the 
new regulations that establish the new designs as the standard, accelerating the 
obsolescence phenomenon at a full scale. For example, despite the introduction of digital 
television sets in the early 2000’s, analog devices were still prevalent in the U.S. The 
coup de grâce to traditional analog TV sets was in fact delivered on June 11, 2009, the 
date chosen by the U.S Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to end all analog 
TV broadcasts, rendering the old TV sets completely obsolete. In some cases, individual 
users may not have any incentive in upgrading the technology to meet the new 
requirements (e.g., a car fulfills the same function for a user whether it pollutes a lot or 
not), but it is society at large that recognizes that standards should be revised for the 
common interest. 
4.3.4 Disappearance of a need  
A last form of obsolescence results from the disappearance of a given need, that is, when 
the purpose served by a product is no longer relevant. Brown et al. [132] mention that 
“[o]bsolescence may occur, for a particular item, because the function served by that item 
is no longer required”. While in certain cases technological innovation might initiate a 
decline in the demand for a product, many other external influences directly determine 
the need for a given function. These external factors can be sociological, scientific, 
political, environmental or even media-related. Bradley and Dawson [133] give the 
example of the disuse of sections of Roman roads: “Whilst roads, in general, are not yet 
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obsolete, some roads will become functionally obsolescent as the destination is no longer 
in use.”   
In science, when the progress of knowledge invalidates old theories and/or ancient 
practices, the associated systems become naturally obsolete. This is for example the case 
in medicine when archaic bloodletting techniques that were usually more harmful than 
helpful finally disappeared, resulting in the obsolescence of its associated instruments 
(e.g., the “scarificator” developed in the 17th century [134]).  
Changes in the political environment may also result in obsolescence. For example, as 
tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union culminated in the early 1960’s, 
the Kennedy administration started to publicly advocate the use of fallout shelters to 
ensure the protection of the population against a nuclear attack. The U.S Congress 
“appropriated $207.6 million for Kennedy’s shelter program.” [135]. On the commercial 
side, “there were expectations that annual sales could run between $2 billion and $20 
billion, and that shelter building would achieve the magnitude of other federally 
promoted programs such as highway building and urban renewal.” [136]. While actual 
sales never really met these initial expectations, the end of the Cold war definitely put an 
end to the perception that home protection against a nuclear threat could be needed. 
Observing “a lack of advertising and consumer demand for home fallout shelters and 
home radiation monitoring devices”, the U.S Federal Trade commission no longer 
provides guides to regulate them [137], a sign that those devices have indeed become 
obsolete. Unlike in the case of obsolescence driven by technological innovation as 
discussed in section 4.3.1, no superior alternative emerged, but the need simply 
disappeared, making such equipment obsolete. 
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Finally, some authors sometimes mention a form of “psychological obsolescence”, which 
pertains to the decline in desirability of certain products due to styling reasons, fashion 
cycles and fads. Discussing this “planned obsolescence of desirability”, Packard [138] 
cites Paul Mazur: “style can destroy completely the value of possessions even while their 
utility remains impaired”. This phenomenon can be considered as the result of the 
combination of the disappearance of a “need” (i.e., the subjective interest in a given style) 
fueled by network externalities (the external pressures of society).  
 
In conclusion, it is important to recognize that the drivers of obsolescence as they have 
been presented are rarely completely uncoupled, and often act as positive feedbacks for 
each other. Technological innovation can push the adoption of designs in a given 
direction, reinforced by network externalities, and regulatory changes are also frequently 
decided in the context of technology advancement and can help precipitate obsolescence. 
As the challenge of obsolescence affects many areas of modern society, various 
disciplines have attempted to address this issue in one way or another. The next section 
now reviews the different modeling approaches that have been proposed in the literature. 
4.4 A multidisciplinary review of obsolescence 
This section discusses the phenomenology of obsolescence, by presenting the various 
manifestations of obsolescence across different disciplines, namely in economics, in 
operations research, in bibliometrics and in engineering. It reviews the modeling 
approaches that have been proposed in each field and ultimately provides opportunities to 
learn from each contribution. 
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4.4.1 Obsolescence in economics 
4.4.1.1 Definitions 
Obsolescence in Economics has traditionally been discussed in the context of 
depreciation. Various concepts of depreciation exist within the community of economists, 
leading to different usages of the term “obsolescence”. This chapter shall principally 
focus on the common definition of depreciation as the decline of value of an asset over 
time, or a “rate of decrease of value” [139]. According to Hill [140], depreciation 
“involves the value of the same asset at two different points in time”, and can be 




D   (4.1)
where Vt represents the value of the asset at the instant t. For example, the depreciation D 
over one year can be expressed as D = Vt – Vt+1. The Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA) does include obsolescence in its definition of depreciation: “the decline in value 
due to wear and tear, obsolescence, accidental damage, and aging.” [141]. Building on a 
discussion reported by Hicks [142], Hill [140] suggests to be more specific by insisting 
that it is the “foreseen obsolescence” (i.e., related to the expected rate of technological 
change) that can be treated like wear and tear. Overall, note that this inclusion of 
obsolescence as a form of depreciation is consistent with the definition of obsolescence 
of section 4.2 as a “decline in value over time”. The form that this decline is assumed to 




4.4.1.2 Models of depreciation 
Fraumeni [143] describes the different patterns of depreciation proposed by the 
community of economists. Since the 1950’s, the BEA has used straight-line depreciation, 
which assumes a constant depreciation D over the lifetime of an asset: 
 DtVtV  0)(  (4.2)
so that the decrease in value between to consecutive years is constant: 
 DVV ii  1  (4.3)
Figure 35 (left) represents the constant decline of value over time due to straight-line 
depreciation.  
Later work progressively promoted a shift towards accelerated patterns of depreciation, in 
which depreciation is higher during the first years of the asset lifetime. A geometric law 
constitutes a simple example of such a pattern, in which the value of the asset at a given 
year is a constant fraction of the value of the asset the year before, with δ representing the 
geometric rate of depreciation: 
 ii VV 1  (4.4)




















Figure 35: Straight-line depreciation (left) and geometric depreciation (right) 
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 iVitV 0)(   (4.5)
Figure 35 (right) represents the evolution of the value of an asset over time under a 
geometric depreciation, which is the model adopted by BEA as the default for “all assets 
except for computers and computer peripherals, nuclear fuel, autos and missiles” [143]. 
The corresponding geometric rates of depreciation used by the BEA were derived from 
the research conducted by Hulten and Wykoff [144] and are organized by categories of 
assets [145]. 
4.4.1.3 Obsolescence and aging 
However, Hulten and Wykoff [144] and Fraumeni [143] distance themselves from the 
mainstream conception of depreciation and insist on analyzing the change of value of an 
asset along two dimensions, by separating the effects of time and the effects of asset age. 
According to this approach, “economic depreciation is by definition, the decline in price 
along the age dimension, the partial derivative of price with respect to age” (holding time 
constant) [144]. “Revaluation” is then the term chosen to describe the decline in price 
over time (holding age constant), due to inflation or obsolescence.  
 
This chapter shall build on and rise above this semantic argument by simply recognizing 
that: 
 Obsolescence is a temporal phenomenon, that contributes to the decline of value 
of an asset over time (in agreement with the Hotelling [139] and Hill [140] 
approaches) 
 137
 Obsolescence is distinct from the decline of value due to aging or physical decay 
(in agreement with the distinction highlighted by Hulten and Wykoff [144] and 
Fraumeni [143]) 
 
Based on those two conclusions, the patterns of “depreciation” presented previously 
constitute relevant examples that can inspire the modeling of the decline of value due to 
obsolescence. 
4.4.2 Obsolescence in Operational Research 
4.4.2.1 The risk of inventory obsolescence 
While obsolescence is a concept that is most of the time defined through the relationship 
between a product and the users of this product (as discussed in section 4.2), it is not 
exclusively observed at the customer-level. Most studies of obsolescence in Operational 
Research focus on inventory management, adopting an approach that is therefore 
supplier-centric. If demand for a product suddenly decreases because of obsolescence, the 
remaining inventory has little or no salvage value from the point of view of the supplier 
[146,147]. This effect reflects the obsolescence of the stocks. From an operational 
research perspective, it is therefore crucial for managers to be able to model the risk of 
obsolescence of their stocks, since cost penalties are associated with both the production 
and the storage of items: first, production expenses of the obsolete items represent an 
investment with no return; second, resources must be spent to store obsolete items before 
they can be discarded. Managing the inventory efficiently thus requires finding the 
optimal lot size so as to minimize these costs of obsolescence [148].  
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4.4.2.2 Models of demand lifetime 
The traditional inventory management view on obsolescence is characterized by the 
“sudden obsolescence” or “sudden death” assumption, under which obsolescence is 
considered to occur at a single point in time at which the demand suddenly collapses 
[149,150,132,151,146,148]. As formulated by Brown et al. [132],  “[b]efore that date the 
item is not obsolescent, after that date it is obsolescent, that is, all demand permanently 
ceases.” (This type of behavior is sometimes described by economists with the term “one-
hoss shay”, a reference to the poem by Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr. “The Deacon’s 
Masterpiece or the Wonderful One-Hoss Shay” presenting a fictional deacon that would 
last a hundred years until it breaks down all at once; see Saleh, [152]). The corresponding 
time-to-obsolescence Tobs for such an item is illustrated in Figure 36, where the time 









Figure 36. Obsolescence due to “Sudden Death” of the demand 
As discussed in section 4.3, many external phenomena occurring non-deterministically 
can drive obsolescence. The time-to-obsolescence of the product, or lifetime of the 
demand, cannot be estimated without uncertainty, and should therefore be considered as a 
random variable. A lifetime of demand that is exponentially distributed has been 
proposed [146,148,149]. Figure 37 represents the probability density function of the 






Figure 37. Probability density function for the time-to-obsolescence Tobs 
Masters justifies the use of an exponential distribution by the fact that “[…] it models a 
constant obsolescence rate; that is, the case where the age of the item does not influence 
the probability of obsolescence during any subsequent interval.” This statement is in 
agreement with the distinction made earlier between aging effects and obsolescence. 
 
Based on an exponential distribution of parameter , similar metrics than those 
commonly used in reliability theory can be defined:  
 the probability that the time-to-obsolescence will be smaller than a given period t 
is then simply expressed via the cumulative distribution function in Eq. 4.6.  
 the mean-time-to-obsolescence is the inverse of the rate  as shown in Eq. 4.7. 





4.4.2.3 Replacement and maintenance 
In the previous approach, the demand for a given product was modeled and used as a 
proxy for obsolescence. Several operations research studies have also addressed the 
problem of finding optimal equipment replacement and maintenance strategies and have 
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formulated models that capture the  obsolescence of old equipment or components. 
Unlike the discontinuity characterizing the sudden death approach, replacement and 
maintenance studies typically model obsolescence as a gradual loss of value. For 
example, Rajagopalan [153] expressed the loss in salvage value over time (reflective of 




 )(  (4.8)
At time tj>0 the salvage value of the equipment unit is lower than the purchase cost , as 
a result of obsolescence. The larger the value of the parameter , the more severe the 
effects of obsolescence are. In the case of industrial plant maintenance, Borgonovo et al. 
[106] adopt a similar approach by assigning a residual value to old components, which 
they assume to “decrease continuously from the time of purchase according to an 
exponential law.”  
4.4.3 Obsolescence in Bibliometrics 
4.4.3.1 Definition and methodologies 
Bibliometrics is “the application of mathematical and statistical methods to books and 
other media of communication.” [154]. An important topic of interest for researchers in 
this field is the obsolescence of scholarship, defined as the “phenomenon of the reduced 
use or decline in the use of information (on a certain topic) with time” [155]. 
Obsolescence in bibliometrics is essentially studied by observing how long a given 
publication keeps being cited. In other words, a document is considered obsolete when it 
is no longer cited frequently in other publications.   
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The analysis of literature obsolescence is typically conducted via either one of the two 
following approaches, as illustrated in Figure 38. 
 The synchronous approach looks in the past, by examining the ages of the 
citations contained in a given publication or set of publications 
 The diachronous approach looks in the future, by following a given source over 
time (publication or set of publications) and observing the number of times that 
said source is cited in future publications 
 
Note that this dichotomy of approaches is consistent with the discussion regarding the 
two types of stakeholders that can experience obsolescence conducted in section 4.2. The 
synchronous method is a customer-centric approach of obsolescence, since a given set of 
publications (the “customer(s)”) collect information by referring to past scholarly articles 
(the sources or “suppliers”). If most references are recent, the literature can be considered 
to go obsolete quickly. Conversely, the diachronous method is a supplier-centric 
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Figure 38. Synchronous approach (left) and diachronous approach (right) 
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a reference (i.e., provides information) for future scholarly articles. If in a given body of 
literature, the publications of interest are not cited for a long time (in other words, the 
demand fades out, as in section 4.4.2), the literature can be considered to go obsolete 
quickly.  
 
According to Egghe and Rousseau [101], “[s]ynchronous studies are usually cheaper and 
easier to perform […] and […] synchronous and diachronous studies of the aging of 
scientific articles lead to the same conclusions, hence implying a preference for 
synchronous ones.”. 
4.4.3.2 Metrics of literature obsolescence 
The bibibliometrics literature have proposed several metrics to capture the phenomenon 
of literature obsolescence that are discussed next. 
 Citation age 
In the case of synchronous studies, the citation age of a referred article is defined as 
the difference between the date of publication of the observed publication referring to 
this article and the date of publication of the article itself. Figure 38 shows examples 
of referred articles (S1, S2, S3) and their corresponding citation age. When 
conducting a synchronous study, the entire distribution of the citation ages (illustrated 










Figure 39: Citation age distribution 
From the citation aging distribution, several statistical quantities are defined to study 
the phenomenon of obsolescence. Egghe and Rao [156] recall that early bibliometrics 
studies typically assumed a negative exponential form of the citation age distribution: 
 tcectc 00)(
  (4.9)
where c(t) represents the number of publications of age t years in the observed 
publication. 
 Aging rate 
The aging function (or aging rate, or obsolescence rate) is generally defined as 










When c(t) follows an exponential distribution, a(t) is constant and is therefore often 
referred to as aging factor. Many bibliometrics studies of the obsolescence of 
literature typically focus on the aging function [101,156,157]. With a literature that 
goes obsolete, older publications are less and less cited, resulting in an aging rate that 
is smaller than 1. 
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 Literature half-life 
The concept of half-life in bibliometrics was first introduced in the late 1950’s, by 
drawing an analogy between obsolescence of literature and the exponential decay of 
radioactive substances. The half-life t1/2 traditionally represents the time needed for a 
substance to decay to half of its initial value. Burton and Kebler [158] formalized this 
concept for bibliometrics purposes by defining the half-life of a literature as the “time 
during which one-half of all the currently active literature was published”. In other 
words, the half-life t1/2 represents the median citation age, that is, 50% of the articles 
being cited have been published less than t1/2 ago. The higher the citation half-time, 
the longer it takes for publications in a specific type of literature to become obsolete. 
When the citation distribution is exponential, the half-life is related to the mean 







t   (4.11)
Figure 40 shows values of the literature half-life for various disciplines.  







Half-life (years)  
Figure 40: Half-life of different literatures (adapted from Burton and Kebler, 1960) 
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4.4.3.3 Obsolescence and supply volume 
Later bibliometrics studies [159,101] acknowledge the impact of the growth of the 
volume of literature published on the obsolescence phenomenon. Specifically, two 
conflicting influences are identified by Egghe and Rousseau [101]: 
 “The more a field grows, the more articles come into existence, acting as sources for 
references to the past, i.e., to articles published earlier.”.  
 “The faster a field grows the heavier the competition between “older” articles to get 
into the reference list of the new ones (the dilution effect).” 
Gupta’s synchronous citation study of Physical Review articles [159] accounts for the 
first effect, by normalizing the number of citations to Physical Review papers by the total 
number of articles published in Physical Review (i.e., the total “supply volume”). This 
example illustrates that obsolescence effects are more clearly analyzed when other 
external market effects (such as variation of number of suppliers or number of potential 
buyers over time) are removed. Special attention ought therefore to be paid to the proper 
normalization of the metrics that describe the obsolescence phenomenon. 
4.4.4 Obsolescence in engineering 
4.4.4.1 Obsolescence and product lifecycle curve 
From a customer-centric perspective, obsolescence in engineering occurs when, “[a] part 
becomes obsolete when it is no longer manufactured” [160]. Sandborn and Myers [119] 
note that this is the inverse problem of the “Sudden Death” obsolescence situation 
encountered in Operational Research (as discussed in section 4.4.2), in which the 
inventory suddenly loses value as a result of a drop in demand. As mentioned in section 
4.2, this challenge is significant for the Department of Defense, and is commonly referred 
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to as Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages (DMSMS). For 
example, Sandborn [161] cites the case of a new sonar system developed by the U.S 
Navy for which more than 70% of the components were no longer manufactured when it 
was finally installed onboard ships in 2002. This problem not only affects hardware but 
also software applications [133] that are typically considered obsolete when “they are 
retired from use and taken off the market” [162] or when support or operating licenses 
are no longer provided [163]. 
Conversely, one traditional approach to define part obsolescence from a manufacturer or 
supplier point of view focuses on the evolution of the number of units sold over time (in 
other words, the demand for that specific product), as described by the Product Lifecycle 
curve. In this context, Cordero [164] discussed the apparent shortening of the product 
lifecycle curves over the last decades in some key industries [165], and linked it to an 
acceleration of the obsolescence of the associated products. This acceleration is 
particularly observed in the field of electronic components where new generations of 
microprocessors are introduced at an increasing rate, making the old generations obsolete 
faster and faster [166] (an example of technological obsolescence, as discussed in section 
4.3.1).  
In electronics, one commonly used standard of lifecycle curve is the American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI)/Electronic Industries Associations (EIA)-724 Product Life 
Cycle Data Model [167]. Using such a model, some authors such as Solomon et al. [168], 
Hatch [169] or Handfield and Pannesi [170] define obsolescence as the last phase 
occurring after the five traditional life cycle stages of a part (introduction, growth, 
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Figure 41: Traditional product lifecycle curve 
(adapted from Solomon et al. [168]) 
 
Focusing on component obsolescence, Solomon et al. [168] proposed a methodology to 
define the starting point of the obsolescence zone i.e. the onset of obsolescence Tobs, on a 
forecasted product lifecycle curve. A normal distribution that adequately fits the actual 
sales data (up to the date of the analysis) is first determined and characterized by its mean 
 (corresponding to the peak sales date) and its standard deviation . The future zone of 
obsolescence is then deterministically defined by considering the interval expressed in 
Eq. 4.12: 
 ]5.3,5.2[  ceobsolescen of Zone (4.12)
The onset of obsolescence in this model is therefore Tobs =  +2.5.  
Note that the bell-shaped lifecycle curve only models one common behavior, but does not 
adequately represent many other possible situations [171]. As noted by Precht and Das 
[172], “[s]ome parts undergo a false start and die out, or may be associated with a niche 
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market. Some parts may also be revitalized after the decline stage. Other possibilities can 
also arise due to various economic, social, and environmental occurrences.”  
 
In analyzing product lifecycle of computer systems, Greenstein and Wade [173] adopt a 
different definition of the on-set of product obsolescence Tobs, as “the first year that a 
product’s installed base does not increase […], [that is] the first year in which retirements 
of the product are greater than the units sold.” Unlike the previous approach, Greenstein 
and Wade’s approach does not exclusively focus on the evolution on unit sales, but 
balances it with the unit retirements to reflect the actual “growth” of the usage of a given 
product. 
4.4.4.2 New product release and time-to-obsolescence 
Regardless of the degree of adoption of a product, another way to define the onset of 
obsolescence in the context of technological innovation is to consider the instant of 
release of a superior technology, an approach that is also customer-centric by nature. In 
the field of Information Technology (IT), Bradley and Dawson [133] analyzed the 
probability distribution of the time between two consecutive versions of a software for 
several popular software packages, and estimated it to follow a lognormal distribution. 
The authors argue that since the “expected time to re-release of any one piece of software 
is [found to be] 1160 calendar days”, an old version of the software “would be considered 
obsolete around 1160 days later”. In other words, provided a distribution of the instants 
of new software release is available (e.g., from statistical data analysis), the time-to-




renewobs TT   (4.13)
This approach implicitly assumes that every new innovation will succeed in penetrating 
the market enough to change the users’ expectations, thus rendering obsolete previous 
versions of a product. As discussed in section 4.3.2.1, this may or not may be the case, 
depending on other circumstances such as network externalities. One important aspect of 
the Bradley and Dawson model is the modeling of the time-to-obsolescence in a non-
deterministic fashion. Recent studies addressing the problem of obsolescence in 
engineering have now moved forward in that direction, by incorporating a probabilistic 
dimension of obsolescence in one form or another [174], as will be proposed in the next 
chapter. 
4.4.4.3 Mitigation strategies 
In economics, operational research and bibliometrics, obsolescence studies have almost 
exclusively focused on the modeling of the phenomenon of obsolescence. Conversely, in 
addition to the modeling approaches presented previously in this section, much of the 
engineering literature investigates practical mitigation strategies to limit the penalties 
resulting from component obsolescence. Those approaches, discussed by Stogdill [175], 
Solomon et al. [168], Howard [176], Singh and Sandborn [97] typically include: lifetime 
buys (purchase and storage a stock of parts in order to last during the entire lifetime of a 
system), part replacement (use of components similar to the obsolete ones), reliance on 
aftermarket sources, redesign of subsystems to host newer components, reclamation (use 
of salvaged components from retired products), uprating (use of components outside of 
their specification limits; see Wright, et al. [177]), etc. Many of those strategies only 
constitute short-term solutions [176] and are often particularly costly as they are reactive 
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by essence [178], since the issue of obsolescence is addressed only after it has occurred. 
As a result, more proactive methods that would be more beneficial (i.e., less costly) in the 
long term are explored, such as the careful and anticipatory planning of product redesigns 
in order to minimize the total lifecycle costs [97]. Note that with such approaches, the 
forecasting of obsolescence by adequately modeling the time-to-obsolescence Tobs (as 
discussed throughout this chapter) plays a crucial part. 
4.5 Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide conceptual contributions to the understanding 
of the phenomenon of obsolescence that affect many assets and products in modern 
society. First, this chapter discussed the key concepts inherent to the issue of 
obsolescence, by highlighting that – unlike other product characteristics that only depend 
on how the product operates (such as performance or reliability) – obsolescence involves 
the relationship of a stakeholder to the product over time, in a given environment. 
Specifically, the following definition of product obsolescence was proposed:  
 
Obsolescence is the decline of value of a product over time, due to a change in the 
stakeholder’s expectations resulting from exogenous events. 
 
Two categories of stakeholders typically encounter obsolescence: 1) suppliers (or 
manufacturers), for which obsolescence may manifest itself through a drop in demand, 
and 2) users (or customers) who will favor newer or other solutions to meet their needs. 
The root causes of the obsolescence phenomenon were then discussed and four main 
drivers were identified: technological innovation, network externalities, regulatory 
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changes and need disappearance. This chapter then examined how obsolescence has been 
traditionally approached and modeled in various disciplines, namely in economics, 
operations research, bibliometrics and engineering (summarized in Table 8).  
 
Through this review, two main angles of study emerged: 
 
1. The decline-focused perspective. In such approaches, one is concerned with the 
rate of decline of product value that characterizes the obsolescence phenomenon, 
that is, the degree of obsolescence. Obsolescence is then often considered to be 
pure depreciation and is assumed to take effect as soon as an asset is produced. It 
is the approach adopted in economics and in operation research studies dealing 
with equipment replacement and maintenance. In a similar fashion, the decline in 
use in bibliometrics is conceived as a gradual phenomenon that starts as soon a 
scholarly article is published (equivalent to the “production”). Several models of 
decline have been proposed, such as functional forms parameterized by straight-
line, geometric or negative exponential rates. Ultimately, the purpose of such 
methods is to quantify the extent to which an item is less valuable to the user. 
 
2. The instant-focused perspective. In such approaches, one is concerned with the 
instant at which obsolescence starts, in other words, the onset of obsolescence. 
This event generally occurs during the lifetime of a product, due to external 
changes such as technological innovation. It is the approach adopted in operation 
research studies dealing with inventory management (through the assumption of 
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“sudden death” of demand) or part obsolescence management in engineering. 
Rather than aiming at characterizing the amplitude of the decline in value, the 
purpose of such methods is to define a time-to-obsolescence Tobs after which 
obsolescence is considered to be established. Depending on the discipline, various 
metrics have been proposed: time of release of superior alternatives, time defined 
from the peak usage instant (from the product lifecycle curves), median design 
age (from the “half-life” of bibliometrics), etc. The proposed formulations of a 
time-to-obsolescence Tobs have been both deterministic (from the forecasted 
product lifecycle for example), as well as non-deterministic, through the use of 
probability density functions (e.g., exponential or lognormal distributions). 
 
While each discipline has focused on one or the other formulation adapted to its field of 
applications, a complete description of the obsolescence phenomenon is in many cases 
likely to require both the characterization of a time-to-obsolescence and the selection of a 
pattern modeling the decline of value that ensues. The discussion conducted in this 
chapter has thus laid the ground for the stochastic model of on-orbit obsolescence of 
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CHAPTER 5 
5 RISK OF ON-ORBIT OBSOLESCENCE: NOVEL 
FRAMEWORK, STOCHASTIC MODELING AND 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
“A horse never runs so fast as when he has other horses to catch up and outpace”  
           [slow]               
 
(Attributed to Ovid, Roman author 43 BC – AD 17/18) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As discussed in section 1.1, the United States Government Accountability Office has 
repeatedly noted the difficulties encountered by the Department of Defense (DOD) in 
keeping its acquisition of space systems on schedule and within budget. In some cases, 
schedules have been stretched by years, and costs have increased by millions, and in 
some cases billions of dollars [1]. To prevent such cost overruns and schedule slippages, 
GAO advised against the inclusion of low maturity technologies in acquisition programs. 
The DOD however disagrees with this GAO recommendation and maintains that it will 
continue to consider low Technology Readiness Level (TRL) technologies for inclusion 
in product development and acquisition—instead of keeping such technologies confined 
to a Science & Technology (S&T) environment until appropriate maturation. Several 
reasons motivate this behavior, as explained by the DOD and reported by the GAO 
[22,25]. These reasons include budget constraints, schedule and organizational 
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considerations, requirements creep, and other aspects specific to the nature of DOD’s 
space programs. First, conducting technology demonstration requires significant funds. 
As a result, the DOD maintains that low TRL technologies will continue to be included in 
acquisition programs, which benefits from significantly larger budgets than S&T 
organizations. Second, DOD’s dominant position (in which “the customer does not walk 
away”) creates an environment that is relatively tolerant of schedule slippages resulting 
from technology maturation issues. Furthermore, external pressures exerted by users 
often encourage the use of unproven technologies, which are hoped to provide significant 
performance benefits or highly appealing novel capabilities. A competitive environment 
tends to encourage this behavior, and the sometimes-inflexible performance requirements 
make it even more difficult to use existing and therefore more mature technology. 
 
However, another important reason for the use of low maturity technologies in DOD’s 
space acquisitions lies in the perception of another type of risk threatening DOD’s 
programs. Satellites are complex systems that cannot be physically accessed after launch 
for possible upgrades (for the majority of them). The DOD argues that, given both their 
long development schedules and their long design lifetimes, satellites face a serious risk 
of on-orbit obsolescence if low TRL technologies are not considered at the onset of their 
development: 
 
“In view of the length of time it takes to develop space systems, DOD asserts that it will 
not be able to ensure that satellites, when launched, will have the most advanced 
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technologies, unless program managers are continually developing technologies.“ GAO-
03-1073 [22] 
 
Furthermore, the high pace of technological progress is such that this exposure to 
obsolescence can even occur before the satellites become operational.  
 
This chapter focuses on the risk of on-orbit obsolescence rationale for DOD’s position 
regarding the inclusion of low TRL in acquisition programs. The objective here is to 
quantitatively analyze the risk of on-orbit obsolescence and assess the appropriateness of 
DOD’s rationale for maintaining low TRL technologies in its acquisition of space assets 
as a strategy for mitigating on-orbit obsolescence.  
This chapter is organized as follows. First, the implications of obsolescence in system 
design are briefly presented in section 5.2, and the specificities of space systems are 
highlighted in section 5.3 to lead to the formulation of the concept of “risk of on-orbit 
obsolescence”. In sections 5.4 and 5.5, the analytical background upon which this chapter 
is based is introduced, with a brief overview of Markov Chains and Monte-Carlo 
simulations; these constitute the analytical underpinnings of the quantitative analysis of 
the risk of obsolescence. Section 5.6 introduces a stochastic framework and models for 
analyzing the risk of on-orbit obsolescence, by formulating Markov models of 
obsolescence and technology maturation. In section 5.7, Monte-Carlo simulations of the 
models are run and the results obtained are analyzed, with a focus on the influence of 
both the initial technology maturities and the spacecraft design lifetime on the risk of on-
orbit obsolescence as well as the time of capability delivery. Finally, this chapter 
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discusses in what context the initial Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence can be influenced by 
the initial technology maturity at the start of the development of a program, and provides 
space organizations with guidelines to trade the Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence against 
the time of capability delivery.  
5.2 Facing the consequences of obsolescence or designing for 
obsolescence? 
Chapter 4 discussed the causes and modeling approaches of system obsolescence. It is 
now important to recognize that the consequences of obsolescence are important and 
affect the commercial, scientific, and military communities. Commercial firms are 
evidently concerned with obsolescence as they strive to maintain their competitive 
advantage and attract new customers by providing them with new or improved solutions 
and innovative products. Scientific research highly benefits from the use of cutting edge 
technologies in order to address scientific and technical challenges. Finally, the 
consequences of obsolescence for the defense are as serious, if not more, than in a 
commercial context, since possessing state-of-the-art technologies is often essential to 
ensure strategic and tactical superiority, as well as maximizing the chances of protecting 
lives. 
 
The necessity to develop strategies and methods for dealing with obsolescence is thus 
experienced in different environments and by the different communities (at various 
degrees). The efforts to address the problem of obsolescence at the engineering level have 
focused so far on treating the symptoms or manifestations of obsolescence as discussed in 
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section 4.4.4.3 (through for example replacements or upgrades of parts that have become 
obsolete [175]) rather than preventing obsolescence. These efforts can however come 
with a bundle of drawbacks and penalties: for example, as noted by Sandborn, “poor 
planning for parts obsolescence causes companies and militaries to spend progressively 
more to deal with the effects of aging systems–which leaves even less money for new 
investment, in effect creating a downward spiral of maintenance costs and delayed 
upgrades.” [161] 
 
The scarcity of academic publications on the subject reflects the absence of theoretical 
frameworks to assess the likelihood of obsolescence and the lack of strategic vision to 
avoid the decline of value of a system associated with obsolescence. The decline of value 
of a product due to aging (i.e., due to physical degradation) can be fairly easily addressed 
for example through replacement or the acquisition of a new model of the same design. In 
the case of obsolescence, this strategy will evidently fail since new (or newly produced) 
items from the same design can already be obsolete. It is therefore important to 
acknowledge the importance of obsolescence at the design stage of a product or system. 
This chapter proposes to adopt a design-centric approach to the problem of obsolescence, 
by quantifying, prior to fielding, the risk of obsolescence as influenced by design choices 
(namely, in this chapter, the initial technology maturity level and the design lifetime of 
the spacecraft), rather than treating obsolescence (and the consequences) after it occurs. 
Understanding and estimating the risk of obsolescence constitutes therefore a first step 
towards a preemptive strategy for dealing with this important issue in engineering and 
system design.  
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The following section focuses particularly on space systems, and briefly discusses why 
some of the specificities of these systems make the issue of obsolescence more critical 
and challenging to address. 
5.3 Obsolescence of space systems: the concept of on-orbit obsolescence 
First, most space systems are not accessible once on orbit, making physical servicing for 
maintenance and upgrade impossible after launch. This trait of space systems reinforces 
the importance of a carefully thought obsolescence mitigation strategy during the 
development of a spacecraft. Second, as manufacturing and launch costs represent a 
significant fraction of the total mission cost, current design practices tend to push towards 
the longest technically achievable design lifetimes. The rationale for such a choice is 
twofold: 1) to operate the costly asset for a long period of time to recover its cost; and 2) 
given the marginal cost of durability of spacecraft [179], it is always cheaper on a cost 
per day basis to extend the design lifetime of a spacecraft, and as a result, it has been 
assumed that launching spacecraft with the longest design lifetime possible ensures the 
highest return on investment in a space system. This logic has been shown to be flawed 
under certain conditions [180], and unfortunately it dramatically increases the risk of 
obsolescence, as space systems cannot be upgraded during their long lifetime on orbit 
while new technologies, and new market needs emerge on shorter time scales. Finally, 
the high degree of complexity of space systems requires long development schedules, 
typically several years. Once again, this increases the likelihood that new technologies 
and new market needs may appear before the completion of the spacecraft development, 
or that substitute products may render the spacecraft obsolete. Furthermore, the high 
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degree of complexity of spacecraft makes it even more difficult to make changes to the 
original design during the development, should new technologies appear and be 
considered for inclusion in the design. 
 
On-orbit obsolescence can thus be defined as the decline of the value of a spacecraft 
and the services it provides on orbit, as a result of exogenous events, such as the 
emergence of outperforming technology (i.e., technological obsolescence) or changes 
in customers’ needs.  
 
Given the specificities of spacecraft mentioned previously, on-orbit obsolescence is both 
a special case of the theory of system obsolescence discussed in Chapter 4, and a 
fundamental distinctive problem that puts the value of spacecraft at risk and that cannot 
be handled by the traditional reactive mitigation strategies (because of physical 
inaccessibility). 
 
The importance of obsolescence for space system design is indeed increasingly 
recognized, not only by the DOD (as discussed previously), but also by NASA and its 
contractors. The risk of obsolescence is especially acute for electronic parts onboard a 
spacecraft, for which technological progress is particularly rapid. While electronic 
products acquired through a COTS approach offer reduction in production times and 
significant cost savings, they expose the spacecraft to an increased risk of obsolescence. 
This dilemma is experienced for example by engineers working on the avionics of 
NASA’s Orion spacecraft, who describe obsolescence as a “huge challenge” and “the 
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biggest problem [they] face”, as these spacecraft are intended to “last 30 years with 
products that become obsolete in five years” [181]. While this case illustrates a form of 
logistical obsolescence (where procurement of parts becomes impossible due to 
discontinuation of production [163]), this situation also reflects the discrepancy between 
the short duration of product procurement lifecycles and the long design cycles of space 
systems. Within the lifetime of a space system, more technologically advanced parts are 
likely to emerge and result in a loss of value of the spacecraft on orbit. It appears 
therefore essential to consider the risk of obsolescence from the very first stages of the 
design of a spacecraft (i.e., upstream in the design process rather than leaving it as an 
afterthought), and to alter design decisions based on the desired level of acceptance of 
this risk. 
 
Despite the growing awareness of the implications of obsolescence in the space 
community, no academic research has so far approached the problem from a system 
theoretic perspective. This chapter proposes to fill this gap by formulating a theory of on-
orbit obsolescence and developing analytical models for quantifying and analyzing this 
risk. As the exogenous events that can result in the obsolescence of a space system (e.g., 
technological innovation, change in demand) and the time needed to develop such a 
system are non-deterministic, stochastic methods should be used. The proposed stochastic 
framework for quantifying and analyzing the risk of on-orbit obsolescence builds on the 
concept of Technology Readiness Level (TRL) and consists of two Markov models: one 
model driving obsolescence, and one model driving technology maturation and spacecraft 
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development. The two models are simultaneously run through Monte-Carlo simulations 
to quantify the risk of on-Orbit obsolescence.  
 
The following section provides the background information on Markov chains and Monte 
Carlo simulation, before the models and analyses are discussed in section 5.6.  
5.4 Markov Chains 
One powerful theoretical framework frequently used to model stochastic behaviors is the 
Markov chain. Markov chains are based on a state representation of a system in which the 
next future state depends only on the current state and not on the previous history of the 
system (this assumption is referred as the Markov property). Mathematically, a discrete-
time Markov chain  
{ Xn | n = 0, 1, … } is defined as a discrete-time, discrete-value random sequence such 
that given X0, …, Xn, the next random variable Xn+1 depends only on Xn through the 
transition probability expressed in Eq. (5.1). 
 ijnnnnnn piXjXiXiXiXjX   }|Pr{},...,,|{Pr 100111  (5.1)
where Xk represents the state of the system at the discrete time k, and pij is the conditional 
probability to transition from state i to state j. Equation 5.1 states that the probability of 
transitioning from state i to state j applies anytime the system is in state i regardless of 
how it got there. For a Markov chain with a finite number of states, the transition 
probabilities from one state to the next can be expressed in the one-step transition matrix 
whose elements are the pij coefficients. Figure 42 shows an example of a transition matrix 

































Figure 42. Transition matrix for a system with four states 
 
This matrix can be read as follows: each row refers to the current state of the system, 
while each column refers to the future state of the system after the transition. Since the 
system can only be in one state at a given time, (whether it is transitioning to a new state 
or staying in the current state), the sum of the probabilities along a row is equal to 1. A 
common representation of a Markov chain is a directed graph with nodes representing the 
states of the system, connected by arcs representing the possible transitions between 
those states, along with their probabilities. An example transition diagram of a system 













Figure 43. Typical transition graph for a Markov chain 
 
Markov chains have been used in a wide variety of contexts and for different applications 
in health care [182], economic valuation [183], and reliability analysis [184] to name a 
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few. More information about Markov chains can be found several textbooks including 
[185, 186, 187].  
5.5  Monte-Carlo Simulations 
Performing estimation and risk analysis in the presence of uncertainty requires a method 
that reproduces and propagates the random nature of certain inputs (such as time to 
failure of various components in the context of reliability theory) in an analytical model. 
A Monte-Carlo simulation addresses this issue by running a model many times (e.g., 
thousands of times) and picking values from predefined probability distributions at each 
run [90].  Here, Monte-Carlo simulations of the Markov chains representing the state of 
obsolescence (resulting from exogenous events) and the state of technology maturity of a 
space system are conducted. These Markov chains are discussed in section 5.6. The 
probabilistic nature of these models is directly used to feed the Monte-Carlo simulations. 
In this work, the randomness of the process results from the multiple applications of the 
transition matrix of the Markov models over time. Depending on the current state of the 
Markov chains, the models “select” the next state according to a probability mass 
function that corresponds to a row of the transition matrix. This work considers the 
evolution of the risk of on-orbit obsolescence over time, and therefore defines a time-
horizon for the analysis that will be denoted by ops. The Markov models stop running 
when the time-horizon is reached, i.e., when t = ops. Different results will thus be 
obtained for every run once the time-horizon is reached. It is the repetition of these runs 
that constitutes a Monte-Carlo simulation from which useful statistics are computed, as 
discussed in the following section.  
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5.6 Stochastic Model of On-Orbit Obsolescence 
The stochastic model of On-Orbit Obsolescence is composed of two models running in 
parallel, in order to capture the impact of the initial maturity level at start of development 
(initial TRL) on the likelihood of obsolescence once the spacecraft is in orbit. Both 
models work in discrete time, and the unit of time here considered is one month. The first 
is an obsolescence model, and the second is a technology maturation model. These two 
models are discussed next. 
5.6.1 Obsolescence model 
In this representation, the space system can be in one of the following three states at a 
time: 1) State-of-the-Art (SoA), 2) minor Obsolescence (mO), or 3) Major Obsolescence 
(MO). The meaning of the states is flexible and context-dependant. Consider for example 
a spacecraft composed of one main instrument for Earth observation.  The minor 
Obsolescence state could correspond to the emergence of a competing technology 
enabling for example to double the accuracy/resolution of the observation. The Major 
Obsolescence state would then correspond to the emergence of a novel technology that 
provides an order of magnitude better accuracy/resolution. Each consecutive 
obsolescence state thus represents a “drop” in value due to obsolescence. This state 
representation constitute a flexible combination between the “instant-focused” 
perspective (where the onset of obsolescence is the instant of the first transition to the 
minor Obsolescence) and the “decline-focused” perspective (that can be modeled by as 
many different obsolescence states as required), as discussed in Chapter 4.  
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The evolution of the system over time is by construction probabilistic. The transitions of 





















P  (5.2) 
p12 is the probability of transitioning from the state 1 (SoA) to the state 2 (mO), p13 is the 
probability of transitioning from the state 1 (SoA) to the state 3 (MO), and finally p11 is 
the probability of staying in state 1 (SoA). It is assumed that the system cannot be 
upgraded (which is typical of most traditional spacecraft currently designed).  Therefore, 
it cannot return to a more “up-to-date” state if it has become obsolete, which in turn 
makes the transition matrix P upper-triangular and the Major Obsolescence state an 
absorbing state (p33 = 1).  The behavior of this Markov model is represented by the state 







Figure 44. State representation of the obsolescence model 
 
Note that the obsolescence model is defined at the system-level, that is, each state of the 
Markov chain represents a state of the entire spacecraft. Conceptually, the system 
obsolescence states are contingent on the aggregate states of obsolescence of each 
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individual component or subsystem (in the previous example of an Earth observation 
spacecraft, a simple case of a spacecraft with a single instrument was considered). 
Among the set of spacecraft components that are subject to obsolescence, electronic parts 
(as mentioned in subsection 4.4.4.1.) become obsolete relatively fast compared for 
example with thermal elements/subsystem of the spacecraft, due to rapid technological 
improvements in the field. The Mean-Time-to-Obsolescence of critical electronic 
components of spacecraft is on the order of 3 years for Digital Signal Processors (DSP), 6 
years for logic families, and up to 8 years for linear interfaces [188]. In the obsolescence 
model, the transition probabilities to obsolete states have therefore been selected to yield 
a Mean-Time-to-Obsolescence for the entire spacecraft that falls within the range of these 
values. However, it is important to acknowledge that the definition of an “obsolete 
spacecraft” should not be restricted to the obsolescence of one particular electronic 
component. Since the relationship between component-centric obsolescence and system-
centric obsolescence is beyond the scope of this work, the values of the transition 
probabilities selected as inputs of the obsolescence model provide a first-order level of 
fidelity that is sufficient for the analysis of “trends” of spacecraft obsolescence conducted 
in this study. 
5.6.2 Technology maturation model 
A major reason cited by the DOD to include low TRL technologies in the development of 
a spacecraft is that more mature technologies might become obsolete by the time the 
space system is launched. A key element driving this dilemma is thus the temporal 
competition between the pace of technology maturation and the pace of obsolescence 
progression. This dilemma is further exacerbated given the current typical duration 
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spacecraft development (several years) and spacecraft design lifetime (10+ years). It is 
therefore critical to implement a model of technology maturation describing the time 
needed to mature all the technologies considered for inclusion in a space system and to 
ultimately bring said system to Initial Operational Capability (IOC). The notion of 
“system-TRL” will be used to represent the level of maturity of the entire spacecraft, as 
defined in section 2.6 by a weighted average of all its components’ TRLs. For example, a 
system TRL of 4 represents spacecraft developed under a technology demonstration 
program, which includes one or several technologies at a relatively low TRL (around 4); 
by contrast, a system TRL of 8 corresponds to a spacecraft containing very few 
technologies that are still unproven. 
 
Section 2.6 proposed a model of duration of spacecraft development as a function of the 
system-TRL, derived from a data set of 28 NASA missions. The model of Final Total 
Duration (FTD) provides an estimate of the total time needed to complete the 
development of a spacecraft and launch it, given its initial system-TRL value. Here, the 
model developed in section 2.6 is applied recursively to estimate the time needed to 
transition from a given system-TRL value to the consecutive one. Table 9 summarizes the 
values obtained when conducting this process. For example, historical data shows that the 
average time needed to develop a spacecraft with an initial system-TRL of 5 is around 78 
months, while it is only 61 months for a system-TRL of 6. The difference (78 – 61 = 17 
months) was then used as a proxy for the mean time needed to transition from system-
TRL 5 to 6. These values constitute a reasonable starting point given the limited data 
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(publicly) available on technology maturation for space systems. The specific numerical 
values here used can be easily refined should more data become available in the future. 
Table 9. Technology maturation model parameters 
System-TRL at 
start of spacecraft 
development 




Mean Time needed 





Readiness Level in 
the next month 
4 100.9 22.3 pTRL5 = 0.0438 
5 78.6 17.4 pTRL6 = 0.0559 
6 61.2 13.6 pTRL7 = 0.0712 
7 47.6 10.5 pTRL8 = 0.0905 
8 37.1 8.2 pTRL9 = 0.1218 
9 28.9 6.4 pTRL9+ = 0.1448 
9+ 22.5 N/A N/A 
 
The resulting model associated with these constants is Markovian as well, the states being 
the different levels of maturity: {TRL4, TRL5, TRL6, TRL7, TRL8, TRL9, and TRL9+}. 
At each time step (i.e., every month), the system has a probability pTRLi of maturing to 
the next level i or staying in the same state (i-1). The state “TRL9+” corresponds to a 
system that has already been flown and for which the technology does not need to be 
matured in a strict sense. The time needed to bring such a system to IOC (i.e., to deliver it 
to its final orbit) is assumed to be incompressible, since there is a minimum time needed 
to physically develop, ship and launch a spacecraft, independently of its maturity. A 
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constant value of 22.5 months (which is the final value of the FTD corresponding to the 
level TRL9+) is therefore added at the end of the maturation process, after which the 
system is considered to be at IOC (delivered on orbit). The transition matrix M, or 
technology maturity matrix, describing this process is a band-matrix, as shown in Eq. 






























































M  (5.3) 
 
The state diagram of this Markov model is shown in Figure 45. 
p∆TRL5
TRL4 TRL5 TRL6 TRL7 TRL8 TRL9 TRL9+
p∆TRL6 p∆TRL7 p∆TRL8 p∆TRL9 p∆TRL9+  
Figure 45. State representation of the technology maturity model 
 
5.6.3 Initial conditions 
The TRL value at the start of development of the spacecraft, TRLini, represents the level 
of “innovativeness” of the spacecraft, and is therefore indicative of the time needed to 
complete its development, as described in Table 9. This value, which is an input of the 
technology maturation model, can be tuned to reflect the type of scenario investigated. 
For example, common practices of DOD correspond to a value of TRLini = 4 at the start of 
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the spacecraft development, while the GAO recommends starting the development of the 
spacecraft with a value of at least TRLini = 7 [22].  
 
The initial state for the obsolescence model also depends on the initial value of the 
technology maturity TRLini. For all systems starting at the lowest TRL value in the model, 
TRLini = 4, the initial obsolescence state is considered to be State-of-the-Art. Indeed, a 
value of 4 corresponds to technologies that are just being validated in a laboratory 
environment [49]. Systems starting with higher values of TRL are not necessarily 
obsolete, however it appears important to account for the longer history of their 
technology development (compared to systems with TRLini = 4), which increases their 
initial exposure to obsolescence. In other words, since they have already matured for a 
longer period, they start with a higher initial Risk of Obsolescence. For a single run of the 
model (i.e., one spacecraft), it translates into the choice of an initial obsolescence state. 
This is computed probabilistically by running the obsolescence model while technology 
matures outside of the spacecraft, from the lowest value TRL = 4 until the desired value 
of TRLini at which technologies start being included in the spacecraft. In a statistical 
sense, this process ensures that for TRLini = 4, all spacecraft start being developed while 
being State-of-the-Art, whereas for higher values of TRLini, their initial state is distributed 
among the three possible obsolescence states, reflecting a higher initial Risk of 
Obsolescence. 
5.6.4 Simulations 
Both the technology maturation and obsolescence models are run simultaneously. The 
clock starts (t = 0) with the onset of a spacecraft development. At every time step, the 
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system under development has a probability of transitioning to the next value of the 
system-TRL in the technology maturation model. Similarly, it has a probability of 
transitioning to a minor or Major Obsolescence state depending on its current state. When 
the system reaches IOC (the system is then on orbit), the technology maturation model 
stops. At this instant, a counter Age is triggered which counts the length of time the 
system spends on orbit and the obsolescence model remains active, to compute the risk of 
on-orbit obsolescence. 
 
One important parameter characterizing a spacecraft in this analysis is its design lifetime, 
which is denoted as Tlife. When the Age of the spacecraft reaches its intended design 
lifetime Tlife, the spacecraft is retired. Assuming that the need for the same (or a similar) 
capability still exists after the retirement of the first spacecraft, a new spacecraft must be 
developed to ensure its succession. The development of this new spacecraft should thus 
be initiated before the retirement of the first one, so as to minimize the likelihood of a 
discontinuation of the service. Since the duration of the development of a spacecraft is 
assumed to be function of the initial system-TRL, the simulation of the development of a 
new spacecraft is triggered when Age = t*, where t* is defined in Eq. (5.4): 
For a given initial TRLi,  )(,0max* ilife TRLFTDTt   (5.4)
 
This criterion increases the likelihood that the new spacecraft will be developed and is 
ready to be launched when the previous spacecraft is retired. If the average time needed 
to develop a new spacecraft exceeds the selected design lifetime Tlife, (that is, Tlife – 
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FTD(TRLi) < 0), the new spacecraft is developed as soon as the first one is operational 
and on orbit, and not before (i.e., when Age = 0+). 
 
This chapter will refer to the “series of spacecraft” as the sequence of spacecraft 
developed in order to respond to a given need, as a result of this retirement/replacement 
scenario. The same initial conditions (initial TRL, initial obsolescence state) are used for 
every spacecraft of a given series. In other words, one series corresponds to one scenario 
where spacecraft are initially developed using technologies that start at TRLini, and with a 
corresponding obsolescence state calculated probabilistically. The entire simulation 
process along with the initial conditions for one single series of spacecraft is summarized 
in Figure 46. 
 
• Obsolescence - Markov model #1
• Aging 
(runs while Age  Tlife)
Service
• Obsolescence - Markov model #1 
• Technology maturation - Markov model #2










TRLini = 4 
(DOD)











Figure 46. Representation of the simulation for one single series of spacecraft 
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5.7 Results and Discussion 
Monte-Carlo simulations are conducted to quantify the risk of on-orbit obsolescence by 
running the technology maturation and obsolescence models a large number of times. 
One single run of a Monte-Carlo simulation represents one series of spacecraft developed 
over the time-horizon ops (20 years or 240 months). The error of approximation in the 
estimates provided by the Monte-Carlo simulations, compared to the “true” quantities 
considered, depends on the number of cases run. The choice of the sample (or 
“population”) size for the Monte-Carlo simulations is therefore critical to guarantee that 
the estimates obtained are reasonably close to the true quantities [189]. In the Monte-
Carlo simulation conducted herein, the number of cases run is n = 10,000. The resulting 
errors and uncertainties on the values of the estimates will be further discussed in 
subsections 5.7.2 and 5.7.3.  
5.7.1 Obsolescence maps 
Following the formulation of the concept of Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence in section 
5.3, it becomes intuitive that this risk depends on the time spent in an obsolete state 
relative to the total time the spacecraft is on orbit. In this subsection, the time spent by 
the spacecraft is thus “observed” along two dimensions: “time on orbit” versus “time in 
State-of-the-Art”. By collecting this information for each run of a Monte-Carlo 
simulation, an “obsolescence map” is populated, as represented on Figure 47. The x-axis 
represents the time spent on orbit for a given series of spacecraft, while the y-axis 
represents the time spent on orbit while being in the “State-of-the-Art” state. Each dot 
represents one run of the Monte-Carlo simulation which simulates the development of a 
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series of spacecraft, thus including retirement/replacements over the time-horizon ops. 
Since for each spacecraft the time spent on orbit while being in State-of-the-Art cannot 
exceed the total time spent on orbit, only the lower right half of the obsolescence map is 
populated.  
























































































































Figure 47. Obsolescence map 
 for Tlife = 5 years and TRLini = 4 (left), or TRLini = 7 (right) 
 
Dots on the x-axis (y = 0) represent series of spacecraft that have never been State-of-the-
Art (SoA) on orbit, i.e., they were obsolete as soon as they were launched. Conversely, 
the diagonal line (y = x) corresponds to cases in which every spacecraft developed in a 
given series remained State-of-the-Art for the entire duration on orbit, i.e., they were 
never obsolete on orbit (neither in minor nor in major obsolescence states). The closer to 
the x-axis the dots are located, the longer the spacecraft have spent while being obsolete. 
A few observations can be made regarding Figure 47 before delving into the statistical 
analysis of the simulation results: 
 
 Different zones can be identified on the obsolescence map: for example, when  
Tlife = 5 years (60 months), zone (1) represents cases for which only one 
spacecraft was developed during the time horizon ops (20 years or 240 months), 
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while zone (2) represents cases for which two spacecraft were developed during 
the time horizon (thus the total time spent on orbit is between 60 and 120 
months). Dots in zone (3) correspond to cases for which two spacecraft have 
served on orbit and been retired, and a third one has spent some time on orbit, etc. 
 
 Since spacecraft in this model are retired after they have served their entire 
lifetime on orbit, and as the Mean-Time-to-Delivery to orbit can be relatively 
long, most simulation cases exhibit a total time spent on orbit that is a multiple of 
the design lifetime Tlife. This phenomenon explains the denser vertical lines 
between the zones, at Ton _ orbit  n  Tlife , n being an integer  1. (This effect is 
more significant at low initial TRL, when the Mean-Time-to-Delivery is long 
compared to the design lifetime). The y-axis being a “subset” of the x-axis, 
similar dense lines can be observed horizontally and on the diagonals.  
 
 Note that zone (1) on the left plot of Figure 47 is sparsely populated except for the 
y = 0 line, as it mostly represents spacecraft that required very long development 
times (and probably extensive schedule slippage), and that are therefore more 
likely to be obsolete for their remaining time spent on orbit.  
 
 Finally, recall that the higher the initial TRL, the sooner the spacecraft are 
delivered (i.e., the sooner they reach IOC). This results in a longer time spent on 
orbit during a fixed time horizon, illustrated by a shift of the population towards 
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higher values along the x-axis, as seen on the right plot of Figure 47 (TRLini = 7), 
compared to the left plot of Figure 47 (TRLini = 4).  
 
From the Monte-Carlo simulations presented and visualized previously, it is possible to 
compute statistical parameters such as expected values (of time spent on orbit, or time 
spent in an obsolete state, etc.) and ultimately, to define various types of risks of on-orbit 
obsolescence, as discussed next. 
5.7.2 Static Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence (SRO) 
The static risk of on-orbit obsolescence (SRO) is defined by considering the expected 
value of the proportion of time a system on-orbit will not spend in the State-of-the-Art 















ESRO 1  (5.5)
Recall that a spacecraft is retired when its age reaches its design lifetime. Ton-orbit and 
TSoA-on-orbit therefore reflect the entire time spent on orbit and in State-of-the-Art by all the 
successive generations of spacecraft (one entire “series of spacecraft”) over the time 
period considered. Figure 48 shows the static risk of on-orbit obsolescence for the 
different values of the model parameters, TRLini and Tlife.  Two important results can be 
observed: 
 
 The initial technology maturity of the spacecraft has little influence on SRO. 
For example, for Tlife = 5 years, the SRO obtained by the models is approximately 
72 % over a time horizon of ops = 20 years, and this value remains nearly 
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constant when TRLini varies (the error bars will be discussed shortly). This result 
contradicts the DOD statement that systems developed from low maturity 
technologies will always be less exposed to obsolescence (this statement will be 
revisited in subsection 5.7.3.2 and the specific context in which the initial 
technology maturity may influence the risk of obsolescence will be discussed). 
 
 SRO increases when the design lifetime of the spacecraft increases. For 
example, the SRO obtained by the models goes from 66 % when Tlife = 2 years, up 
to 74 % when Tlife = 7 years. This finding is not surprising since space systems 
characterized by a large Tlife are overall more likely to become obsolete as the 
development (and integration and launch) of new and competing technologies is 


































Tlife = 2 years
Tlife = 5 years
Tlife = 7 years
 
Figure 48. Static Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence for the various values of the model parameters and 
corresponding 95% confidence intervals 
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The Monte-Carlo simulation provides estimates of the SRO that are only approximations 
of the “true” SRO. The error  on the estimate obtained by the Monte-Carlo simulation 
depends on the sample size n and the true standard deviation  of the random variable (1 




  2  (5.6)
 
where z/2 is the critical value of the standard normal distribution for the  confidence level 
1–. (For  = 0.05, z/2 = 1.96). Since the true value  is unknown, the sample standard 
deviation s obtained by the Monte-Carlo simulation is used to compute the error  on the 
estimate [190]. For 10,000 Monte-Carlo cases, Table 10 shows the values of s and the 
corresponding error  on the SRO for the various settings of Tlife and TRLini. 




4 5 6 7 8 9 
s 0.3472 0.2957 0.2546 0.2224 0.1905 0.165 
2 
 0.006805 0.005796 0.00499 0.004359 0.003734 0.003234
s 0.3277 0.2824 0.2482 0.2351 0.2303 0.221 
5 
 0.006423 0.005535 0.004865 0.004608 0.004514 0.004332
s 0.3149 0.2814 0.268 0.257 0.2461 0.2416 
7 
 0.006172 0.005515 0.005253 0.005037 0.004824 0.004735
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In all cases, the error on the estimate remains less than 1 percentage point. The error bars 
corresponding to the 95% confidence intervals defined by SRO   are plotted on Figure 
48. The large gap between the error bars of each series characterized by a given design 
lifetime Tlife suggests that the increase of the SRO as Tlife increases is statistically 
significant (see [191] for an interesting discussion on the use of error bars in statistical 
analysis). 
 
Being exposed to various exogenous events over time, which can cause obsolescence, 
space systems are more likely to be obsolete as time goes by. In addition to the scalar 
SRO measure, other definitions of the risk of on-orbit obsolescence are therefore needed 
to reflect the dynamic nature of this risk. Two dynamic perspectives on, and the 
corresponding analyses of on-orbit obsolescence are discussed next. 
5.7.3 Two dynamic views of the risk of on-orbit obsolescence 
Two additional measures for the risk of on-orbit obsolescence based on instantaneous 
quantities (i.e., defined at every instant of time) are now proposed, so as to allow the 
study of the temporal evolution of the risk of obsolescence. A fundamental conceptual 
difference exists between the two measures introduced next, and involves the reference 
used to measure time. 
 
For dynamic analyses conducted in the context of value-centric design, it is essential to 
emphasize the importance of precisely specifying the temporal mindset in which one 
operates. Section 3.6.2 introduced the paradigm shift needed to address issues of space 
responsiveness, from the traditional “clock-based mindset” (the value of a spacecraft 
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starts being evaluated after the launch of the spacecraft, and for a given period of time 
after that date), to a “calendar-based mindset” (the value of a spacecraft starts being 
evaluated when the spacecraft development starts, in response to a need, and until a 
specific calendar date—in this context, a schedule slippage penalizes the value of a 
spacecraft). To analyze the risk of on-orbit obsolescence, which affects the value of a 
space system, a similar distinction can be made between a clock-based and a calendar-
based design and acquisition mindset/environment. As will be discussed next, such a 
distinction will shed some light on the appropriateness of the key argument in the DOD’s 
position for dipping into low technology maturity (low TRL) in the acquisition and 
development of space programs (in disagreement with GAO’s recommendation of 
confining acquisition programs to high TRL to avoid cost growth and schedule slippage). 
5.7.3.1 Lifetime Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence 
The following dynamic definition of the risk of on-orbit obsolescence fits within clock-
based considerations, and aims at answering the following question: 
 
“What is the probability that a spacecraft will become obsolete n years after 
being launched?” 
 
Since such a question is legitimate at any time during the lifetime of the spacecraft (i.e., 
from its launch until its retirement), this section will refer to this dynamic risk as the 
Lifetime Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence (LRO). In this clock-based mindset where the 
actual calendar date, e.g., April 2010, is irrelevant, the time axis t’ represents the lifetime 
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of the spacecraft, and the instant of the launch of each spacecraft tL is taken as the 
common time origin.  
 
In this time referential, the Lifetime Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence (LRO) represents the 
instantaneous probability of the spacecraft of being obsolete at a given instant during its 
lifetime: 
 LRO(t' )  Pr{Obsolete}(t' ) (5.7) 
 
In this expression, being “obsolete” corresponds to the event “not in SoA state” in the 













































Figure 49. Illustration of the calculation process of the Lifetime Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence 
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Figure 50 shows the results for the Lifetime Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence obtained 
with the models for two different values of the initial TRL, namely TRLini = 4 and 
TRLini = 7. The important result is that the initial level of technology maturity shows 
no impact on the LRO of a spacecraft. For example, the likelihood that a spacecraft 
will be obsolete right after being launched is the same whether the initial TRL was low 
(such as TRLini = 4) or high (such as TRLini = 7). In both cases, this initial lifetime risk is 
around 62 %. Note that the LRO increases from the launch until the retirement of the 
spacecraft. For example, the likelihood that the spacecraft will be obsolete 30 months 
after launch is roughly equal to 72% regardless of the initial TRL.  
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Figure 50. Lifetime Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence for TRLini = 4 and TRLini = 7 (Tlife = 5 years) 
Figure 51 shows a ”close-up” of the Lifetime Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence for the two 
initial TRL values, at three points in time, namely at t’=1, 30 and 60 months. The 
corresponding 95% confidence intervals that almost fully overlap between TRLini = 4 and 
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TRLini = 7 indicates the absence of statistical effect of the initial TRL on the Lifetime 

















































t’ = 1 month after launch t’ = 30 months after launch t’ = 60 months after launch
(t’ = Tlife) 
Figure 51. Lifetime Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence and 95% confidence intervals at t’ = 1, 30 and 60 
months after launch, for TRLini = 4 and TRLini = 7 (Tlife = 5 years) 
 
Varying the lifetime of the spacecraft also yielded similar results for the LRO (the time 
window considered for the analysis became larger). 
 
Recall that by construction of the models, systems starting with a TRL of 4 have a lower 
initial chance of being in an obsolete state than systems with an initial TRL of 7, when 
their development starts. On the other hand, it takes longer to mature technologies in a 
spacecraft with TRLini = 4, and to ultimately launch this spacecraft. This longer schedule 
eventually increases the likelihood of being obsolete after the launch, which cancels out 
the initial advantage at the start of development due to the lower TRL. As a result of 
these two conflicting trends, the argument that spacecraft whose development starts 
with low maturity technologies are less likely to be obsolete after launch than “high-
TRL systems” appears to be flawed.  
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It is important to note that the quantitative results provided previously should not be over 
interpreted or used beyond the domain of validity of the data used to calibrate the model. 
The exposure to obsolescence for example may be influenced by factors inherent to the 
mode of production of spacecraft and that have not been directly included in this 
analysis§§§.  More attention should therefore be given to the trends than to the absolute 
results generated by the models. Nevertheless, the absence of significant effect of the 
initial system-TRL on the Lifetime Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence exhibited by the 
models appears to be of an “intrinsic” nature to the problem at hand rather than model-
dependant. Since additional time is required to mature and implement technologies that 
are initially at low TRL, no significant reduction in risk of obsolescence is in fact 
obtained when such technologies are used. The idea that the risk of obsolescence is 
directly reduced with the use of low TRL technologies appears flawed, merely because it 
does not properly consider the longer schedules resulting from the use of such 
technologies. 
 
Organizations with space assets, such as the DOD, may be interested, in addition to the 
LRO, in estimating another type of risk of on-orbit obsolescence, which focuses on a 
specific (calendar) date in the future. The next section introduces a second dynamic risk 
measure, the “Calendar Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence” (CRO). 
 
 
                                                 
§§§ The mode of production is for example different for a one-of-a-kind scientific satellite than for a production-line 
defense satellite. 
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5.7.3.2 Calendar Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence 
Instead of using the time origin as the moment when the spacecraft is launched, as done 
previously (i.e., the clock is triggered after the spacecraft is launched), this section adopts 
a different time origin: t = 0 now represents the “program decision time”, that is the 
instant at which the development of a spacecraft is initiated, in response to a given need 
(i.e., the clock is now triggered once the program is initiated). Using this new time 
reference, one may be interested in answering the following question: 
 
“If the development of a spacecraft starts now, what is the probability that the 
system will be obsolete at a given date (e.g., 2015), provided it is then on-orbit?” 
 
To address this problem, the “Calendar Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence” (CRO) is 
defined as follows: 
 
CRO(t)  Pr{obsolete | on  orbit}(t) 




The CRO thus represents the conditional probability of the spacecraft of being obsolete, 
provided it is on-orbit, at a given instant (or calendar date). In this expression, being 
“obsolete” also corresponds to the event “not in SoA state” in the obsolescence model. In 
other words, the CRO represents the instantaneous risk that a currently operational 

































Figure 52. Illustration of the calculation process of the Calendar Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence 
Using a design lifetime Tlife = 5 years, Figure 53 represents the Calendar Risk of On-Orbit 
Obsolescence for two different values of the initial system-TRL, namely TRLini = 4 and 
TRLini = 7. Also plotted on these figures is the proportion of systems in the population 
that are on orbit, which is an estimate of the instantaneous probability of being on orbit. 
At t = 0, this proportion is zero since all systems have just started being developed. 
(Since it is also the denominator of the ratio defining the CRO, the small values of this 
probability of being on orbit explain the numerically ill-conditioned behavior of the CRO 
when time is close to zero. In these cases, the CRO behaves like the undefined ratio 
“0/0”). As more spacecraft reach IOC at different instants, this proportion increases, as 
can be seen on the dash-dotted curves. Several important trends can be observed: 
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 The static risk of on-orbit obsolescence (SRO) is the limit of the calendar risk of 
on-orbit obsolescence (CRO) when time goes to infinity.  
 
 While the Static RO is similar for both initial system-TRL values, the Calendar 
Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence for the two systems are fairly different in their 
transient phase. The model shows that systems with low maturity (and thus 
innovative) technologies (TRLini = 4) start at a low initial Calendar RO, which is 
around 33% for the first systems that are delivered on orbit (left of Figure 53). 
Conversely, more mature systems  
(TRLini = 7), start with a higher Calendar RO (around 50% after the initial 
instability).  
 
 The Calendar RO of low technology maturity systems remains below the Static 
limit for a longer period than that one of higher maturity systems. For example, 
when TRLini = 4, the Static limit of RO of 72% is first reached by the Calendar RO 
at t = 124 months, instead of t = 80 months when TRLini = 7. Stated differently, up 
until 124 months after the development of the spacecraft starts, low TRL systems 
have a lower likelihood of being obsolete than high TRL systems, if they are 
delivered on orbit. As mentioned in subsection 5.7.3.1, spacecraft whose 
development start at low TRL have a low chance of being delivered early (as 
showed by the curve of the proportion of spacecraft population on orbit), but if 
they are, they are likely to be less obsolete at a given calendar date after the start 
of their development than high TRL systems. 
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Figure 53. Calendar Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence for Tlife = 5 years  
and TRLini = 4 (left) vs. TRLini = 7 (right)  
 
In short, systems with more mature technologies are exposed to a higher initial Calendar 
Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence, but this disadvantage slowly vanishes over time as the 
Calendar Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence converges towards the Static Risk of On-Orbit 
Obsolescence, which is the same regardless of the initial TRL value. Furthermore, the 
advantage of low maturity systems in terms of initial Calendar Risk of On-Orbit 
Obsolescence is obtained for the rare (low probability) scenarios where these systems are 
delivered early (the reader is referred to the Introduction of the present work for a 
discussion of schedule slippage and low TRL in space programs). 
 
The previous analysis was conducted for a fixed Tlife = 5 years. Figure 54 shows how the 
behavior of the Calendar Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence is affected when the design 
lifetime Tlife varies, while the initial technology maturity is held constant.  
 
 Except for the short oscillatory transient due to the numerical artifact of the 
model, the Calendar RO starts at the initial value of 59 % around t = 36 months in 
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both cases, for  
Tlife = 2 years and Tlife = 7 years. The spacecraft design lifetime has no impact on 
the initial likelihood of a spacecraft to be obsolete.  
 
 For a short design lifetime of Tlife = 2 years, the Calendar Risk of On-Orbit 
Obsolescence quickly converges to the static limit, as the proportion of spacecraft 
on-orbit reaches a stationary distribution. Conversely, the right plot of Figure 54 
indicates that for a larger value of Tlife = 7 years the oscillations subsist longer, 
with a CRO ranging from 72% to 80%. The shorter cycles associated with shorter 
design lifetimes therefore result in a smaller variability of the CRO.  
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Figure 54. Calendar Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence for TRLini = 7  
and Tlife = 2 years (left) vs. Tlife = 7 years (right) 
 
While the design lifetime of the spacecraft does not affect the initial Calendar Risk of 
On-Orbit Obsolescence, it modifies the nature of the cycles (amplitude and period) of the 
CRO for a series of spacecraft developed in response to a given need. 
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In the light of the two types of dynamic risks of on-orbit obsolescence introduced 
previously, it becomes important for an organization concerned with the risk of on-orbit 
obsolescence to understand and articulate its “temporal mindset”, as different 
implications and mitigation strategies result in a clock-based versus a calendar-based 
design and acquisition environment (the latter being the paradigm shift that space 
responsiveness introduces, as discussed in section 3.6.2). For example: 
 
 If an organization is concerned with the likelihood that a spacecraft will be 
obsolete after a given period following launch, then the Lifetime Risk of On-Orbit 
Obsolescence is the relevant metric. The preliminary results obtained by the 
models indicate that the initial technology maturity level has little if any influence 
on this risk of obsolescence. In other words, it is ineffectual to dip into low TRL 
technologies with the hope of mitigating the risk of on-orbit obsolescence as the 
spacecraft LRO is not affected by such TRL choice. In addition, while not 
providing advantages in terms of LRO, low TRL increase the likelihood of 
schedule slippage and cost growth in spacecraft development (as discussed in 
sections 2.6 and 3.5.1). 
 
 If, at the start of the spacecraft development, an organization is concerned for 
some reason with the likelihood that a spacecraft on orbit will be obsolete at a 
given date, then the Calendar Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence is a relevant metric. 
Space systems with innovative technologies (still unproven and therefore at low 
TRL) start with an initial advantage over more mature systems. However, this 
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advantage is only meaningful if the spacecraft are developed in a timely manner, 
an unlikely scenario for low maturity systems. Furthermore, this advantage 
disappears over time, since, for all systems, the Calendar Risk of On-Orbit 
Obsolescence converges towards the Static Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence, which 
is the same regardless of the initial technology maturity level. It is incumbent 
upon an organization to justify or provide a convincing rationale for its interest in 
the Calendar Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence; it should be understood however 
that a lower initial CRO can only be obtained with low maturity technologies, and 
thus a higher likelihood of schedule slippage. 
 
In the following subsection, the time required to deliver a spacecraft is quantified based 
on the initial technology maturity TRLini. 
5.7.4 Time-to-Orbit or time of first delivery of capability 
Another effect of including more mature technologies in space systems was previously 
alluded to: the reduction of development times, which results in an earlier date of the 
delivery of service to the customer. By analogy with Control Theory, it is possible to 
define a time constant reflecting the time to develop and deploy the space system and 
deliver the desired capability, or time to “respond” to a given need. This issue, presented 
in chapter 2, has become crucial as increasingly more resources are invested to develop 
an “Operationally Responsive Space”. The Time-to-Orbit is denoted by to-orbit, or time of 
the first delivery of capability. This quantity represents the time needed to develop and 
deploy the asset on orbit with a 95% probability, and is defined from the start of 
development until the asset starts providing service to the customer. In this definition, the 
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Time-to-Orbit only captures the first “cycle” of development/service of a spacecraft 
responding to a need, and does not consider the later replacements of retired spacecraft. 
The Time-to-Orbit is thus also the time of the first delivery of capability, which is an 
essential parameter indicative of space responsiveness. Recall that given an initial TRL 
value (representing the initial level of technology maturity of the spacecraft), the 
technology maturation model estimates the time needed to reach IOC. The Time-to-Orbit 
to-orbit is thus simply computed by looking at the time needed for 95% of the cases of a 
Monte-Carlo simulation to reach IOC. As seen on Figure 55, the results obtained by the 
model for to-orbit show that the capability is delivered approximately twice faster when 
TRLini = 7 (74 months) than when TRLini = 4 (164 months).  
 





































Figure 55. First delivery to orbit for Tlife = 5 years 
and TRLini = 4 (left) vs.  TRLini = 7 (right) 
 
 
Table 11 shows the values of the Time-to-Orbit to-orbit obtained with the models, for the 
various values of the initial technology maturity TRLini. 
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Table 11. Time-to-Orbit as a function of TRLini 
TRLini  4 5 6 7 8 9 
to-orbit 
(months) 
164 127 98 74 56 41 
 
5.7.5 Obsolescence-responsiveness plot 
The results presented previously in 5.7.3.2 and 5.7.4 highlight the trade-off that must be 
considered by an organization developing space systems (such as the DOD or NASA), 
between the initial Calendar Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence, if this measure of interest to 
them, and the time of the first delivery of the capability. This compromise is illustrated in 
Figure 56: the higher the initial TRL, the higher the initial Calendar Risk of On-Orbit 
Obsolescence, but the faster the spacecraft will be delivered (and reciprocally). 
 














Figure 56. Illustration of the trade-off between initial CRO and time of first delivery of capability 
 
As these two objectives are conflicting, the appropriate initial level of maturity for the 
technologies implemented on a spacecraft will depend on the priority given to one or the 
other by the decision-makers. The quantitative analysis presented in this chapter can 
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prove useful to guide such decisions. Specifically, an Obsolescence-Responsiveness plot 
can display the trade-off between Time-to-Orbit and initial Calendar Risk of On-Orbit 
Obsolescence for the different possible initial TRL values. Figure 57 provides an 
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Figure 57. Example of an Obsolescence-Responsiveness plot 
 
 Figure 57 reads as follows: for example, a system with an average initial TRL = 5 
is likely to be delivered on orbit within 127 months and, three years after the start 
of the program, will likely be obsolete (or not State-of-the-Art) with a 43 % 
chance. On the other hand, a system with an average initial TRL = 7 is likely to be 
delivered in 74 months (faster delivery than the previous system), with an initial 
                                                 
**** It is after three years that, for all values of TRLini, a statistically significant proportion of spacecraft is delivered on 
orbit, thus allowing a proper definition and calculation of the CRO. 
 196
risk of obsolescence three years after the development start of 58 % (but higher 
initial CRO). 
 
 For a given schedule (or responsiveness) requirement, which can be represented 
in the Obsolescence-Responsiveness plot by a horizontal line above which the 
Time-to-Orbit should not go, the figure shows the preferred initial TRL values 
that will most likely satisfy this requirement. For those various design options, the 
different values of the initial Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence are then provided. 
For example, if a spacecraft needs to be operational within 80 months of 
development start, designs with an initial system-TRL of 7 and above will most 
likely satisfy this schedule constraint. Furthermore, the likelihood that the 
spacecraft will be obsolete after three years of start of development will be at least 
58 %. 
 
 If for example an organization is concerned with the risk of obsolescence and 
only wants to fly a spacecraft that will have less than 50 % chance of being 
obsolete three years after the development starts, then system-TRL less than 6 
should be selected. Furthermore, the Time-to-Orbit of the first delivery of the 
capability will most likely exceed 110 months. 
 
Caveat: it is recognized that the contribution of such a plot (Figure 57) cannot be 
interpreted beyond the level of fidelity offered by the data used to generate the models of 
technology maturation and the obsolescence models. The example provided herein 
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indicates trends and serves as an illustration of the trade-off between Time-to-Orbit and 
Calendar Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence. Should more data become available regarding 
the time needed to mature technology, as well as empirical data on the spacecraft 
obsolescence (to derive the probabilities in Eq. (31)), different plots could be generated 
that would offer, beyond the trends here identified, an increased level of fidelity in the 
quantitative findings and “absolute” values of the numerical results.  
5.8 Summary 
Technology maturity has been a central argument in the diverging views of GAO and the 
DOD regarding best practices for the development of space systems. In several reports, 
GAO recommended the inclusion of only mature technologies in acquisition programs, 
specifically with a TRL ≥ 7, in order to limit the likelihood of cost growth and schedule 
slippage. While the DOD remains committed to limiting the probability of cost overruns 
and schedule slippages, it is also concerned with the likelihood of deploying space assets 
that may become rapidly obsolete on orbit. Obsolescence can indeed reduce the ability of 
a defense organization to maintain its strategic and tactical superiority. This dilemma can 
explain in part the reluctance of the DOD to apply GAO’s recommendations regarding 
the minimum TRL threshold. By their specificities (physical non-accessibility, long 
development schedule and extended design lifetimes), space systems are exposed to a 
unique form of obsolescence, which was referred to as the “Risk of On-Orbit 
Obsolescence”.  
 
In this chapter, a stochastic model of Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence based on two 
Markov models was developed: the first capturing the drift of a space asset towards 
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obsolescence, and the second simulating the technology maturation process using system-
TRL as a yardstick. The interaction of those two models, along with the description of a 
given spacecraft characteristics, allowed us to define several types of risks of on-orbit 
obsolescence. The Static Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence represents the overall risk that 
the spacecraft used over a given time-horizon will be obsolete while being on orbit. The 
(dynamic) Lifetime Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence informs us about the instantaneous 
probability that a spacecraft will be obsolete at a given instant after it has been launched. 
Finally, the (dynamic) Calendar Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence represents the 
instantaneous conditional probability of the spacecraft of being obsolete, provided it is on 
orbit, at a given calendar date. 
 
Through these last two definitions, this chapter insisted on the importance of clearly 
defining the temporal mindset in which one operates to assess the evolution of the risk of 
obsolescence over time. When observed over the entire lifetime of the spacecraft (via the 
LRO), this risk of obsolescence is no more significant at high TRL than at low TRL. 
When focusing on a given calendar date (via the CRO), a lower initial risk of 
obsolescence can be obtained with low maturity technologies. This can however occur 
only in the eventuality of a timely delivery of the spacecraft. An obsolescence-
responsiveness plot, an example of which was provided herein, can display the resulting 




In section 2.6, the influence of technology maturity on schedule slippage was analyzed at 
the system-level, through the definition of a system-TRL for the entire spacecraft. 
Similarly, the approach undertaken in this chapter to model the risk of on-orbit 
obsolescence was by construction system-centric: each state of the Markov chain 
represented the level of obsolescence of the entire spacecraft. 
The next chapter will propose an integrated modeling framework that: 
1) goes beyond the initial system-centric evaluation of obsolescence previously 
presented, by modeling the obsolescence phenomenon at the instrument (or 
subsystem) level 
2) connects this new instrument-centric obsolescence model to the model of 
spacecraft Time-to-Delivery based on the idea of spacecraft portfolio presented in 
Chapter 3. The resulting framework provides a powerful capability to 
simultaneously explore the impact of design decisions on spacecraft schedule, on-




6 INTEGRATED STOCHASTIC ANALYSES: SPACECRAFT 




“The sources of poetry are in the spirit seeking completeness.” 
 




Chapter 2 discussed the importance of responsiveness for the space industry, and 
presented several “levers of space responsiveness”, or means to influence the schedule of 
space systems (reducing the extent and likelihood of schedule slippage and/or improving 
the overall responsiveness). Chapter 3 focused on the design-centric levers of 
responsiveness and introduced a stochastic model of spacecraft time-to-delivery by 
conceiving of a spacecraft as a portfolio of instruments or technologies. The implications 
of the choice of the portfolio characteristics (e.g., number of instruments, various 
instrument TRLs) on the spacecraft delivery schedule and the cumulative utility delivered 
by the spacecraft were investigated. Once the spacecraft is on orbit, it is exposed to 
another type of “temporal risk”, namely the risk of on-orbit obsolescence. After a general 
overview of the issue of system obsolescence conducted in Chapter 4 and the 
presentation of various approaches to model this phenomenon, a stochastic model of 
spacecraft obsolescence at the system-level was formulated in Chapter 5, and the impact 
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of technology maturity (via the average system-TRL) and design lifetime Tlife on the risk 
of on-orbit obsolescence was explored. Figure 58 illustrates how design choices such as 
spacecraft portfolio size, various TRLs and design lifetime Tlife, can influence the time-
to-delivery and time-to-obsolescence of the spacecraft, ultimately impacting the 
cumulative utility delivered by the spacecraft over its actual lifetime (in a clock-based 


















Figure 58. Spacecraft lifecycle and the impact of design choices on time-to-delivery and time-to-
obsolescence  
This chapter proposes to connect together the two main models presented in Chapter 3 
and 5 and to analyze jointly the impact of design choices (materialized by the selection of 
portfolio characteristics) on both the time-to-delivery TDs/c and time-to-obsolescence Tobs 
of the spacecraft. The result is an integrated framework that should help inform decisions 
made during the design of a spacecraft (or series of spacecraft) when timeliness and 
utility delivered are important objectives being considered. 
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To do so, the model of spacecraft time-to-delivery presented in Chapter 3 is first refined 
in section 6.2 by adopting a local approach to model the instruments delivery schedule 
that magnifies the progression of the technology maturation process. This refined model 
constitutes the “development module” of the integrated framework. In section 6.3, an 
obsolescence model at the instrument (or subsystem) level is formulated, and is made 
compatible with the spacecraft portfolio approach developed in Chapter 3. This 
obsolescence model combined with a simple probabilistic model of failure and a 
spacecraft replacement strategy (presented in section 6.4) constitutes the “operations 
module” of the integrated framework. The full framework, that is stochastic and state-
based by construction, is presented in section 6.5. Finally, in section 6.6, the main results 
produced by the integrated framework are discussed, through the description of utility 
profiles obtained for single spacecraft as well as series of spacecraft, and the analysis of 
two example mission scenarios (science and defense missions). 
6.2 Development module: model of spacecraft Time-to-Delivery 
Chapter 3 presented a probabilistic model of spacecraft Time-to-Delivery that was 
formulated around the concept of spacecraft portfolio. This model of spacecraft Time-to-
Delivery assumed that the delivery schedule of a spacecraft follows three main phases 
that are conducted sequentially: the instruments development phase, the integration and 
testing phase, and the shipping and launch operations phase. The duration of each phase 
was treated as random variable, whose probability density function was assumed to be 
lognormal, with parameters indexed by the spacecraft portfolio characteristics (e.g., 
instruments TRLs, size) and derived from historical data. By adding the three 
intermediate random variables calculated in the model of Instruments Delivery Schedule 
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(IDS), the model of spacecraft Integration & Testing time, and the model of Shipping 
time, the final random variable of spacecraft Time-to-Delivery was obtained. The 
following section proposes a refinement of the model of Instruments Delivery Schedule 
(IDS). In section 3.4.1, the Instruments Delivery Schedule was modeled according to a 
“global approach”: a probability distribution of the time TDi elapsed between the 
development start and the instrument delivery was defined as a function of the initial 
instrument TRLini. Figure 59 illustrates how the Time-to-Delivery TDi of a portfolio 






TRLini 4  TRLini i  TRLini 9
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Figure 59. Global approach of instrument time-to-delivery (notional) 
 
6.2.1 Local approach of technology maturation and instrument development 
This section proposes an alternate approach to model the instrument time-to-delivery, 
aligned with the state-space representation of technology maturation proposed in Chapter 
5. In this “local approach”, the maturation of the main technology characterizing 
instrument i is followed step-by-step, by modeling the successive Technology Readiness 
Levels reached by technology i, from the initial TRL at the development start. Each 
transition from one TRL to the next is captured by a random variable that follows a given 
distribution.  
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For example, assume that the time to transition from TRL k to TRL (k+1) follows an 
exponential distribution of parameter k, whose value can be derived from historical data 






   (6.1)
 
This “local” approach, represented in Figure 60, provides more resolution and flexibility 
to model the technology maturation process. For example, specific distributions can be 
used to model the difficult transitions from TRL 4 to TRL 6, which have often been 
discussed, sometimes under the term “TRL gap” or “TRL Valley of Death” 
[192,193,194]. In addition, unlike the global approach, this local approach allows the 
explicit modeling of returns to lower TRL values (e.g., when technical problems are 
identified and things have to be “redesigned”). Indeed, the “linear path” (from TRL 1 
straight to TRL 9) is common for critical mission subsystems but may not occur every 
time (especially around TRL 7, as described by Mankins [195]). Similarly, Cornford and 
Sarsfield state that “few development efforts move sequentially along the TRL 
continuum” [196]. In that case, the local approach gives the flexibility to rearrange the 
TRL states and transitions to reflect the path taken by the technology maturation process 
for the technology considered.  
 
Note also a final refinement visible in Figure 60: an instrument that has never flown on 
an actual mission jumps directly from TRL 8 to the final delivery state, once its 
development is complete. If the instrument has been flown on previous missions (i.e., the 
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instrument has some “heritage”), it starts at a TRL 9 and transitions to the final delivery 
state once the necessary adjustments to its design have been performed. 
 





Figure 60. Local approach of instrument time-to-delivery  
 
The final Time-to-Delivery of instrument i can then be computed by summing the 
consecutive transition times from the initial TRL to the final delivery state, as expressed 
















6.2.2 Spacecraft Integration & Testing 
Once all the instruments and the bus have been delivered, the integration and testing of 
the spacecraft can start. The duration of this phase is captured by the random variable Tint 
that follows a specific lognormal distribution depending on the spacecraft portfolio size 















Figure 61. Model of spacecraft Integration & Testing duration (notional) 
 
Recall the functional form of the probability density function of the random variable Tint 
discussed in section 3.4.2: 







































































6.2.3 Spacecraft shipping and launch operations 
Once the instruments and the bus have been integrated and tested, the spacecraft is ready 
to be shipped to the launch range and integrated into the launch vehicle. The duration of 
this phase is captured by the random variable Tship that follows a lognormal distribution 















Figure 62. Model of spacecraft Integration & Testing duration (notional) 
 
Recall the functional form of the probability density function of the random variable Tship 


































































6.2.4 Final state representation of the model of Spacecraft Time-to-Delivery 
When the three state-based models discussed previously (Instruments Development, 
Integration & Testing, Shipping and Launch operations) are connected to each other, a 
final state representation of the model of spacecraft Time-to-Delivery is obtained, as 
illustrated in Figure 63. Using such a state representation, this model of spacecraft Time-
to-Delivery can be implemented with various stochastic tools, such as Stochastic Petri 
Nets (SPNs), in which the transition distributions have to be defined as presented 
previously. Note that the comments made in section 3.4.6 on the domain of applicability 
of the model of spacecraft time-to-delivery still hold, and it is still important to 
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distinguish the conceptual contribution that the structure of the model constitutes, from 
the quantitative results obtained with the NASA data used in the particular application 
discussed in this thesis. 
TRL 4 TRL 5 TRL 6 TRL 7 TRL 8 TRL 9
Delivered
TRL 4 TRL 5 TRL 6 TRL 7 TRL 8 TRL 9
Delivered




















Figure 63. State representation of the model of spacecraft Time-to-Delivery, 
for illustrative purposes only.  
For maximum flexibility, the analyses conducted in the rest of this chapter result from a 
manual implementation of the models in MATLAB. In the example of Figure 63, a 
spacecraft portfolio of ninst = 3 instruments is considered with the following TRL 
configuration: Pf = [6 4 8]. When the instruments and the bus have reached the 
“delivered” state, the entire spacecraft can transition to the next stages of the 
development (I&T and shipping) until it is finally launched and operational on-orbit. 
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6.2.5 Comparative examples 
In the following, the predicted schedules for three NASA missions currently proposed as 
a response to the Astro 2010 Decadal Survey are considered. The team responsible for 
each mission submitted a Response to the Request For Information (RFI) that included 
(at least) a master schedule with a predicted launch date, along with a technical 
description of the proposed spacecraft design that presented the various payload 
instruments and their current TRL. 
Recall that for the purpose of this analysis, an “instrument” means an independent value-
delivering subsystem. This definition requires that: 
a. the subsystem function is not to support the general operations of the spacecraft 
(e.g, gyroscope, solar array) but to deliver value that is aligned with the objective(s) 
of the mission 
b. the subsystem has to be capable to deliver value on its own, without the joint use 
of another subsystem 
6.2.5.1 THESIS 
The Terrestrial and Habitable-zone Exoplanet Spectroscopy Infrared Spacecraft 
(THESIS) is a mission designed around the use of a 1.4m telescope used in conjunction 
with  molecular spectroscopy to investigate the composition and chemistry of exoplanet 
atmospheres [197]. The RFI response document states that “All components of THESIS 
[…] have TRL of 6 or higher” and the predicted time-to-delivery of the system 
{telescope + spectrometers} is 4.5 years. 
For a spacecraft portfolio Pf = [6], the model of spacecraft time-to-delivery yields a 
Mean-Time-to-Delivery of 48 months = 4 years. 
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6.2.5.2 Xenia 
Xenia is a mission aiming at improving our understanding of the formation and evolution 
of cosmic objects such as stars and galaxies. It will “use x-ray monitoring and wide-field 
x-ray imaging and high-resolution spectroscopy to collect essential information from 
three major tracers of these cosmic structures: the warm-hot intergalactic medium 
(WHIM), galaxy clusters, and [Gamma Ray Bursts]” [198]. The design of the spacecraft 
is characterized by three main independent instruments: 
 The CRyogenic Imaging Spectrometer (CRIS); average TRL ~4-5 
 The Transient Event Detector (TED); average TRL ~ 6 
 The High Angular Resolution Imager (HARI); average TRL ~ 6 
 
According to the RFI response documentation, the predicted time-to-delivery is 
approximately 7 years [199]. 
For a spacecraft portfolio Pf = [5 5 6] the model of spacecraft time-to-delivery yields a 
Mean-Time-to-Delivery of 83 months = 6.9 years. 
6.2.5.3 International X-Ray Observatory (IXO) 
The International X-Ray Observatory (IXO) is a mission that proposes to address 
astrophysical questions that for example relate to the evolution of black holes [200].  
The design of the spacecraft is characterized by five main independent instruments: 
 The X-Ray Microcalorimeter Spectrometer (XMS); TRL ~ 4 
 The Wide Field and Hard X-Ray Imager (WFI/HXI); TRL ~ 4 
 The X-Ray Grating Spectrometer (XGS); TRL < 4 
 The X-Ray Polarimeter (XPOL); TRL ~ 5 
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 The High Time Resolution Spectrometer (HTRS); TRL ~ 6 
 
According to the RFI response documentation, the predicted time-to-delivery is 
approximately 12.5 years [200]. 
For a spacecraft portfolio Pf = [4 4 4 5 6] the model of spacecraft time-to-delivery yields 
a Mean-Time-to-Delivery of 138 months = 11.5 years. (Note that the model does not 
consider technologies that are still at the formulation stage, i.e., TRL  3, and that the 
value of TRL 4 was used for the XGS while the reference documents a lower level of 
maturity for that instrument, which may explain partially the shorter MTTD obtained by 
the model). 
 
These results should be treated with caution. The purpose of these comparisons is not to 
convince of the accuracy of the model; these examples merely provide some assurance 
that the Mean-Time-to-Delivery produced by the model lies within a “reasonable” range 
of values and that it is consistent with estimates from some NASA missions currently 
proposed.  
6.3 Operations module: instrument-centric model of obsolescence 
The stochastic model of spacecraft obsolescence presented in Chapter 4 was system-
centric: each state of the Markov chain represented the level of obsolescence of the entire 
spacecraft. While this approach provided general trends highlighting the influence of 
selected design parameters on the risk of obsolescence, a higher level of fidelity in the 
definition of the states is required to understand what drives the obsolescence of the 
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spacecraft. Specifically, since each instrument or spacecraft subsystem serves a specific 
function, it can be reasonably argued that each one can be rendered obsolete 
independently from the others. This section therefore proposes to extend and refine the 
analysis of on-orbit obsolescence conducted in Chapter 4 by modeling the obsolescence 
phenomenon at the instrument (or subsystem) level. This approach is aligned with the 
spacecraft portfolio concept formulated in Chapter 3 and presents benefits: 
 
 It offers an opportunity to identify instruments/subsystems that go obsolete the 
fastest, and to isolate them from others that are less prone to obsolescence. 
 
 When obsolescence data is available, it allows the infusion of this data more 
easily in the models by targeting the relevant subsystems, as opposed to the 
“entire spacecraft”. 
6.3.1 Instrument obsolescence 
When conceiving a spacecraft as a portfolio of instruments, TDi is a random variable 
representing the time needed to fully develop an instrument and have it ready for 
integration in the whole spacecraft. The concurrent development of all the instruments 
constituting the spacecraft portfolio has consequences on the final delivery schedule of 
the entire spacecraft, described by another random variable TDs/c. Similarly, in a 
subsystem-level approach of obsolescence, the time elapsed until the onset of 
obsolescence of a given instrument is captured by a random variable.  
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Figure 64 shows a state representation of the model of obsolescence for a given 
instrument of the portfolio.  Similarly to the system-level model presented in section 
5.7.1, three main states are used to describe a given instrument i of the portfolio: State-of-
the-Art (SoAi), minor Obsolescence (mOi) and Major Obsolescence (MOi). As discussed 
in section 5.7.1, it is assumed that no on-orbit servicing is performed, precluding any 









Figure 64. State representation of the obsolescence model for each portfolio instrument.  
The proper formulation of such models at the instrument/technology level requires: 
 an understanding of the manifestation of obsolescence for the instrument 
considered, and the resulting definition of the states SoAi, mOi and MOi, based on 
performance levels for example. 
 the selection of the transition probabilities from one state to the next. 
 
In his survey of sensors used for Earth observation mission, Kramer [201] provides 
relevant data that can serve as a basis to derive data-driven obsolescence transition laws. 
The next three subsections present examples of the use of obsolescence data (for a given 
class of instruments/technologies) to define the transition probabilities between the 
various obsolescence states. 
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6.3.2 Calibration of transition probabilities using data: examples 
6.3.2.1 Obsolescence of land surface imaging instruments 
Adapted from Kramer [201], Figure 65 shows the evolution of the spatial resolution of 































Figure 65. Spatial resolution of surface imaging sensors since 1970. Adapted from Kramer [201]. 
Visual inspection of Figure 64 confirms the expected improvement in spatial resolution 
of the sensors used for surface imaging missions over time. This general trend can be 
captured from Figure 64 by performing a linear regression analysis on the data points, 
resulting in the formulation of a simple functional form for the spatial resolution as a 
function of time. For example, if the variable t represents the number of years since 1970, 
the following function can be assumed: 
 t
Rs
RseRs    (6.6)
 with Rs = 83.4871 and Rs =  0.0877 
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Using the previous law, an estimate of the time required for the spatial resolution to be 








   (6.7)
 
 If the major obsolescence state is defined by the emergence of a competing sensor 
technology that allows to gain a factor 10 in the spatial resolution, the Mean-







   (6.8)
 
 If the minor obsolescence state is defined by the emergence of a competing sensor 
technology that allows to gain a factor 2 in the spatial resolution, the Mean-Time-







   (6.9)
 
These Mean-Times-To-Obsolescence are used as the central parameter in the probability 
distribution governing the transition from one state to another. In the light of the 
obsolescence modeling schemes discussed in Chapter 4, let us assume that the time to 




MOeTf   )(   (6.10)
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In Eq. 6.10, the random variable TSoAMO has an expected value that is equal to the 
parameter MO. As a result, the parameter MO can be defined as from the previous 
analysis by setting  
MO = MTT(SoAMO)  26.2 years. 
6.3.2.2 Radar altimeters 
Similarly, Kramer [201] provides range precision data concerning radar altimeters that 
have been flown on space missions since 1970. A similar approach can be used to define 

































Figure 66. Range precision of radar altimeters sensors since 1970. Adapted from Kramer [201]. 
6.3.2.3 SAR instruments 
Kramer [201] also provides the spatial resolution of Synthetic Aperture Radars (SAR) 
that have been flown on space missions since 1975. A similar approach can be used to 
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Figure 67. Spatial resolution of Synthetic Aperture Radars since 1975. Adapted from Kramer [201]. 
Note that one performance metric (e.g., spatial resolution or range precision) may not be 
sufficient to fully reflect the quality of the service provided by the instruments 
considered. Further analyses along other dimensions of performance (e.g., data rate) may 
help to define more appropriately the states of obsolescence. 
6.4 Operations module: failure model and replacements 
6.4.1 Failure model 
The service delivered by a spacecraft may end prematurely if the spacecraft experiences a 
failure resulting in the total loss of functionality of one or several of its payload 
instruments.  
 218
The operations module is designed to capture this eventuality through the use of two 
main states (Operation or Failed) representing the functionality status of each portfolio 






Figure 68. State representation of the functionality status of each portfolio instrument 
 
For each instrument i, the Time-to-Failure since spacecraft launch TFi is treated as a 
random variable, and its probability density function can be derived from historical 
reliability data. For the purpose of this study, the single Weibull model of spacecraft 
reliability developed by Castet and Saleh [202] was selected. 
6.4.2 Replacement strategy 
The integrated framework allows simulating the development and launch of a series of 
spacecraft responding to a given need. In that simulation mode, it is assumed that within 
a given series of spacecraft, each spacecraft will be designed based on the same 
technology portfolio configuration than its predecessor (same number of instruments and 
TRL configuration) and the same design lifetime Tlife.  
6.4.2.1 Date of development start for subsequent spacecraft 
In order to minimize the likelihood of service discontinuation and to help guarantee that a 
new spacecraft will be ready as soon as its predecessor reaches its design lifetime, the 
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decision to start the development of a subsequent spacecraft is made according to the 
same strategy that was discussed in Chapter 5. Specifically, for the subsequent spacecraft, 
this decision is based on an estimate of the time-to-delivery of that subsequent spacecraft 
as well as the common design lifetime Tlife that characterize all the spacecraft of the 
series. In the model, the projected time-to-delivery of the next spacecraft is equal to the 
time-to-delivery of the previous spacecraft. The calendar time tk* of the development 
start (e.g., date of the Authority-To-Proceed) of the kth spacecraft of a series is calculated 
as follows: 
For k = 1 0* kt  
For k > 1  )1(/)1(/*1* ,0max   kcslifekcskk TDTTDtt  
(6.11)
 
This criterion ensures that: 
 The development of a new spacecraft will not start until the previous spacecraft is 
launched 
 The development of a new spacecraft starts before the previous spacecraft reaches its 
design lifetime; specifically it is scheduled to have the spacecraft ready for launch 
when the previous one reaches its design lifetime. 
6.4.2.2 Launch date of subsequent spacecraft 
An additional condition is implemented that specifies that if the next spacecraft is ready 
for launch before the previous spacecraft has completed its mission, it remains on stand-
by and is only launched once the previous spacecraft has reached its design lifetime. 
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6.5 An integrated framework for the modeling of spacecraft schedule 
and on-orbit obsolescence 
This section describes how the various models described previously are now connected to 
each other to form an integrated framework that allows for the calculation of spacecraft 
time-to-delivery, risk of on-orbit obsolescence and the evaluation of the utility delivered 
by a given spacecraft portfolio configuration. 
6.5.1 State representation  
Figure 69 is a state representation of the integrated framework showing both the 
development module (with the model of spacecraft Time-to-Delivery) and the operations 
module (including the obsolescence and failure models).  
Several model characteristics that are visible on Figure 69 should be noted: 
 
 For a given instrument i, the model of time-to-delivery and the obsolescence 
model are connected. It is assumed that the “obsolescence clock” of instrument i 
starts ticking only once this instrument/technology is delivered. In other words, 
the delivery of a given instrument/technology is an enabling condition for the start 
of the obsolescence process of said instrument (represented by a red link in Figure 
69). This assumption is made to ensure that a technology that is still going 
through the maturation process is not already subject to obsolescence. (Without 
this assumption, a technology starting at TRL 4, thus more innovating, would take 
longer to be delivered and would then be subject to a higher risk of obsolescence 
than an already proven (TRL 9) technology, producing a counterintuitive trend).  
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 The “failure clock” for each instrument is triggered when the spacecraft is 
launched.  
 When the spacecraft or instrument i experiences a total failure, instrument i, 
regardless of its obsolescence state, immediately transitions to the “Failed” state. 
In other words, an instrument or spacecraft total failure is an enabling condition 
for the immediate transition to the failed state.  
 
TRL 4 TRL 5 TRL 6 TRL 7 TRL 8 TRL 9
Delivered
TRL 4 TRL 5 TRL 6 TRL 7 TRL 8 TRL 9
Delivered
TRL 4 TRL 5 TRL 6 TRL 7 TRL 8 TRL 9
Delivered
SoA mO MO Op.
Failed
SoA mO MO Op.
Failed























Figure 69. State representation of the complete integrated framework for a spacecraft portfolio of 
ninst = 3 instruments (illustrative) 
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The spacecraft can only deliver utility if it has been launched and some of its instruments 
are operational. The extent to which the operational instruments are obsolete determine 
how much instantaneous utility is delivered. The following two subsections discuss the 
specific assumptions that govern the calculation of the utility delivered by each 
instrument. 
6.5.2 Refinements to the use of the spacecraft utility 
Chapter 3 introduced the notion of utility, defined as a scalar representing the satisfaction 
derived from the services provided by the system to the customer per unit time. The 
analyses presented in Chapter 3 were conducted by making two important assumptions: 
1. Each portfolio instrument delivers the same instantaneous utility (that was set to 
1) 
2. The instantaneous utility delivered by the instruments is constant throughout the 
life of the spacecraft 
Those assumptions are now lifted and the next sections discuss how to scale the 
instantaneous instrument utilities in a manner that should capture not only the 
performance benefits offered by innovative (low-TRL) instruments but also the impact of 
obsolescence on the service delivered. 
6.5.2.1 Capturing the value of innovation 
Recall that Eq. 27 from Chapter 3, shows the instantaneous instrument utilities as a 
vector: 
  ncs uuu ˆ...ˆˆˆ 21/ u  (6.12)
 223
 
The analyses conducted in Chapter 3 assumed that for every instrument i, ûi = û0 = 1, 
regardless of the initial TRL of instrument i. In reality, the development of new 
technologies is undertaken in order to yield some benefits. For example, a technology 
that is currently at TRL 4 is typically being developed because it is expected to provide 
some improvements in terms of performance, reliability, cost, etc. compared to existing 
technologies that are at TRL 9.  If trade studies that compare the various cumulative 
utilities delivered by different design options (i.e., spacecraft portfolio configurations) are 
to be conducted, this “value of innovation” should be captured by the instantaneous 
utilities.  
In the remainder of this work, the instantaneous instrument utilities ûi are thus varied 
based on the different values of the instrument TRLs. It is contended that ûi should be a 
decreasing function of the initial instrument TRL. For example, for a portfolio of four 
instruments  
Pf = [4 4 7 9], one could define the vector of instantaneous instrument utilities as: ûs/c = 
[3 3 2 1], if the two instruments at TRL 4 are considered to offer “three times as much” 
utility as a similar instrument that has been flown on previous space missions (TRL 9). 
(Consider for example an existing radiometer at TRL 9 with a data rate of several Mbps 
vs. a future radiometer currently at TRL 4, with similar specifications, but offering a 
larger data rate of several tens of Mbps.) 
6.5.2.2 Impact of obsolescence on utility 
The stochastic framework developed in Chapter 5 provides quantitative results regarding 
the likelihood of system obsolescence, and relates it to selected design parameters, 
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namely the design lifetime Tlife and the initial system-TRL level TRLini. In portfolio 
theory, as implemented in the field of Research & Development, projects (or products) 
that are providing a diminishing return on investment, therefore no longer supporting the 
company’s strategic objectives (and that can thus be considered “obsolete”) are allocated 
fewer resources, deprioritized or terminated. 
In a similar fashion, this section proposes to model the impact of instrument obsolescence 
on the service provided to the customer through a reduction of the utility delivered. 
Depending on the state of obsolescence of the instrument i, its instantaneous utility 
delivered is scaled down from its initial value when the technology was state-of-the-art. 










where the coefficient ci depends on the current obsolescence state of instrument i, that is: 
ci = cSoAi if instrument i is at the state “State-of-the-Art” 
ci = cmOi if instrument i is at the state “minor Obsolescence” 
ci = cMOi if instrument i is at the state “Major Obsolescence” 
By default, cSoAi = 1 was selected. Examples of values used in the following analyses 
include:  
cmOi = 0.5 and cMOi = 0.25. 
6.5.3 Simulation tool with Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
In order to conduct the design space exploration and investigate the implications of 
spacecraft portfolio choices on schedule and cumulative utility, the models are controlled 
by a simulation tool with a Graphical User Interface (GUI). As shown in Figure 70, this 
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GUI can take as inputs various model parameters: number of Monte-Carlo cases, time 
horizon ops, portfolio characteristics including number of instrument ninst and various 
instrument TRLs, instantaneous instrument utilities ûi based on their TRL, ci 
obsolescence coefficients, and finally obsolescence and failure parameters of the 
probability distributions describing the transition times for each instrument. For a given 
portfolio configuration, the results returned by the GUI include Mean-Time-to-Delivery 
as well as various levels of schedule risk, and average and standard deviation of the total 
cumulative utility at the end of the time horizon. In addition, plots of the distribution of 
the random variable spacecraft time-to-delivery TDs/c and utility profiles (that are 
presented next) are produced.  
 
Varying the portfolio characteristics via for example the instrument TRL “knobs” allows 
the dynamic exploration of the design space as the output metrics and plots are updated in 
real-time. The specific impact of a change in portfolio size or instrument TRLs can thus 




Figure 70. Graphical User Interface (GUI) of the simulation tool  
 
6.5.4 Further directions to validate the integrated framework 
Further steps to validate the integrated framework would include: 
 Collecting a larger sample of spacecraft with data regarding the initial instruments 
TRL at the program start, the total number of instruments, and the duration of each 
main schedule phase. For this larger sample, the following tests could be perform: 
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o probability plots on the sample to validate the use of a given distribution type 
for each phase. It could for example provide some justification of the use of 
lognormal distributions for the integration & testing and shipping phases 
(preliminary lognormal probability plots with the current data used in this 
thesis and their interpretation are provided in Appendix B). If these tests are 
unsuccessful (data points representing the various integration & testing 
durations not aligned on a lognormal probability plot), probability plots 
testing other types of distributions (e.g., Weibull, Gamma) shall be used until 
an appropriate family of distribution can be identified. 
o Assuming that the type of distributions used by the model (e.g., lognormal in 
this thesis) is indeed appropriate to model the duration of those phases, more 
sophisticated goodness of fit tests can provide quantitative information to 
further validate the parameters of these distributions. These include for 
example the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [203] that provides a p-value based on 
the maximum difference between the empirical cumulative distribution 
function (from the data) and the cumulative distribution function from the 
model. An example of this test for the duration of the shipping phase is 
provided in Appendix A. If the parameters of the distribution are found to be 
inadequate, various methods can be considered to obtain appropriate 
parameters, such as Least Square Fits on the probability plots, non-linear 
Least Square Fits on the empirical c.d.f, or Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
(MLE) on the data.  
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 Analyzing the master schedule of a larger number of spacecraft to unveil the most 
common structure and compare it to the three-phase structure (Instruments 
Development, Integration & Testing, and Shipping) proposed in this framework. 
 
Since the obsolescence model and failure model of the operations module have 
parameters that are directly input by the user (depending on the type of instruments 
considered), their validation remains context-specific. 
The following section now discusses the main results obtained with the integrated 
framework, by presenting utility profiles for single spacecraft as well as series of 
spacecraft, and then proposing two mission scenarios. 
6.6 Results 
6.6.1 Utility profiles 
6.6.1.1 Instruments utilities and utility profile for a single spacecraft 
Figure 71 shows an example of temporal profiles for the 3-instrument portfolio Pf = [7 9 
6] for a time horizon of ops = 12 years = 144 months. Note that all the events represented 
on this figure (transitions to delivered, obsolete or failed states) correspond to the average 
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Figure 71. Examples of utility profiles for a 3-instrument portfolio  
 
 The top plot represents the development and then operations of the corresponding 
spacecraft. The Mean-Time-to-Delivery for this spacecraft portfolio was found to 
be 61 months, as illustrated by the jump from “Under Development” to 
“Delivered” at t = 61 months. 
 Among the 9 central subplots, each row is associated with one particular 
instrument (e.g., row 1 corresponds to the 1st instrument that is at TRLini = 7). 
Each row of plots provides three utility profiles, based on whether the instrument 
has transitioned to the “minor Obsolescence” state, “Major Obsolescence” state or 
“Failed” state. For example, on row 2, instrument 2 becomes “minor obsolete” at t 
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= 102 months, after which it only delivers a fraction of the initial utility, i.e., c1 û1 
= 0.5 units of utility (far-left plot). At t = 117 months, instrument 2 becomes 
“Major Obsolete”, after which it only delivers c1 û1 = 0.25 units of utility (middle 
plot). The far-right plot of row 2 shows that instrument 2 has remained 
operational until t = ops. 
 The bottom plot represents a combination of all the plots above and shows the 
average utility profile for the spacecraft portfolio Pf = [7 9 6]. The spacecraft 
MTTD is still visible at t = 61 months (no utility is delivered before that date), 
and the total instantaneous utility delivered by the spacecraft is the sum of the 
instruments instantaneous utilities. For example, three units of utility are delivered 
by the spacecraft until t = 102 months, date at which instrument #2 is the first 
instrument to become obsolete. The full spacecraft utility profile reflects both the 
significance of the time-to-delivery as well as the impact of obsolescence on the 
total utility delivered over time until the time horizon is reached. 
 
Note that since instrument #2 is the most technologically mature (TRLini = 9), it is the 
one that becomes obsolete the earliest. Also, the consecutive transitions to obsolescence 
of the various spacecraft instruments result in a significantly reduced utility delivered at 
the end of the time window:  ûtot(t=144) = 1 unit of utility <  ûtot(t=MTTD) = 3 units. 
6.6.1.2 Utility profile for a series of spacecraft (replacement strategy) 
Figure 72 represents the temporal profiles of the cumulative utility delivered by a series 
of spacecraft based on the portfolio Pf = [7 7], and with Tlife = 4 years, developed 
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consecutively to maintain a certain service. Note that this figure only represents one 
specific Monte-Carlo run. 
The top plot shows the overall utility delivered over time, through the replacement of the 
consecutive spacecraft. During, the first 80 months, utility is delivered via the 1st 
spacecraft that is launched at t = 32 months, as seen on the 2nd plot. 
Based on Eq. 6.11, the calendar date of the development start of the 2nd spacecraft (or 
ATP of spacecraft #2) is t2
* = 0 + 32 + max (0, 4*12 – 32) = 48 months. Assuming that 
the time-to-delivery of the 2nd spacecraft will be similar to the time-to-delivery of the 1st 
spacecraft (i.e., 32 months), the development of the 2nd spacecraft starts at t2
* = 48 
months, so that it is ready when the 1st spacecraft reaches its design lifetime and is 
retired. The 3rd plot shows that spacecraft #2 is actually delivered TDs/c 2 = 45 months 
after the development start or ATP date. As a result, the top plot shows that service is 
discontinued (no utility is provided) between the retirement of spacecraft #1 (t = 80 
months) and the launch of spacecraft #2 (occurring at t = t2
* + TDs/c 2 = 48 + 45 = 93 
months). In a similar fashion, the development start of the 3rd spacecraft is scheduled for 
t3
* = t2
* + TDs/c 2 + max (0, Tlife - TDs/c 2 ) = 48 + 45 + (48 – 45) = 96 months in calendar 
time. The time-to-delivery of the 3rd spacecraft TDs/c 3 = 30 months is actually shorter 
than that of the 2nd spacecraft. Instead of being launched when it is ready, (that is, at t = 
t3
*
 + TDs/c 3 = 96 + 30 = 126 months), the 3
rd spacecraft remains on stand-by until the end 
of the mission of the 2nd spacecraft, occurring at t = 93 + 4*12 = 141 months, ensuring no 
discontinuation of service. 
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Figure 72. Examples of utility profiles for a series of spacecraft of Tlife = 4 years and ops = 20 years 
 
The choice of the spacecraft portfolio configuration (number of instruments and TRLs) as 
well as the design lifetime of the spacecraft will impact the delivery-retirement dynamics, 
modifying the shape of the total utility profile (top plot of Figure 72). In other words, the 
design decisions leading to the selection of a given spacecraft portfolio have important 
implications on the total utility delivered over the time horizon of interest.  
6.6.2 Calendar Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence and Schedule Risk 
The concept of calendar risk of on-orbit obsolescence was introduced in Chapter 5 at the 
system-level. In a similar fashion, the calendar risk of on-orbit obsolescence for an 
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instrument i CROi can be defined as the probability that the instrument will be obsolete at 










The integrated framework now allows the simultaneous investigation of the impact of 
TRL on the instrument calendar risk of on-orbit obsolescence and on spacecraft schedule 
risk. By analogy to Figure 57, Figure 73 shows an example of a calendar obsolescence – 
schedule risk plot for an instrument in a 2-instrument spacecraft portfolio. For each value 
of the initial TRL used for instrument #1 at the start of the development of the spacecraft, 
Figure 73 provides the resulting calendar risk of on-orbit obsolescence (CRO) of that 
instrument at t = 5 years after the development start, as well as the schedule risk at 5 
years (i.e., the risk that the spacecraft time-to-delivery will exceed 5 years). 
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Figure 73. Calendar obsolescence – Schedule risk plot 
In agreement with the discussion conducted in section 5.7.5, Figure 73 shows a case in 
which the CRO at t = 5 years increases when the initial TRL of instrument #1 increases. 
Specifically, the instrument CRO increases from 22% when TRLini = 4 to 43% when 
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TRLini = 9. This provides some validity to the rationale used by the DOD to continue 
developing technologies with low maturity in order to reduce the calendar risk of on-orbit 
obsolescence. 
More importantly, the figure also confirms that the likelihood of the spacecraft not to be 
delivered within 5 years increases dramatically when the initial TRL of instrument #1 
decreases (from 0% when TRLini = 9 to 96% when TRLini = 4), in agreement with the 
findings of Chapter 3Figure 3. As a result, there exists in that case a trade-off between 
schedule risk and calendar risk of on-orbit obsolescence, that Figure 73 allows 
highlighting. In other words, using low maturity technologies (TRLini  8) at the start of 
the development of a spacecraft can result in a reduction of the instrument calendar risk 
of on-orbit obsolescence in the short-term, but this comes at a price of a higher chance of 
the spacecraft not to be delivered for that date.  
 
Recall that the purpose of the framework developed herein is to contribute to inform 
design decisions that are meant to meet the mission requirements. The next section thus 
proposes to consider two main mission scenarios (science mission and defense mission), 
with specific sets of requirements, and shows, in each case, how the new framework help 
unveil the appropriate design decisions and trade offs. 
6.6.3 Scenarios and examples of application 
6.6.3.1 Science mission scenario 
In this scenario, the case of a single science mission (with no follow-on) that is schedule-
risk driven, and for which a high science return desired, is analyzed. Consider for 
example an interplanetary mission to Mars with a design lifetime of Tlife = 2 years. In that 
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case, science starts being collected only once the destination (Mars vicinity) has been 
reached. Due to the 26-month synodic period of the system Earth-Mars, launch 
opportunities only occur at determined dates. Besides the objective of meeting a given 
launch window, there is no special incentive or utility benefit in launching earlier. The 
design space exploration is therefore conducted in a clock-based mindset.  
 
Main requirement: the spacecraft must be ready within the next 8 years, i.e., TDs/c  96 
months (which corresponds to the date of the targeted launch window). The acceptable 
level of schedule risk (i.e., the likelihood that the spacecraft will not be ready within 96 
months), is set to the value of 5 %.  
 
Design decisions: how many instruments (ninst) and what level(s) of technology maturity 
(TRLs) should be selected in order to remain under the level of schedule risk agreed upon 
and to ensure high science return? 
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Figure 74. Schedule risk of exceeding 96 months and average cumulative utility after Tlife= 2 years for 
spacecraft portfolios of size ranging from 1 to 4 instruments 
For all the spacecraft portfolios combinations of 1 to 4 instruments, Figure 74 shows the 
corresponding schedule risk of exceeding the 96-month requirement vs. the average 
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cumulative delivered by the spacecraft after Tlife= 2years of operations. Larger spacecraft 
(ninst = 4) typically deliver a higher average cumulative utility than smaller spacecraft 
(ninst = 1), consistent with the discussion conducted in section 3.6.2. On the other hand, 
the schedule risks associated with smaller spacecraft are found to be more limited 
(maximum schedule risk of ~37 %) than that of larger spacecraft (maximum schedule 
risk of ~ 91%). In other words, the confidence that the schedule constraint will be met is 
typically higher with smaller spacecraft than larger spacecraft.  
Figure 75 allows a more detailed investigation by zooming in on the spacecraft portfolios 
that meet the schedule constraint with the 5 % confidence level.  
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Figure 75. Spacecraft portfolios resulting in a schedule risk lower than 5 % for the 96-month delivery 
requirement. 
Several observations can be made: 
 Portfolios containing instruments with high TRLs do result in a lower schedule 
risk, in agreement with the comments made in section 3.5.1. Figure 75 allows the 
precise identification of the combinations that do and do not meet the 5 % 
schedule risk requirement.  
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 For portfolios containing ninst = 4 instruments, any TRL lower than TRL 7 cannot 
be employed if the 96-month delivery requirement must be met with 5% 
confidence. This is not the case for smaller spacecraft, for which TRL 6 may be 
used in certain cases (increased design freedom). 
 
Figure 76 represents the number of spacecraft portfolios meeting the 5 % schedule risk 
constraint as a function of the time remaining until the targeted launch opportunity. As 
the launch opportunity gets closer, the reduction in design freedom can be quantified. For 
example, at the very start of the development, there are 80 spacecraft portfolios of ninst = 
4 instruments that should still result in a time-to-delivery that meets the schedule 
requirement with a 5% confidence. This number drops significantly to ~12 two years 







































































Figure 76. Number of spacecraft portfolios meeting the 5 % schedule risk constraint as a function of 
the time remaining until the targeted launch opportunity. 
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Several other observations can be made: 
 Compared to small spacecraft portfolios, fewer large portfolios are possible as the 
launch date approaches. The larger size indeed results in the need for higher 
technology maturity in order to meet the launch date with a 5% schedule risk. 
 If the launch is pushed back to the next opportunity (as a back-up plan), larger 
portfolios can still be considered and visualized as we have moved back along the 
left of the x-axis of Figure 76. 
6.6.3.2 Defense scenario 
This scenario considers the case of a series of Earth satellite missions that are highly 
focused (the number and nature of instruments is already determined) and for which no 
discontinuation of service as well as a maximal utility delivered is desired. Consider for 
example a new reconnaissance capability that is needed to monitor a region of interest 
(e.g., a country that is suspected to be developing weapons of mass destruction within a 
hypothesized time horizon). In that case, it is beneficial to be able to start collecting data 
as early as possible, i.e., as soon as the 1st satellite is delivered, and until the given time 
horizon, e.g. ops = 15 years. For this reason, the design space exploration is conducted in 
a calendar-based mindset. 
 
Main requirements: 
1. the first satellite must be delivered within the next five and a half years (soft 
deadline), i.e., MTTDs/c  66 months.  
2. Two instruments are considered (ninst = 2): 
 An imager in the visible spectrum 
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 A thermal infrared sensor to monitor nightly activities (such as the ones used 
onboard Advanced KeyHole-11 [204,205]). 
 
Several candidate technologies with various levels of technology maturity, heritage, and 
performance are evaluated. Note also that instantaneous utility can be mapped into 
relevant quantities such as for example number of pictures taken per day and their quality 
(e.g., spatial resolution), etc. 
 
Design decisions:  
 What levels of technology maturity (TRLs) should be selected to ensure timely 
delivery as well as high performance? 
 How often should the satellites be replaced (Tlife) to minimize discontinuation of 
service and mitigate the effects of obsolescence? 
Figure 77 represents the MTTD of the 1st satellite launched, for all the 2-instrument 
spacecraft portfolios and allows the identification of the ones that meet the MTTDs/c  66 
months requirement. The corresponding possible combinations are listed in Table 12.  
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Figure 77. MTTD vs. average cumulative utility for all the various 2-instrument spacecraft 
portfolios, ops = 15 years after development start (for the 1st satellite of the series). 
 
Note that spacecraft portfolios [i j] and [j i] are considered distinct since the two different 
instruments are distinct (by nature and function) and can thus be assigned different TRLs. 
Two different design choices are then captured. The resulting MTTD is however similar, 
within the accuracy of the model of spacecraft time-to-delivery. The analysis shows that 
only instruments of TRL greater or equal than 6 should be considered in the design in 
order to meet the schedule requirement. 
 
For illustrative purposes, let us now compare only homogeneous spacecraft portfolios 
series for both ends of this TRL spectrum ([6 6] and [9 9] respectively). It is also assumed 
that within a given series of spacecraft, each spacecraft will have the same TRL 
configuration than its predecessor, with similar impact on instantaneous utility and time-











6 6 62.9 
6 7 56.0 
6 8 53.1 
6 9 52.2 
7 6 56.2 
7 7 46.1 
7 8 40.8 
7 9 38.6 
8 6 53.3 
8 7 40.9 
8 8 33.0 
8 9 28.2 
9 6 52.1 
9 7 38.7 
9 8 28.2 
9 9 20.7 
 
For this scenario, the following model parameters have been selected: 
 To capture the value of innovation, the instantaneous utility provided by a TRL 6-
instrument that offers performance improvement has been set to u0TRL6 = 2, while 
the instantaneous utility provided by a TRL 9-instrument has been set to u0TRL9 = 
1. 
 For both the visible imager and the infrared sensor, the average time to minor 
obsolescence state (defined as the time of emergence of an alternative technology 
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that allows to improve the image resolution by a factor of 2) has been set to 
MTT(mO) = 8 years.  
 For both the visible imager and the infrared sensor, the average time to major 
obsolescence state (defined as the time of emergence of an alternative technology 
that allows to improve the image resolution by a factor of 4) has been set to 
MTT(MO) = 15 years.  
 The decrease in utility when an instrument is at the minor obsolescence state is 
captured by the coefficient cmO = 0.5 that is multiplied to the instantaneous utility. 
Similarly, the decrease in utility when an instrument is at the major obsolescence 
state is captured by the coefficient cMO = 0.25 that is multiplied to the 
instantaneous utility. The instantaneous utility delivered by a state-of-the-art 
instrument is then taken as the reference, i.e., cSoA = 1. 
 
Figure 78 represents the average cumulative utility delivered by each series of spacecraft 




























































Figure 78. Mean cumulative utility delivered by a series of  2-instrument homogeneous spacecraft 
portfolios ([6 6] and [9 9] respectively) after ops = 15 years 
The analysis of Figure 78 shows how the choice of level of technology maturity (TRL) is 
contingent on the design lifetime considered. More specifically:  
 
 For Tlife < 3 years, series of spacecraft portfolios using more mature technologies 
(TRL 9) deliver on average more utility over a time span of 15 years than series 
of low-maturity (TRL 6) spacecraft portfolios.  
For those high-TRL portfolios series, the time-to-delivery of each subsequent 
spacecraft is relatively short, resulting in a rapid replacement of the previous 
spacecraft, thus guaranteeing a short (if any) discontinuation of service.  In addition, 
the rapid turnover of spacecraft (short design lifetime Tlife) allows more frequent 
technology refreshes, thus mitigating the impact of technology obsolescence. 
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 For Tlife > 3 years, series of spacecraft portfolios using more innovative but low-
maturity technologies (TRL 6) deliver on average more utility over a time span 
of 15 years than series of high-maturity (TRL 9) spacecraft portfolios. 
For those TRL 6-portfolio series, the innovative instruments offer performance 
improvements, resulting in a higher instantaneous utility delivered. No major 
discontinuation of service is experienced as the longer design lifetimes Tlife allow for 
longer delivery schedules for the replacement spacecraft. As a result of those two 
effects, TRL 6-portfolio series provide a higher cumulative utility over the 15-year 
time horizon. 
 
In this replacement scenario, optimal spacecraft portfolios series (on a utility basis) are 
therefore contingent on the design lifetime intended for each satellite, that is, the 
replacement frequency. Several technical and programmatic considerations (including 
cost) may lead towards the selection of one particular design lifetime. Outputs from the 
integrated model show that once this design lifetime is selected, there is a rational basis 
for the choice of the levels of technology maturity in the scenario described. 
6.7 Summary 
This chapter built on and refined the previous analyses developed in this thesis and 
presented an integrated framework that connected together the two main models 
presented in Chapter 3 and 5 (i.e.,  the model of spacecraft time-to-delivery and the 
model of on-orbit obsolescence). This complete framework allowed analyzing jointly the 
impact of design choices (materialized by the selection of portfolio characteristics) on the 
time-to-delivery TDs/c, the time-to-obsolescence Tobs of the spacecraft, and the resulting 
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implications in terms of cumulative utility delivered. This chapter then presented how the 
instantaneous instrument utilities could be tuned to capture the value of innovation as 
well as the impact of obsolescence. Results produced by the simulation tool/GUI 
developed for this thesis include schedule and utility outputs, full utility profiles for a 
given spacecraft portfolio and a series of spacecraft launched and replaced, based on the 
same portfolio configuration. Finally, two illustrative scenarios (science and defense 
missions) were investigated to show how the integrated framework developed in this 
thesis allows the exploration of the design space, the selection of design candidates based 
on the mission requirements, and the identification of trends to help conduct design trade-
offs.  
 
The next chapter summarizes the work conducted in this thesis and proposes new 




7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FUTURE WORK 
 
“Hâtez-vous lentement ; et, sans perdre courage, 
Vingt fois sur le métier remettez votre ouvrage. ” 
 “Hasten slowly, and without losing heart, 
Put your work twenty times upon the anvil.” 
 
Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux, French poet 
L'Art Poétique (The Art of Poetry), Canto I, l. 171, 1674 
 
7.1 Summary and contributions 
This thesis explored the temporal dimension of what could be referred to as 
“programmatic systems engineering” in the case of space systems. Risk has many 
dimensions, and generally, cost risk and technical risks are explored in traditional 
systems engineering. This thesis focused instead on the less frequently explored 
“temporal risks” and investigated two types of temporal risk faced by space systems, 
namely schedule risk or risk of a late system delivery, and the risk of on-orbit 
obsolescence. The purpose of the thesis was twofold: 1) to first identify and develop a 
thorough understanding of the fundamental causes of the risk of schedule slippage and 
obsolescence of space systems; and 2) in so doing, to guide spacecraft design choices that 




It was hypothesized (Hypothesis 1 and 4 in the Introduction) that certain architectural 
choices made during the design of space systems may be key determinants of their 
responsiveness (or lack thereof), schedule slippage and risk of obsolescence. To explore 
these hypotheses, stochastic models of those temporal risks were formulated around 
selected design parameters such as the size or number of key subsystems or instruments 
of a space system (as a proxy for complexity), the technology maturity of each subsystem 
(as measured by the Technology Readiness Level or TRL), the heterogeneity of the 
technology maturity of the whole system, and the spacecraft design lifetime. 
Furthermore, essential conceptual questions were contemplated in the form of Hypothesis 
2 and 3: can we conceive of and analyze a spacecraft as a portfolio of technologies? What 
implications would this have in terms of schedule risk, and what design choices can it 
help inform? To what extent, if any, is the current spacecraft design and optimization 
paradigm (clock-based) responsible for the issues of schedule slippages experienced in 
the space industry, and can an alternate paradigm be formulated to address these issues? 
 
These various research questions were motivated and investigated throughout each 
chapter of this thesis: 
Chapter 2 discussed the importance of responsiveness for the space industry, and 
provided a review and synthesis of the literature on responsive space and the 
challenge of keeping the development of space systems on schedule. A multi-
disciplinary framework was provided for thinking about and addressing issues of 
space responsiveness: it defined different levels or types of responsiveness (global, local 
and interactive), introduced tools for identifying and prioritizing responsiveness-
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improvement efforts (such as time compressibility metric and responsiveness maps), and 
identified “levers of space responsiveness” or practical means for improving space 
responsiveness. These include launch levers (vehicles and ranges), “soft” levers of 
responsiveness (selection processes, design reviews, acquisition policies, export control 
laws), and design-centric levers (modularity, complexity, technology maturity).  
 
Chapter 3 then addressed the limitations of the TRL scale at the system-level and 
explored the effects of other design parameters on spacecraft delivery schedule. To do so, 
Chapter 3 adapted the notion of portfolio developed by the R&D community to the 
micro-level of a single complex engineering system. Chapter 3 thus proposed to conceive 
of and analyze a spacecraft as a portfolio of technologies/instruments, whose 
characteristics were defined as the spacecraft size (e.g., number of instruments), the 
technology maturity of each instrument, and the resulting TRL heterogeneity of the 
portfolio. Chapter 3 introduced a stochastic model of spacecraft time-to-delivery 
constructed around the concept of spacecraft technology portfolio. This model 
explicitly estimated the duration of the Instruments development, the spacecraft 
Integration and Testing, and the spacecraft Shipping phases, by treating the respective 
durations as random variables. The resulting random variable Time-to-Delivery (along 
with its mean and dispersion) constituted one important characterization of space 
responsiveness and schedule risk. Through the variation of the portfolio characteristics, 
Chapter 3 investigated how the Mean-Time-To-Delivery (MTTD) of the spacecraft and 
schedule delivery risk are affected by the choice of the spacecraft technology portfolio. 
Finally, the utility implications of varying the portfolio characteristics and time-horizons 
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were explored, and “portfolio maps” were provided as guides to help system designers 
identify appropriate portfolio characteristics. Chapter 3 identified a critical paradigm 
shift needed for designing for responsiveness, by opposing the traditional clock-based 
mindset (in which utilities are calculated and compared after the launch) to a calendar-
based environment (i.e., for a given time-horizon after the start of development). Chapter 
3 emphasized the importance of clearly identifying which temporal mindset is more 
appropriate for a given situation (clock-based or calendar-based).  
 
Chapter 4 then presented another type of “temporal risk” faced by systems (including 
spacecraft), namely the risk of obsolescence, which has several implications after the 
system is produced (from a cost and utility standpoint). The purpose of Chapter 4 was to 
help improve the understanding of the phenomenon of obsolescence and to unveil its 
fundamental causes. It was showed that obsolescence involves the relationship of a 
stakeholder to the product over time, in a given environment, and was then formally 
defined as “the decline of value of a product over time, due to a change in the 
stakeholder’s expectations resulting from exogenous events”. Four main drivers of 
obsolescence were then identified: technological innovation, network externalities, 
regulatory changes and need disappearance. Finally, Chapter 4 examined how 
obsolescence has been traditionally approached and modeled in various disciplines, 
namely in economics, operations research, bibliometrics and engineering. Through this 
review, two main perspectives emerged: a decline-focused perspective, reflecting the rate 
of decline of product value over time, and an instant-focused perspective, reflecting the 
instant at which obsolescence starts or onset of obsolescence. The issues and notions 
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discussed in Chapter 4 paved the ground for the modeling of obsolescence of space 
systems conducted in Chapter 5. 
 
Chapter 5 shed some new light on the divergence of views concerning best practices for 
the design and development of space systems in relation to obsolescence and technology 
maturity. In several of its reports, the U.S Government Accountability Office 
recommended the inclusion of only mature technologies in acquisition programs, 
specifically with a TRL ≥ 7, in order to limit the likelihood of cost growth and schedule 
slippage. Although still committed to limiting the probability of cost overruns and 
schedule slippages, the U.S Department of Defense raised concerns about the likelihood 
of deploying space assets that may become rapidly obsolete on orbit. This reason can 
partially explain why the use of low-maturity technologies in acquisitions programs has 
persisted within the DOD. Chapter 5 proposed to provide new analytical answers to this 
argument (formulated by Hypothesis 4), by introducing the concept of “Risk of On-
Orbit Obsolescence”, a unique form of obsolescence faced by space systems resulting 
from their specificities (physical non-accessibility, long development schedule and 
extended design lifetimes). Specifically, a stochastic model of Risk of On-Orbit 
Obsolescence based on two Markov models was developed: the first capturing the drift 
of a space asset towards obsolescence, and the second simulating the technology 
maturation process using system-TRL as a yardstick. Three types of risks of on-orbit 
obsolescence were defined from the interaction of those two models: a Static Risk of On-
Orbit Obsolescence (SRO) that represents the overall risk that the spacecraft used over a 
given time-horizon will be obsolete while being on orbit; a (dynamic) Lifetime Risk of 
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On-Orbit Obsolescence (LRO) that informs about the instantaneous probability that a 
spacecraft will be obsolete at a given instant after it has been launched; finally a 
(dynamic) Calendar Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence (CRO) that represents the 
instantaneous conditional probability of the spacecraft of being obsolete, provided it is on 
orbit, at a given calendar date. These two definitions emphasized the importance of 
clearly defining the temporal mindset in which one operates to assess the evolution of the 
risk of obsolescence over time.  
 
Finally, Chapter 6 proposed to go beyond the initial system-centric evaluation of 
obsolescence of Chapter 5, by modeling the obsolescence phenomenon at the instrument 
(or subsystem) level. More importantly, it presented an integrated modeling framework 
that connects the instrument-centric obsolescence model to the model of spacecraft 
Time-to-Delivery based on the idea of spacecraft portfolio presented in Chapter 3. The 
resulting framework provided a powerful capability to simultaneously explore the 
impact of design decisions on spacecraft schedule, on-orbit obsolescence, and utility 
delivered over time. Figure 79 illustrates the new optimization horizons, or “augmented 
temporal dimension”, opened by this thesis, that the integrated framework of Chapter 6 
proved capable of exploring. When the design space is traditionally explored, many 
optimization tasks are typically conducted 
a. deterministically  
b. in a clock-based mindset that does not account for the time-to-delivery of the 
spacecraft (as discussed in Chapter 3) and  
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c. without reflecting the actual change of utility delivered by the spacecraft over 
time that results from on-orbit obsolescence or on-orbit failures.  
The new design mindset introduced in this thesis is  
d. stochastic, allowing the modeling of (various) uncertainties 
e. calendar-based (when appropriate); in other words, it accounts for the time-to-
delivery of the system  
f. capable of capturing changes of utility delivered by the spacecraft over time, 
resulting from temporal risks occurring during the lifetime of the spacecraft, such as 
























Figure 79. Calendar-based optimization of utility delivered under the risk of late delivery, on-orbit 
obsolescence and on-orbit failures (notional) 
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In this new design mindset, various combinations of the design parameters values or 
spacecraft portfolio characteristics will yield different utility profiles over time (with 
different time-to-delivery TDs/c, time-to-obsolescence Tobs and time-to-failure TF). As 
illustrated in Figure 79, some designs may result in a late delivery but a later onset of 
obsolescence, while some others may result in a shorter delivery but a more rapid 
obsolescence. 
 
In conclusion, the integrated framework fulfills the premise of the thesis of modeling 
and analyzing the temporal risks faced by space systems to help inform design 
decisions. The integrated framework allows the exploration of design options along 
this “augmented temporal dimension” and the identification of system design 
choices that satisfy various constraints and objectives, temporal (delivery 
times/dates) as well as utility-based.  
 
7.2 Review of hypotheses 
This section now revisits the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 1, in the light of the 
results obtained by the models presented throughout this dissertation. 
7.2.1 Hypothesis #1 
In addition to programmatic considerations, architectural choices and design parameters 
are key determinants of spacecraft delivery, schedule slippage and responsiveness (or 
lack thereof). 
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As a preliminary test of Hypothesis 1, Chapter 2 focused on one design-centric lever of 
responsiveness, namely the Technology Readiness Level. The univariate statistical 
analysis of schedule as a function of average system-TRL suggested that the overall level 
of technology maturity characterizing a space system at the start of its development 
has significant implications on schedule slippage and schedule risk. Specifically, it 
was shown that the average and dispersion of the schedule slippage increases when the 
system-TRL decreases, that is, with the use of low technology maturity.  
The results of the Monte-Carlo simulations of the stochastic model of spacecraft time-to-
delivery formulated in Chapter 3 then confirmed that the MTTD and schedule risk of 
the spacecraft increase when the initial TRL of the instruments is lower, and that, for 
a given maturity level, the MTTD of the spacecraft increases when the number of 
instruments increases. 
7.2.2 Hypothesis #2 
Conceiving of and analyzing a spacecraft as a technology portfolio (of 
instruments/subsystems) will reveal insights about spacecraft delivery schedule and 
responsiveness, and will help make better risk-informed design decisions (in particular 
with respect to schedule risk). 
Analyzing a spacecraft as a technology portfolio highlighted the combined effect of 
the instruments TRL and the number of instruments on schedule and 
responsiveness. Specifically: 
 The sensitivity of the MTTD to TRL increases when the number of instruments 
increases. 
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 The impact of an increase in number of instruments on MTTD is more significant at 
low TRL than at high TRL. 
TRL-schedule risk curves were then introduced to visualize and quantify schedule 
risk changes as a function of the spacecraft portfolio parameters. Finally, the MTTD 
was found to decrease as the heterogeneity of the technology maturity 
characterizing the portfolio (measured by the degree of TRL-heterogeneity) decreases. 
7.2.3 Hypothesis #3 
The current clock-based design optimization mindset is one major driver of the 
recurrent issues of schedule slippage. 
To address Hypothesis 3, Chapter 3 showed that the use of the clock-based optimization 
mindset results in the promotion of design choices that may ultimately jeopardize 
space responsiveness. Specifically, under the clock-based paradigm that does not 
account for the spacecraft delivery time, bigger spacecraft appear to deliver the most 
cumulative utility over time, despite being characterized by longer development 
schedules. On the other hand, under the calendar-based paradigm, optimal spacecraft 
portfolio (on a utility basis) are contingent on the time horizon of interest. For 
example, when operating in a calendar-based environment, larger spacecraft with more 
instruments are not necessarily providing more cumulative utility than smaller ones, as 
their delivery to the customer is more likely to be delayed.  
This comparison demonstrated that optimal design choices are different depending on 
the optimization mindset adopted. In particular, the calendar-based paradigm proved 
relevant to design for space responsiveness as it accounts for the time-to-delivery of the 
spacecraft. 
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7.2.4 Hypothesis #4 
The risk of on-orbit obsolescence is influenced by architectural choices and design 
parameters, and a trade-off exists between mitigating the risk of on-orbit 
obsolescence and schedule risk. 
It was shown that the overall risk that the spacecraft (or its instruments) becomes 
obsolete while it is on orbit, or static risk of on-orbit obsolescence (SRO), is reduced 
when the spacecraft design lifetime is reduced. 
When observed over the entire lifetime of the spacecraft (via the Lifetime Risk of On-
Orbit Obsolescence), it was then found that the risk of obsolescence is no more 
significant at high TRL than at low TRL. On the other hand, it was shown that when 
focusing on a given calendar date (via the Calendar Risk of On-Orbit Obsolescence), 
a lower initial risk of obsolescence may be obtained with low maturity technologies, 
provided the spacecraft is delivered early enough.  
Finally, obsolescence-schedule risk plots were introduced to explore situations in which 
a trade-off exists between schedule risk and the calendar risk of on-orbit 
obsolescence. Specifically, they allowed visualizing simultaneously the reduction of 
CRO and the increase of schedule risk with the use of lower technology maturity.   
 
7.3 Flexibility of the modeling framework 
The complete framework developed in this thesis possesses flexibility that manifests 
itself on various levels, as discussed below and summarized in Table 13: 
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 The modeling framework formulated in this work was applied to space systems, but is 
relevant to any complex engineering system that can be conceived of and analyzed as 
a portfolio of technologies. 
 
 A spacecraft “instrument” was considered the elementary constituent of the spacecraft 
portfolio, as it corresponds to an independent value-delivering subsystem of the 
spacecraft. This choice was motivated by the numerous analyses conducted in this 
work that focused on the utility provided by the spacecraft over time. Nevertheless, 
the framework remains valid if a more general definition of the spacecraft portfolio 
constituents is adopted, in which the main spacecraft subsystems in a broader sense 
(and not limited to payload instruments) are used. 
 
 Each portfolio instrument follows an individual technology maturation path, as well 
as an individual obsolescence path. While for each instrument, the states and 
transitions describing these paths were assumed to be identical (for the sake of 
simplicity), they need not be the same for each instrument. For example, technologies 
related to thermal systems may mature at a different pace than technologies related to 
structural systems. In other words, the specificities of a subsystem or instrument i can 
call for a “specialization of the path” to be followed by instrument/subsystem i. This 
can be performed by the addition or removal of states, and/or the use of specific 
temporal transitions that are deemed more appropriate for subsystem i. 
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 State transitions and enabling conditions (the “wiring” between the states) can be 
rearranged to reflect the degree of coupling between the various 
instruments/subsystems developments. For example, the complete maturation of one 
instrument may be contingent on the advancement of the development of another 
subsystem. The level of interdependence of the developments of each portfolio 
constituent constitutes an important modeling opportunity enabled by the framework 
flexibility.  
 
 Any well-defined period of the spacecraft lifecycle (whether it is during the 
development phase or during the operations phase) with a distinct and inherent 
amount of uncertainty can be defined as an individual state. Specifically: 
o The Integration & Testing, and shipping phases can be broken down into more 
elementary stages (and therefore states), provided schedule data is available to 
support the definition of the corresponding transitions 
o Additional states of obsolescence can be added to represent a more gradual 
decline of value 
o Each obsolescence state can be unfolded into different obsolescence states 
related to various drivers of obsolescence (e.g., technology innovation and 
standardization being treated as two separate sources of obsolescence), and 
thus governed by different dynamics.  
 
 While the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) metric was used to measure the 
advancement of the technology maturation process and to index the probability 
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distributions of schedule, any other metric of technology readiness could be 
implemented to complement or substitute the use of the TRL. 
 
Table 13. Summary of the flexibility features of the framework developed in this thesis 
Characteristic Flexibility feature 
Relevance 
Framework relevant to any complex engineering 
system that can be conceived of and analyzed as a 
portfolio of technologies 
Spacecraft portfolio 
constituents 
“Payload instrument” can be replaced by spacecraft 
subsystems in a broader sense 
Temporal paths 
Distinct temporal paths adapted to each portfolio 
constituent (subsystem or instrument) can be defined  
Modeling structure 
State transitions and enabling conditions can be 
rearranged to reflect different levels of dependence 
between the subsystems/instruments developments 
State-based representation 
Number of states can be modified based on scope of 
the analysis and data availability 
Metrics 
Any relevant metric of technology readiness can be 
implemented to complement or substitute the use of 







7.4 Recommendations for future work 
7.4.1 Data collection 
Limited TRL and schedule data is currently available to academia. Extensions to the 
work proposed in this thesis would highly benefit from an extended dataset to define 
transition laws guiding the technology maturation process as well as the subsequent 
phases of spacecraft development (e.g., integration and testing, shipping). This thesis 
advocates a systematic methodology to record and document the schedule of space 
projects in relation with design parameters including: 
At the mission level: 
 Projected dates of main reviews (such as Concept Study Report, Mission Design 
Review, Systems Requirement Review, Preliminary Design Review, Critical 
Design Review, Flight Readiness Review, etc.), key decision points and launch 
 Actual dates of main reviews, key decision points and launch 
At the subsystem level: 
 For each subsystem and payload instrument, initial TRL at a date defined as the 
starting point (Authority-to-Proceed, contract award, etc.) 
 For each subsystem and payload instrument, projected date of the consecutive 
transitions to the next TRL 
 For each subsystem and payload instrument, actual date of the consecutive 
transitions to the next TRL 
 
While this methodology may already be implemented (at least partly) in the industry or 
within government agencies like NASA and DOD, access to consistent data required for 
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any modeling and analysis task remains limited. The Cost Analysis Data Requirement 
(CADRe) initiative started by NASA in 2003 constitutes one step in that direction [206]. 
The guidelines for the responses to the Request For Information of the Astro 2010 
Decadal Survey made the comparisons presented in section 6.2.5 possible. It is the 
author’s wish that such recommendations become generalized to all proposals and 
documentation pertaining to the design and development of space systems. 
7.4.2 Beyond the limitations of the TRL metric 
Many models presented in this thesis used the TRL metric as a yardstick to estimate the 
duration of the development of subsystems (and more specifically, instruments) and of 
the entire spacecraft. Since its formulation within NASA in the 1980’s, various 
limitations of the TRL metric have however been identified, such as its intrinsic 
ambiguity [59,196,207]. Not only the sources of information may differ to evaluate the 
TRL of one technology, but also the interpretation of the information remains at least 
partly subjective, resulting in possible discrepancies in the TRL assessment of that 
technology.  In an effort to overcome this obstacle, the Air Force Research Laboratory 
developed a TRL Calculator to provide some guidance in the evaluation of the TRL of a 
technology [208]. Through various questions asked to the user about to the current status 
of the technology considered, AFRL’s TRL Calculator follows a systematic algorithm to 
determine the current TRL of the technology. Despite its explicit attempt to provide a 
rational basis for the assessment of a TRL, the TRL Calculator does not provide one 
unique and absolute answer as the user can choose to weight differently the various 
categories of questions asked. This raises the point that the residual ambiguity of the TRL 
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scale may never be eliminated, even by the most accurate and systematic assessment 
tools.  
 
It could be argued that part of the resulting uncertainty related to the ambiguity of the 
TRL may already be captured by the random nature of the schedule estimates indexed by 
TRL discussed in this thesis. However, one possible research direction to explore this 
further would be to attribute uncertainty to the TRL value itself. It is precisely the discrete 
nature of the TRL scale that makes it difficult to assign a TRL value to a technology 
whose maturity (or readiness level) may in actuality lies somewhere in between two 
values. Note that an intrinsic “fuzziness”, inherent to the difficulty of mapping subjective 
statements on technology maturity to numbers, may remain regardless of the metric (TRL 
or other) used to index the probability distributions describing the random variables of 
schedule. This fuzziness characterizing the level of maturity of a technology has to be 
distinguished from the “random” nature of the schedule estimates that have been indexed 
by the TRL (which results from unexpected, random events associated with technical, 
organizational, budget difficulties). In other words, it seems inadequate to consider that 
the level of maturity of a technology is “randomly” distributed between various values.  
 
In the light of these considerations, fuzzy theory may constitute a possible research 
direction to model the “fuzziness” of the maturity of one technology with respect to the 
9-level TRL scale commonly accepted. 
Fuzzy sets were introduced by Zadeh in 1965 [209] to extend our ordinary concept of sets 
and have since then generated significant interest in the field of mathematics and found 
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numerous applications in engineering, medicine, decision making, social sciences, etc. 
Traditional subsets A on a referential set E (e.g., R, Z or N) are called crisp sets and are 
typically represented by their characteristic function A that takes its values in {0,1}, as 
follows [210]: 
 














An ordinary number a is a crisp set reduced to a singleton {a}.  
A fuzzy set A can be defined through its membership function A, which, unlike the 
characteristic function of crisp sets formulated in Boolean algebra, takes its values in the 
entire interval [0,1]. (Crisp sets can thus be considered a special case of fuzzy sets). In 
other words, in traditional set theory, an element either belongs to the crisp set or does 
not. Figure 80 shows that an element can belong to a fuzzy set with various degrees of 









Figure 80. Crisp set and fuzzy set (notional) 
Kaufman and Gupta then define a fuzzy number as a fuzzy set whose membership 
function is convex and normal (i.e. the maximum value of the fuzzy set is 1) [210]. 
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Those concepts may prove useful to capture the intrinsic ambiguity of the TRL scale and 
the inherent subjectivity of TRL assessment. Instead of considering the TRL value of a 
given technology an ordinary number, it can be represented by a fuzzy number.  
For example, the proposition “TRL ~ 4” could be expressed by a fuzzy number such as 
the one represented in the left panel of Figure 81. The proposition “TRL ~4-5” could be 
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Figure 81. Possible Triangular Fuzzy Number (TFN) representation of TRL ~ 4 (left)  
and possible Trapezoidal Fuzzy Number (Tr.FN) representation of TRL ~ 4-5 (right) 
 
Expert elicitation can be used to provide different estimations of the TRL of each 
technology. Several techniques have been proposed to create the fuzzy number resulting 
from the aggregation of each expert contribution [211], including the Fuzzy Delphi 
Method (F.D.M) [212]. 
Once a membership function has been defined for each technology of the spacecraft 
portfolio, one important task that remains is to find the proper definition of the 
probability density function describing the time-to-delivery of the spacecraft that is 
indexed by the fuzzy number associated to the technology. The fields of fuzzy sets (or 
“possibility theory”) and probabilities are rich in concepts and analytical tools that could 
serve this endeavor if combined together.   
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7.4.3 Further investigation of time to system integration and testing 
The integrated framework proposed in Chapter 6 uses probability distributions for the 
random variable time-to-integration and test Tint similar to those presented in section 
3.4.2. These lognormal distributions were indexed by the portfolio characteristic number 
of instruments ninst, with larger spacecraft portfolios having longer average integration 
and testing times and higher variability in that variable. It is worth exploring further the 
different architectural and technical factors involved in the integration and testing phase. 
Specifically, one could consider to “unfold” the I&T state of the integrated framework 
(see Figure 69) to exhibit the different interactions between subsystems/technologies. In 
that case, a metric similar to the IRL metric discussed in section 2.7.2 could serve as a 
yardstick to model the integration of various combinations of instruments (or 
subsystems), in the same way that the TRL metric was used to index the probability 
distributions of instrument delivery schedule. This constitutes an important area of further 
improvement of the current framework, provided that data that relates IRL (or any other 
integration metric) to the duration of the integration and testing phase can be collected in 
the future.  
7.4.4 Impact of resource allocations 
The analyses conducted for this thesis were made with the assumption that resources 
(e.g., budget, workforce) were fixed. Recall the compressibility metric defined in section 
2.4.1 : 









Through the definition of  and the formulation of responsiveness maps, Chapter 2 
identified resources as a key factor impacting responsiveness. The integrated framework 
presented in Chapter 6 could be extended to include for example a variable representative 
of the budget allocated to the project. Ramirez-Marquez and Sauser [58] addressed a 
similar problem and proposed an approach based on the IRL and SRL metrics (discussed 
in section 2.7) and the estimation of resource consumption for each integration effort 
(i.e., cost and time needed to transition from TRL j to TRL j+1 and from IRL k to IRL 
k+1). Their approach allows for the prediction of the maximum maturity that can be 
reached based on the resources allocated to the project. Recall that this thesis was 
concerned with the modeling of the spacecraft time-to-delivery, and assumed that 
systems are deployed once full maturity is reached. In this situation, the use of the 
compressibility metric  at several stages of the lifecycle of the spacecraft (e.g., 
instruments development, integration & testing) could provide an opportunity to change 
the transition probabilities (i.e., the duration of the transition) from one state to the next, 
as a function of the allocated budget.  
This refinement could be performed in two ways: 
 in a static manner: the budget is assumed to be allocated at the start of the 
development and remains constant over time.  
 in a dynamic manner: the budget fluctuates according to funding profiles that 
“update” the transition probabilities in real time. 
This thesis recognizes the importance of resource allocation for responsiveness and 
considers this issue an important research direction for future work. The relevance and 
validity of any modeling effort of resource impact on responsiveness (captured through 
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expediting maturity transitions for example) will be contingent on the availability and 
collection of the appropriate data. 
7.4.5 Implications of on-orbit obsolescence 
In Chapter 6, the impact of obsolescence was modeled via a reduction of the 
instantaneous utility delivered by the instruments going obsolete. As highlighted in 
Chapter 5, obsolescence is a significant problem for space systems, and presents major 
consequences that extend beyond the reduction of utility delivered. Several directions can 
be explored to refine the modeling of obsolescence and its implications for the design of 
space systems. Because ground systems are so tied to technologies that are flown onboard 
a spacecraft, there exists a cost and time penalty in upgrading technologies on the ground 
to support future spacecraft using innovative technologies. The cost dimension was not 
explored in this thesis; there are however opportunities to model the implications of on-
orbit obsolescence in addition to the reduction of utility. The issue is particularly relevant 
when using the integrated framework for a series of spacecraft (through consecutive 
replacements, as illustrated in section 6.6.3.2), and further refinements could include: 
 
 Extending the integrated framework to include ground nodes as part as the total 
system delivering utility. Those ground nodes would also face obsolescence, but 
unlike spacecraft, could be upgraded to restore modernity. In a state-based 
representation, this would correspond to the modeling of a transition from an 
obsolescence state to the State-of-the-Art state, with a “time-to-restore” of the ground 
node.  The delivery of utility could result from the joint operation of spacecraft 
instruments and ground nodes. 
 268
 Revising the replacement policy presented in section 6.4.2 to capture the time penalty 
of upgrading technologies on the ground. For example, if instrument j on spacecraft 
of generation#1 becomes obsolete while it is on orbit, it can be decided to upgrade the 
ground installations to accommodate a new type of technology for instrument j of the 
replacement spacecraft (generation #2). Completion of the technology refresh of the 
ground installations could be modeled as an enabling condition for the development 
of the replacement spacecraft, thus potentially increasing its time-to-delivery.  
 To explore the cost dimension, costs can be assigned not only to each transition of the 
spacecraft development module (instruments development, integration & testing, 
shipping), but also to the upgrades of ground installations. Such transitions can be 
activated only if the cost profile of the entire system {ground + spacecraft} remains 
under the resource profile proposed in section 7.4.4. In other words, the use of state-
of-the-art technologies for replacement spacecraft (which was an assumption of the 
integrated framework), could be contingent on the difference between available 
resources and upgrade costs.  
7.4.6 Concurrent development of design alternatives and implications for spacecraft 
time-to-delivery 
The integrated framework currently uses a single design as a starting point. In other 
words, a single spacecraft portfolio gets carried over throughout the various states 
constituting the development and operations modules. The current model could be 
extended to concurrently consider alternate technology options that represent “design 
contingency plans” or “design backup paths”. The impact of the pursuit of simultaneous 
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design alternatives on the responsiveness of the delivery of capability can then be 
assessed. 
For example, spacecraft portfolio Pf =  [4 9 7 9] is being developed but program 
managers decide to also pursue the development of an alternate instrument #1 at TRL = 6 
instead of TRL = 4. If technical difficulties emerge, resulting in the excessive 
consumption of resources (budget and/or time), managers may decide to replace the 
TRL-4 instrument by the TRL-6 instrument in the initial design. What are the time 
savings associated with the adoption of this “contingency plan”? What are the potential 
difficulties (and thus time penalties) that may emerge from a systems engineering 
perspective, if the design must now accommodate the TRL-6 instrument? Those are 
questions that can be further explored if concurrent development of design alternatives is 
investigated. 
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APPENDIX A: LOGNORMAL PROBABILITY PLOTS FOR 
THE MODEL OF SPACECRAFT TIME-TO-DELIVERY 
 
This appendix provides a justification of the use of lognormal distributions for the three 
main modules of the model of spacecraft time-to-delivery developed in Chapter 3, 
namely the model of Instruments Delivery Schedule [Eq. (3.2)], the model of Integration 
& Testing Schedule, Tint [Eq. (3.6)], and the model of the spacecraft shipping time Tship 
[Eq. (3.8)]. 
 
To test the appropriateness of lognormal distributions for these schedule-related random 
variables, the data is here displayed in what is referred to in statistics as “probability 
plots”. Probably plots provide a quick and efficient visual test of whether data or 
observations of a random variable arise from a particular parametric distribution (e.g., 
exponential, lognormal), or if the considered parametric distribution is a good 
approximation (or mathematical model) for the data. Typically, values of the random 
variable of interest would be represented along the x-axis, while the cumulative 
probabilities associated with these values would span the y-axis. Probably plots however 
introduce a simple and most useful variation to this graphical representation: instead of 
these variables, a probability plot represents a particular change of variables such that, if 
the empirical data is aligned in say a lognormal probability plot, then the data indeed 
arises from a lognormal distribution or can be properly approximated by a lognormal 
distribution. The details of the particular change of variables can be found in various 
statistical analysis textbooks [213,214], and the specifics of Weibull probability plots are 
 271
discussed in a paper by Castet and Saleh [215]. For each of the three modules of the 
model of spacecraft time-to-delivery TDs/c, the lognormal probability plots are provided 
in the following sections, based on the data available (limited in some cases) to justify the 
use of lognormal distributions as good approximation for the input random variables. 
 
Integration & Testing phase duration 
Figure 82 shows lognormal probability plots for the data set of 21 NASA spacecraft used 
in section 3.4.2 to model the duration of the Integration & Testing phase. When all 
portfolio sizes are considered, the left plot of Figure 82 reveals that with the exception of 
one outlier, a lognormal distribution is an acceptable model of the I&T phase. Recall 
though that for each value of the portfolio size, a specific lognormal distribution was 
used, as described in Eqs (3.6) and (3.7). For example, consider the case ninst = 3 
instruments: for this subset of spacecraft, the right plot of Figure 82 provides a lognormal 








































Figure 82. Lognormal probability plot for duration of Integration & Testing 
(left: all portfolio sizes; right: only ninst = 3) 
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As a result, lognormal distributions for the I&T phase (based on the available data of the 
21 NASA spacecraft used in this paper) are good approximations for the duration of this 
phase. More formal methods for the justification of the lognormal distribution are not 
relevant for the purpose of this thesis, but they would constitute useful future work if a 
larger dataset was available. 
 
Spacecraft Shipping phase duration 
In section 3.4.3, the duration of the shipping phase was modeled using a single lognormal 
distribution. Figure 83 shows the corresponding lognormal probability plot for the 21 
spacecraft of the dataset. The data seems roughly aligned for the larger durations; a 
noticeable divergence from a pure lognormal distribution is however visible for four data 
points with the shortest durations of shipping. While these data points cannot be ruled out 
as outliers, their parametric modeling requires advanced statistical techniques that are 






















Figure 83. Lognormal probability plot for duration of Shipping 
 273
To confirm the visual inspection of Figure 83, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness of fit 
test can be performed. The set used to calibrate the model of shipping time included  
m = 21 data points. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic is: 
 )()(sup tFtFD m
t
m   (A.1)
where Fm represents the empirical cumulative distribution function of shipping time (i.e., 
from the dataset) and F is the underlying cumulative distribution function. In section 
3.4.3, the modeled cumulative distribution function was chosen to be described by the 
lognormal function of Eq. 3.8. Figure 84 shows both cumulative distribution functions, 
from the data (empirical) and from the model of shipping time.  
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Figure 84. Comparison between the empirical cumulative distribution function from the data and the 
cumulative distribution function of the model of shipping time 
 
For each “step” of the empirical function, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test considers the 
difference between the value of the model c.d.f and the upper and lower values of the 
empirical c.d.f. The resulting statistic is the maximum of all those differences. With the 
21 data points from the sample and the inferred distribution of Eq. 3.8, the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistic for the duration of the shipping phase is found to be Dm = 0.1593. For  
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m = 21, tables of Kolmogorov-Smirnov critical values [203] show that for a level of 
confidence 1– = 0.90, the null hypothesis that the underlying c.d.f F(t) is the modeled 
function is not rejected. 
 
In conclusion, while it is not claimed herein that the lognormal distribution is the ideal 
parametric distribution to model the duration of the shipping phase, it provides 
nevertheless a reasonable approximation of the duration of this phase. 
 
Development schedule in relation with TRL 
Very limited schedule data in relation to TRL exist in the literature. For this reason, the 
data presented in section 2.6.1 is used to provide an indication of schedule distribution in 
relation to technology maturity. This data set included 28 NASA spacecraft for which 
total schedule duration as well as average system-TRL were available. The left plot of 
Figure 85 represents a lognormal probability plot for the total schedule of all the NASA 
spacecraft, regardless of the initial system-TRL. As a preliminary result, this figure 
shows that lognormal distribution is a legitimate model of the total schedule of spacecraft 
development in a general sense.  
 
Furthermore, this assumption remains valid when subcategories of spacecraft based on 
initial technology maturity are considered. As an example, the right plot of Figure 85 
shows a lognormal probability plot for the subset of spacecraft characterized by an 
average TRL value of 5. The fairly good alignment of the data points with the lognormal 














































Figure 85. Lognormal probability plot for total schedule (left: all TRLs; right: only systems with 
system-TRL = 5) 
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APPENDIX B: ALGORITHMIC STRUCTURE 
 
In an effort to enhance the transparency of the study conducted for this thesis and  to 
facilitate the replication of the results, this appendix now presents the algorithmic 
structure of the main functions and scripts used to perform the calculations and analysis 
presented previously. 
The following list describes the different input and output variables used by the main 
scripts and functions: 
ops  = time-horizon of a calendar-based analysis 
dt  = time step of the simulation (here, dt = 1 month) 
Tclock  = time span of a clock-based analysis (after launch) 
ncases  = number of Monte-Carlo cases 
ninst  = number of instruments or portfolio size 
cSoA  = obsolescence coefficient for utility delivered at State-of-the-Art state 
cmO  = obsolescence coefficient for utility delivered at minor Obsolescence 
state 
cMO  = obsolescence coefficient for utility delivered at Major Obsolescence 
state 
Risk level  = Risk level for schedule risks as described in section 3.4.7 
Pf  = spacecraft portfolio vector as described in section 3.4.1.2 
û0  = instantaneous utility vector as described by equation 6.12 
Tlife  = spacecraft design lifetime 
MTT(SoAimOi) = mean-time-to-minor Obsolescence from SoA for instrument i 
MTT(SoAiMOi) = mean-time-to-Major Obsolescence from SoA for instrument i 
MTT(mOiMOi) = mean-time-to-Major Obsolescence from mO for instrument i 
i  = shape parameter for failure model of instrument i 
i  = scale parameter for failure model of instrument i 
TDs/c  = spacecraft time-to-delivery (random variable) 
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MTTDs/c  = spacecraft Mean-Time-to-Delivery 
uj(t)  = utility profile delivered by instrument j 
uSC(t)  = utility profile delivered by entire spacecraft 
uSC
k(t)  = utility profile delivered by spacecraft of generation k 
uSC
series(t)  = utility profile delivered by series of spacecraft 
t*k  = instant of development start (or ATP) of spacecraft of generation k 
(Pf)  = degree of TRL-heterogeneity of portfolio Pf 
TRL  =  average TRL of a spacecraft portfolio 
utotSC  = total cumulative utility delivered by a spacecraft 
 
Basic simulation for a given spacecraft portfolio configuration 
Figure 86 represents the structure of a basic simulation for a given portfolio Pf, using the 
integrated framework from command line or Graphical User Interface (presented in 
section 6.5.3). Two main functions are responsible for the execution of the Monte-Carlo 
simulation: MC_modelPf.m (for a calendar-based simulation) or 
MC_modelPfclock.m (for a clock-based simulation). For the calculation of the 
spacecraft time-to-delivery as described in section 6.2, three functions are used to 
compute the duration of each of the three main schedule phases (namely, 
InstTtoIdel.m for the Instruments Development, SC_IandT.m for the spacecraft 
Integration & Testing, and SC_shipping.m for the spacecraft Shipping). It is in those 
three functions that historical data is entered to estimate the duration of each schedule 
phase. The resulting output is the spacecraft time-to-delivery TDs/c. 
The operations module (as described in section 6.3) is then implemented via two main 
functions, Obsoltimes.m to calculate the transition times to obsolescence states for 
each instrument, and Ftimes.m to calculate the transition times to failure state for each 
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instrument. The utility profiles uj(t) delivered by each instrument are then constructed 
based on all the random obsolescence and failure times, and are finally aggregated to 
form the utility profile delivered by the spacecraft uSC(t).  
The repetition of the process ncases times constitutes the Monte-Carlo simulation that 
produces distributions for the spacecraft time-to-delivery and total cumulative utility 



























































Figure 86. Basic simulation using the integrated framework for a given portfolio configuration (using 
command or GUI) 
 
Basic simulation for a series of spacecraft based on given portfolio  
Figure 87 represents the structure of a basic simulation for a series of spacecraft designed 
around a given portfolio configuration, following the replacement strategy discussed in 
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section 6.4.2. The instant of development start (or ATP) of spacecraft of generation k t*k 

























































Pf = [TRL1 TRL2 … TRLn]
û0 = [û1 û2 … ûn]
Tlife
 )(/)(/**1 ,0max kcslifekcskk TDTTDtt 
 
Figure 87. Basic simulation using the integrated framework for a series of spacecraft based on a 
given portfolio configuration 
 
Impact of TRL and portfolio size on spacecraft time-to-delivery 
(homogeneous TRL cases)  
Figure 88 illustrates the basic algorithm used to investigate the impact of TRL and 
portfolio size on spacecraft time-to-delivery, for homogeneous TRL cases (as discussed 
in section 3.5.1). For each value of the common TRL and the number of instruments, the 
function MC_modelPf.m is called to perform the Monte-Carlo simulation and to 
produce the distribution of the spacecraft time-to-delivery TDs/c. When all values of the 
common TRL and portfolio size have been treated, plots that show the joint impact of 
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portfolio characteristics (TRL and number of instruments) on MTTD and schedule risk 
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Figure 88. Algorithm used to investigate the impact of common TRL and portfolio size on spacecraft 
time-to-delivery (illustrative) 
 
Impact of the degree of TRL-heterogeneity on MTTD 
Figure 89 illustrates the basic algorithm used to investigate the impact of the degree of 
TRL-heterogeneity on the MTTD (as discussed in section 3.5.2). For each value of the 
average portfolio TRL TRL and the number of instruments ninst, a set of possible 
portfolios is constituted and the degree of TRL-heterogeneity  for each possible 
portfolio is calculated. For each possible portfolio, the function MC_modelPf.m is then 
called to perform the Monte-Carlo simulation and produce the distribution of the 
spacecraft time-to-delivery TDs/c. When all portfolio combinations with a mean TRL 
 281
TRL and a number of instruments ninst have been evaluated, plots that show the impact of 
the degree of TRL-heterogeneity on MTTD can be generated for the values of TRL and 



























































Figure 89. Algorithm used to investigate the impact of TRL heterogeneity on MTTD (illustrative) 
 
Identification of optimal portfolios in calendar-based vs. clock-based 
optimization mindset 
Figure 90 illustrates the basic algorithm used to identify the optimal portfolios depending 
on the time horizon ops considered (in a calendar-based optimization mindset) or the 
number of years after launch Tclock (in a clock-based optimization mindset), as discussed 
in section 3.6. For example, in the homogeneous TRL case, a value of the common TRL 
is first selected. For each value of the time-horizon ops and the number of instruments 
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ninst, the cumulative utility delivered over time by each spacecraft portfolio (i.e., for each 
portfolio size) is evaluated by the function MC_modelPf.m (in the calendar-based 
optimization mindset) or the function MC_modelPfclock.m (in the clock-based 
optimization mindset). Plots that represent the average cumulative utility delivered by the 
spacecraft for each portfolio size can then be generated (such as Figure 30), to identify 
the optimal portfolio size (on a utility basis) depending on the design optimization 
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Figure 90. Influence of the time horizon on the optimal portfolios (on a utility basis) 
 
Visualization of all portfolios 
For a given value of the time horizon ops or time after launch Tclock, Figure 91 illustrates 
the basic algorithm used to evaluate all portfolios combinations, their associated MTTD, 
schedule risk and cumulative utility. For each value of the portfolio size ninst, all portfolio 
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combinations are first generated. For each portfolio configuration, the distributions of 
spacecraft time-to-delivery and the cumulative utility over a period of time are then 
generated via a call of the function MC_modelPf.m (in the calendar-based 
optimization mindset) or the function MC_modelPfclock.m (in the clock-based 
optimization mindset). The MTTD, schedule risk and average cumulative utility can then 
be computed. The results can finally be visualized on plots that show all spacecraft 
portfolio configurations, their MTTD or schedule risk against the average cumulative 
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Figure 91. Visualization of all portfolios and their associated MTTD, schedule risk and cumulative 
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